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Profile: J David Velleman (New York University)
  1. J. David Velleman (1996). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
  2. J. David Velleman (1999). Love as a Moral Emotion. Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
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  3. J. David Velleman (1992). What Happens When Someone Acts? Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
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  4. Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1989). Color as a Secondary Quality. Mind 98 (January):81-103.
  5. J. David Velleman (1997). How To Share An Intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29 - 50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...)
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  6. J. David Velleman (1992). The Guise of the Good. Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
    The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...)
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  7. J. David Velleman (2001). The Genesis of Shame. Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (1):27-52.
  8. J. David Velleman (2003). Narrative Explanation. Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
  9. J. David Velleman (2007). What Good is a Will? In Anton Leist & Holger Baumann (eds.), Action in Context. de Gruyter/Mouton.
    As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good. When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way (...)
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  10. J. David Velleman (1991). Well-Being and Time. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):48-77.
  11. J. David Velleman (1999). A Right of Self‐Termination? Ethics 109 (3):606-628.
  12.  64
    Velleman J. David (1996). Self to Self. Philosophical Review 105 (1):39 - 76.
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  13. J. David Velleman (2005). Family History. Philosophical Papers 34 (3):357-378.
    Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.
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  14. J. David Velleman (2013). Foundations for Moral Relativism. OpenBook Publishers.
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual (...)
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  15. Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1991). Physicalist Theories of Color. Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.
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  16. J. David Velleman (2005). The Self as Narrator. In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  17.  14
    J. David Velleman, Love as a Moral Emotion.
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  18. Margaret Gilbert, Andrew Mason, Elizabeth S. Anderson, J. David Velleman, Matthew H. Kramer, Michele M. Moody‐Adams & Martha C. Nussbaum (1999). 10. Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy (Pp. 454-456). Ethics 109 (2).
     
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  19.  47
    Thomas Hofweber & J. David Velleman, How to Endure.
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  20.  83
    J. David Velleman (1985). Practical Reflection. Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
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  21. J. David Velleman (2005). Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  22. J. David Velleman (2008). The Way of the Wanton. In Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.
    Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of action as a prolegomenon to the Zhuangzi.
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  23. J. David Velleman (1992). Against the Right to Die. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (6):665-681.
    How a "right to die" may become a "coercive option".
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  24. J. David Velleman, On the Aim of Belief.
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  25. J. David Velleman (1999). A Rational Superego. Philosophical Review 108 (4):529 - 558.
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  26. J. David Velleman (1997). Deciding How to Decide. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 29--52.
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  27. J. David Velleman (2000). From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy. Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):349-377.
    I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming along (...)
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  28. J. David Velleman & Thomas Hofweber (2011). How to Endure. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):37 - 57.
    The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than (...)
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  29. J. David Velleman (2013). Sociality and Solitude. Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):324-335.
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  30. Herlinde Pauer-Studer & J. David Velleman (2011). Distortions of Normativity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):329-356.
    We discuss some implications of the Holocaust for moral philosophy. Our thesis is that morality became distorted in the Third Reich at the level of its social articulation. We explore this thesis in application to several front-line perpetrators who maintained false moral self-conceptions. We conclude that more than a priori moral reasoning is required to correct such distortions.
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  31. J. David Velleman (2008). The Identity Problem. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):221 - 244.
  32.  31
    J. David Velleman (1988). Brandt's Definition of "Good". Philosophical Review 97 (3):353-371.
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  33. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Dan W. Brock, Paul J. Weithman, Gerald Dworkin, F. M. Kamm, J. David Velleman & Ezekiel J. Emanuel (1999). 10. Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism (Pp. 668-671). [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (3).
     
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  34. J. David Velleman (1989). Epistemic Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
    Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm anyone of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. This paper sketches a potential explanation for our feeling of freedom. The freedom that I postulate is not causal but epistemic (in a sense that I shall define), and the result is that it is quite compatible with determinism. I (...)
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  35. J. David Velleman (1999). The Voice of Conscience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):57–76.
    I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must sound - that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of moral (...)
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  36. J. David Velleman (2008). Love and Nonexistence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):266-288.
    This is the second of three papers on issues of personal identity, existence, and nonexistence. Here I argue that the birth of a child leads us to before and after value judgments that appear to be inconsistent. Consider, for example, a 14-year-old girl who decides to have a baby. We tend to think that the birth of a child to a 14-year-old would be a very unfortunate event, and hence that she should not decide to have a child. But once (...)
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  37. J. David Velleman (2013). Doables. Philosophical Explorations (1):1-16.
    Just as our scientific inquiries are framed by our prior conception of what can be observed ? that is, of observables ? so our practical deliberations are framed by our prior conception of what can be done, that is, of doables. And doables are socially constructed, with the result that they vary between societies. I explore how doables are constructed and conclude with some remarks about the implications for moral relativism.
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  38. J. David Velleman (1993). The Story of Rational Action. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):229-254.
    Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the theory are embodied in a single mathematical proof. The problem in the foundations of decision theory is to explain how elements of one and the same proof can serve both functions. I hope to solve this problem in a way that anchors the decision-theoretic norms of rational preference in fundamental intuitions about rationality (...)
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  39. J. David Velleman (2005). Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason. Philosophical Studies 121 (3):225 - 238.
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  40.  10
    J. David Velleman (2004). Willing the Law J. David Velleman. In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27.
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  41.  53
    J. David Velleman (2012). Dying. Think 11 (32):29-32.
    Some people hope to die in their sleep. Not me. I don't regret having been oblivious at my birth, but I don't want death to catch me napping.
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    J. David Velleman (2008). III. Love and Nonexistence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):266-288.
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  43.  1
    J. David Velleman & Michael E. Bratman (1991). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Philosophical Review 100 (2):277.
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  44.  6
    Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman, Colour as a Secondard Quality.
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  45. Dudley Knowles & J. David Velleman (1990). Practical Reflection. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):524.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
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    Stephen Darwall & J. David Velleman (2001). New Model Publishing. The Philosophers' Magazine 14 (14):11-12.
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    J. David Velleman (2001). Review of Faces of Intention by Michael Bratman. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202).
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  48.  2
    Roderick T. Long & J. David Velleman (1992). Practical Reflection. Philosophical Review 101 (4):903.
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    J. David Velleman (2003). XIV. Don't Worry, Feel Guilty. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:235-248.
    One can feel guilty without thinking that one actually is guilty of moral wrongdoing. For example, one can feel guilty about eating an ice cream or skipping aerobics, even if one doesn't take a moralistic view of self-indulgence. And one can feel guilty about things that aren't one's doing at all, as in the case of survivor's guilt about being spared some catastrophe suffered by others. Guilt without perceived wrongdoing may of course be irrational, but I think it is sometimes (...)
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    J. David Velleman (2007). Reply to Catriona MacKenzie. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):283 – 290.
    In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept 'self' is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled 'The Centered Self') and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in 'The Self (...)
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