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J. David Velleman
New York University
  1. The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
  2. How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
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  3. Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
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  4. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
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  5. How We Get Along.J. David Velleman - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational grounds (...)
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  6.  32
    Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman & Michael E. Bratman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277.
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  7. Color as a Secondary Quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.
  8. Narrative Explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
  9. The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
    The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...)
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  10. Well-Being and Time.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):48-77.
  11. How to Endure.J. David Velleman & Thomas Hofweber - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):37 - 57.
    The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than (...)
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  12. What Good is a Will?J. David Velleman - 2007 - In Anton Leist & Holger Baumann (eds.), Action in Context. de Gruyter/Mouton.
    As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good. When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way (...)
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  13. The Genesis of Shame.J. David Velleman - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (1):27-52.
  14.  82
    Self to Self: Selected Essays.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual as (...)
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  15.  83
    Self to Self.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):39 - 76.
  16. Family History.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):357-378.
    Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.
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  17. A Right of Self‐Termination?J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3):606-628.
  18.  1
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
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  19. The Self as Narrator.J. David Velleman - 2005 - In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  20. Physicalist Theories of Color.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.
  21. Against the Right to Die.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (6):665-681.
    How a "right to die" may become a "coercive option".
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  22. 10. Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy (Pp. 454-456).Margaret Gilbert, Andrew Mason, Elizabeth S. Anderson, J. David Velleman, Matthew H. Kramer, Michele M. Moody‐Adams & Martha C. Nussbaum - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2).
     
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  23. Foundations for Moral Relativism.J. David Velleman - 2013 - OpenBook Publishers.
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual (...)
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  24.  98
    Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
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  25. The Way of the Wanton.J. David Velleman - 2008 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.
    Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of action as a prolegomenon to the Zhuangzi.
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  26.  3
    Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.
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  27. A Rational Superego.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):529 - 558.
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  28. The Identity Problem.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):221 - 244.
  29. From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14 (s14):349-377.
    I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming along (...)
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  30. Distortions of Normativity.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & J. David Velleman - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):329-356.
    We discuss some implications of the Holocaust for moral philosophy. Our thesis is that morality became distorted in the Third Reich at the level of its social articulation. We explore this thesis in application to several front-line perpetrators who maintained false moral self-conceptions. We conclude that more than a priori moral reasoning is required to correct such distortions.
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  31.  4
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.
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  32. Sociality and Solitude.J. David Velleman - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):324-335.
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  33. Deciding How to Decide.J. David Velleman - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 29--52.
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  34. Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  35. On the Aim of Belief.J. David Velleman - manuscript
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  36. Epistemic Freedom.J. David Velleman - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
    Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm anyone of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. This paper sketches a potential explanation for our feeling of freedom. The freedom that I postulate is not causal but epistemic (in a sense that I shall define), and the result is that it is quite compatible with determinism. I (...)
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  37.  49
    How to Endure.Thomas Hofweber & J. David Velleman - unknown
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  38. The Voice of Conscience.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):57–76.
    I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must sound - that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of moral (...)
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  39.  50
    Brandt's Definition of "Good".J. David Velleman - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):353-371.
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  40. 10. Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism (Pp. 668-671). [REVIEW]Judith Jarvis Thomson, Dan W. Brock, Paul J. Weithman, Gerald Dworkin, F. M. Kamm, J. David Velleman & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3).
  41.  5
    Practical Reflection.Dudley Knowles & J. David Velleman - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):524.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
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  42. Love and Nonexistence.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):266-288.
    This is the second of three papers on issues of personal identity, existence, and nonexistence. Here I argue that the birth of a child leads us to before and after value judgments that appear to be inconsistent. Consider, for example, a 14-year-old girl who decides to have a baby. We tend to think that the birth of a child to a 14-year-old would be a very unfortunate event, and hence that she should not decide to have a child. But once (...)
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  43.  2
    How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
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  44. Doables.J. David Velleman - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations (1):1-16.
    Just as our scientific inquiries are framed by our prior conception of what can be observed ? that is, of observables ? so our practical deliberations are framed by our prior conception of what can be done, that is, of doables. And doables are socially constructed, with the result that they vary between societies. I explore how doables are constructed and conclude with some remarks about the implications for moral relativism.
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    Narrative Explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
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  46. Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):225 - 238.
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  47. The Story of Rational Action.J. David Velleman - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):229-254.
    Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the theory are embodied in a single mathematical proof. The problem in the foundations of decision theory is to explain how elements of one and the same proof can serve both functions. I hope to solve this problem in a way that anchors the decision-theoretic norms of rational preference in fundamental intuitions about rationality (...)
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  48.  1
    Motivation by Ideal.J. David Velleman - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89-103.
    I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things.
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  49.  34
    III. Love and Nonexistence.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):266-288.
  50.  75
    Dying.J. David Velleman - 2012 - Think 11 (32):29-32.
    Some people hope to die in their sleep. Not me. I don't regret having been oblivious at my birth, but I don't want death to catch me napping.
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