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J. Dmitri Gallow
University of Pittsburgh
  1.  48
    Causation, Production, and Dependence, or A Model-Invariant Theory of Causation.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    I provide a theory of causation formulated within the causal modeling framework. This theory is model-invariant in the following sense: if the theory says that C caused (didn't cause) E in a causal model, M, then it will continue to say that C caused (didn't cause) E once we've removed an inessential variable from M. On this theory, we can understand causation as a model-invariant generalization of a relation of causal production. Begin by saying that C produces E iff they (...)
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  2.  26
    Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    The internalist says that your evidence can never fail to tell you what your total evidence is. If your total evidence is e, then you must have the evidence that your total evidence is e. The externalist denies this. An update is a strategy for revising your degrees of belief, or credences, in response to the outcome of an experiment. The internalist has their update: upon learning e, adopt your pre-experimental credences conditional on e. This is the rule of conditionalization. (...)
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  3.  30
    A Subjectivist's Guide to Deterministic Chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    I present an account of deterministic chance which takes, as its jumping-off point, the physico-mathematical approach to theorizing about deterministic chance known as 'the method of arbitrary functions'. This approach promisingly yields deterministic probabilities which align with what we take the chances to be---it tells us that there is approximately a 1/2 probability of a spun roulette wheel stopping on black, and approximately a 1/2 probability of a flipped coin landing heads up---but it requires some probabilistic materials to work with. (...)
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  4.  25
    The Causal Decision Theorist's Guide to Managing the News.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscript
    Causal decision theorists say that the good news an act carries about factors outside of your control does not speak in favor of performing that act. But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, an act can tell you two, importantly different, kinds of things. It can tell you that the world in which you find yourself is good; but so too can it tell you that the act itself is in a position to improve things. While the (...)
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  5. How to Learn From Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism: A Solution for Conditionalizers.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):493-519.
    Weisberg ([2009]) provides an argument that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization is capable of accommodating the holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience can suffer undercutting defeat. I diagnose this failure as stemming from the fact that neither conditionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization give any advice about how to rationally respond to theory-dependent evidence, and I propose a novel updating procedure that does tell us how to respond to evidence like this. This holistic updating rule yields conditionalization as a special (...)
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  6.  13
    Learning and Value Change.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Accuracy-first accounts of rational learning attempt to vindicate the intuitive idea that, while rationally-formed belief need not be true, it is nevertheless likely to be true. To this end, they attempt to show that the Bayesian's rational learning norms are a consequence of the rational pursuit of accuracy. Existing accounts fall short of this goal, for they presuppose evidential norms which are not and cannot be vindicated in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. I propose an alternative account, according (...)
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  7.  54
    Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A handful of well-known arguments (the 'diachronic Dutch book arguments') rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not 'diachronically Dutch bookable') if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non-trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire---in the case of conditionalization, the assumption is that, if you might learn that e, then it is not the (...)
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  8. The Emergence of Causation.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (6):281-308.
    Several philosophers have embraced the view that high-level events—events like Zimbabwe's monetary policy and its hyper-inflation—are causally related if their corresponding low-level, fundamental physical events are causally related. I dub the view which denies this without denying that high-level events are ever causally related causal emergentism. Several extant philosophical theories of causality entail causal emergentism, while others are inconsistent with the thesis. I illustrate this with David Lewis's two theories of causation, one of which entails causal emergentism, the other of (...)
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  9.  41
    No One Can Serve Two Epistemic Masters.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted (...)
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  10. A Theory of Structural Determination.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):159-186.
    While structural equations modeling is increasingly used in philosophical theorizing about causation, it remains unclear what it takes for a particular structural equations model to be correct. To the extent that this issue has been addressed, the consensus appears to be that it takes a certain family of causal counterfactuals being true. I argue that this account faces difficulties in securing the independent manipulability of the structural determination relations represented in a correct structural equations model. I then offer an alternate (...)
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