The author brings a musical competence to bear upon an original treatment of music as a natural phenomenon. This attempt to treat music, not primarily as a product of artistic genius, but as a part of experience in general, involves a study of motion, time and space. The analysis of musical time and motions develops those concepts after the manner of the philosophers of process. Most interesting is the consideration of musical space in which Zuckerkandl elaborates what he alleges (...) is Heidegger's suggestion of space as "force" from "out there."--J. E. B. (shrink)
As thinkers in the market for knowledge and agents aspiring to morally responsible action, we are inevitably subject to luck. This book presents a comprehensive new theory of luck in light of a critical appraisal of the literature's leading accounts, then brings this new theory to bear on issues in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of action.
Written argumentative discourses were produced by 7 to 14 year-old children in two debate situations: one concerning a scientific issue (“Discours Formel”: DF,) and another concerning an opinion issue (“Discours Naturel”: DN). We had made the following developmental hypothesis: a specific discourse representation would be gradually built up by children in each situation, and would enable them to produce two different discourses, particularly with regard to the implication marks used by the writer. The two debate situations had been set up (...) to be only differentiated by the type of proposed issues. All the remaining situational characteristics had been made identical (social scenario, announced goal, addressee, etc.).Children's verbal products were divided into utterances. Each utterance was coded with regard to whether the following implication marks were present or not: the assuming by the writer of its assertive content; the writer's linguistically expressed reference to him- or herself; the evaluative or prescriptive value of the utterance; and the certainty modalities.The main results were: writer's assuming the assertive content specifies more and more DN, with a clear opposition between the two discourses realised by 13–14 children. While decreasing with age in both situations, the writer's self references are found to only occur in DN from 13–14. Prescriptive and evaluative types of utterance appear only in DN, at all the ages; the first ones decrease and the second ones increase from 7 to 14. At the opposite, DF proves to consist exclusively of constative utterances. At last, certainty modalities mainly occur in DN utterances. Differentiation between the two discourses has so begun by 7–8. But it becomes complete, for all the implication marks, at 13–14. The results observed at 13–14 join those shown by two reference adult groups, which performed the same discourse tasks.Finally, results are discussed with respect to parts of conceptions developed by Grize and by Bronckart. Given the many controls brought to bear in setting up the two discourse situations, children seem really to have been led, by the one representation of the argumentative issue, to produce more and more differentiated discourses. (shrink)
The primary problems of philosophy are those "whose answers directly bear on our lives." Scriven believes definitive answers to primary questions can be given and justified, and he gives his answers in a straightforward, vigorous, no-holds-barred manner: judgments of greatness in art are usually best construed as expressions of personal preference; there is no God; "man is not just an animal or a machine, but yet he is an animal and a machine"; brain determinism is in no way incompatible (...) with free choice; it is rational to be moral. The work is intended as an introductory text, and could be good as such, despite the tendency for arguments to give way to sermons. The student would be forced to come to grips with philosophical questions by coming to grips with Scriven. Since alternative positions are not always indicated or presented in the strongest light, there is something left for the teacher to do.—A. E. J. (shrink)
Mental imagery (varieties of which are sometimes colloquially refered to as “visualizing,” “seeing in the mind's eye,” “hearing in the head,” “imagining the feel of,” etc.) is quasi-perceptual experience; it resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the appropriate external stimuli. It is also generally understood to bear intentionality (i.e., mental images are always images of something or other), and thereby to function as a form of mental representation. Traditionally, visual mental imagery, the most discussed variety, was (...) thought to be caused by the presence of picturelike representations (mental images) in the mind, soul, or brain, but this is no longer universally accepted. (shrink)
Relativists about knowledge ascriptions think that whether a particular use of a knowledge-ascribing sentence, e.g., “Keith knows that the bank is open” is true depends on the epistemic standards at play in the assessor’s context—viz., the context in which the knowledge ascription is being as- sessed for truth or falsity. Given that the very same knowledge-ascription can be assessed for truth or falsity from indefinitely many perspectives, relativism has a striking consequence. When I ascribe knowledge to someone (e.g., when I (...) say that, at a particular time, “Keith knows that the bank is open”), what I’ve said does not get a truth-value absolutely, but only relatively. If this semantic thesis about the word “knows” and its cognates is true, what implications would this have for epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge? e present aim will be to engage with this mostly unexplored question, and then to consider how the epistemological conclusions drawn might bear on the plausibility of a relativist semantics for “knows”. (shrink)
In this paper Lucas comes back to Gödelian argument against Mecanism to clarify some points. First of all, he explains his use of Gödel’s theorem instead of Turing’s theorem, showing how Gödel’ theorem, but not Turing’s theorem, raises questions concerning truth and reasoning that bear on the nature of mind and how Turing’s theorem suggests that there is something that cannot be done by any computers but not that it can be done by human minds. He considers moreover how (...) Gödel’s theorem can be interpreted as a sophisticated form of the Cretan paradox, posed by Epimenides, able to escape the viciously self-referential nature of the Cretan paradox, and how it can be used against Mechanism as a schema of disproof. Finally, Lucas suggests some answers to the most recurrent criticisms against his argument: criticisms about the implicit idealisation in the way he set up the context between mind and machine; questions concerning modality and finitude, issues of transfinite arithmetic; questions concerning the need of formalizing rational inference and some questions about consistency. (shrink)
This paper examines relationships between accountants’ personal values and their moral reasoning. In particular, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between accountants’ “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning. This investigation is important because the literature suggests that conformity with rule-based standards may be one reason for professional accountants’ relatively lower scores on measures of moral reasoning (Abdolmohammadi et al. J Bus Ethics 16 (1997) 1717). We administered the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) (Rokeach: 1973, The Nature of Human Values (...) (The Free Press, New York)) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest: 1979, Development in Judgment Moral Issues (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN)) to164 graduating accounting students enrolled in capstone courses at two universities in the Northeastern United States. As potential entrants into the accounting profession, these subjects bring their values and moral reasoning to bear on attitudes and behaviors in the workplace. We find a highly significant inverse relationship between “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning (i.e., those who prefer Conformity values have lower levels of moral reasoning). However, we also find that accounting students as a group do not prefer Conformity values above other values such as Self-actualization and Idealism, and we find positive relationships between Self-actualization and Idealism values and moral reasoning. Implications for values and ethics research are discussed. (shrink)
Although Professor of Philosophy at Calvin College, Alvin Plantinga has developed a theodicy that is fundamentally Arminian rather than Calvinistic. Anthony Flew, although the son of an Arminian Christian minister, regards the Arminian view of ‘free will’ to be both unacceptable on its own terms and incompatible with classical Christian theism. In this paper I hope to disentangle some of the involved controversy regarding theodicy which has developed between Plantinga and Flew, and between Flew and myself. The major portion of (...) this paper is devoted to showing that Plantinga's theodicy contains some serious flaws and undesirable implications. (shrink)
What are physical quantities, and in particular, what makes them quantitative? This book presents an original answer to this question through the novel position of substantival structuralism, arguing that quantitativeness is an irreducible feature of attributes, and quantitative attributes are best understood as substantival structured spaces.
Towards the conclusion of his interesting remarks on the meaning of the Homeric phrase, τ δ' πτερος πλετο μθος, Professor J. A. K. Thomson writes, ‘When a classical author uses the word πτερος it means “wingless” or “featherless” and nothing else,’ and he accordingly rejects Headlam's interpretation of πτερος φτις at Aesch. Ag. 288 together with the same scholar's proposal to read at P. V. 707 πτερος for the unmetrical απνδιος It may be true that the phrase, πτρ τάχει, which (...) Headlam adduced in his note on the Agam. passage in support of his rendering, is not by itself convincing, but there are other considerations which Professor Thomson has, I imagine, overlooked. What follows is not an attempt to demonstrate that πτερος does mean ‘wing-swift’ in Aeschylus, but only to suggest that there is evidence to show that the word could bear that meaning in classical Greek authors, and that Headlam's interpretation and emendation should therefore not be rejected out of hand. (shrink)
Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.
While it is generally accepted that we need to use our intelligence in order to get what we want, it is thought to be a cardinal error to imagine that by reasoning we can discover what we ought to want. Reason can in no way constrain the choice of ends, it can only constrain the choice of means once an end has been adopted. In Plato's philosophy we find a view strongly opposed to this attitude towards reason. It is widely (...) held, however, that to arrive at a position which is plainly opposed to common sense, Plato must have grossly confused reasoning about means with reasoning about ends. Evidence of this confusion is found in Plato's use of analogies between statecraft and navigation, and between virtue and skill. But the diagnosis of confusion rests on a misunderstanding of how Plato wanted to use the word translated ‘skill’, i.e. ‘ technē ’, and this misunderstanding is shared even by those who see Plato as rejecting the virtue/skill analogy. (shrink)
J. E. Malpas discusses and develops the ideas of Donald Davidson, influential in contemporary thinking on the nature of understanding and meaning, and of truth and knowledge. He provides an account of Davidson's holistic and hermeneutical conception of linguistic interpretation, and, more generally, of the mind. Outlining its Quinean origins and the elements basic to Davidson's Radical Interpretation, J. E. Malpas' book goes on to elaborate this holism and to examine the indeterminacy of interpretation and the principle of charity. The (...) metaphysical and epistemological consequences of Davidson's approach are considered, particularly in relation to scepticism and relativism, the realist/anti-realist debate, and the problem of truth. Parallels are drawn between the Davidsonian emphasis on the centrality of the notion of truth and Heidegger's notion of truth as aletheia, as the book looks to structuralist, hermeneutical and phenomenological sources to illuminate Davidson's position. (shrink)
This short, suggestive essay was the 1972 Aquinas Lecture at Marquette. It contains an outline of Findlay’s critique of "mechanistic neuralism," i.e., belief in "invariant, isolable factors and rigorous laws governing their interaction." In a manner reminiscent of Bergson, he sees this view as the product of specifically intellectual activity which naturally produces a "world of remote objects, all fully interpreted, which stand over against our subjectivity...." Speculative and experimental neurology thus present a view of mind in which the self (...) is identified with the cerebrum. "The cerebrum... becomes the true man... to whom we attribute all our highest preceptive, cogitative, emotional and practical feats". Findlay attacks no particular version of this view. His main concern is to argue against the tendency in thought. He holds that the difficulties faced by a through-going cerebralism are purely logical, and he sketches a number of arguments designed to expose some of the problems involved in reductionist accounts of perception, thought, and action. What makes the essay particularly interesting is the way in which it incorporates scattered but important insights of Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Hegel which bear significantly on any treatment of the mind-brain problem. What is frustrating is the pervasive generality of Findlay’s characterization of "cerebralism." No cerebralist is identified, and no recent defense of the position is discussed or referred to in detail. Perhaps this is both unavoidable and appropriate in a public lecture. But it may leave the reader wondering how Findlay’s critical points apply to recent important discussions of the problem.—J. W. (shrink)
The author brings to the study of the two concepts of "religious" and "secular" the same intellectual honesty and analytical rigor that we met in his early work Pacifism: An Historical and Sociological Study. This is a "book of demolition" which attempts to eliminate the term "secularization" from the vocabulary of sociology due to the simple-minded fashion in which the word has been applied to describe the decline of religious faith in the present day. He tries to show that the (...) term is not monolithic and cannot be used legitimately merely to support some ideological perspective. It is rooted in various ideologies of utopianism and betrays many elements which were derived from Christianity. Certain identities of structure which he calls "an ontological privileged strata" are present--Israel as the Chosen People, Intelligentsia, Proletariat-who think of themselves as "seers" who bear the truth on behalf of the world. He mentions such examples as scientific messianism and Marxist messianism which have tried to translate the monism of nature into the monism of society so as to collapse certain dialectical opposites in Judaism and Christianity--e.g., God and Man, Heaven and Earth, Church and State--and to convert certain undefensible metaphysical views into technical issues which can be subjected to the strategies spun out by rational planning. Having pointed out the complementary relationship between the "religious" and the "secular," Martin proceeds to examine so-called secularization in music, theology, and sociology. In conclusion, Martin indicates that the application of these two concepts can be made only if the institutional setting and historical background is kept firmly in view, and he shows convincingly that it is not "a simple convergent process consequent on industrialism and the scientific and technological revolution."--J. B. L. (shrink)