Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...) I attempt to resolve this puzzling tension. I argue, first, that PMM is defective insofar as it manifests a failure to respond to reasons. I argue, second, that not every instance of PMM manifests a responsiveness failure. In particular, we need to distinguish between the de dicto final desire to do what is right and the de dicto final desire to do what is right for the right reasons. (shrink)

Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle (...) things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, only actual sequence features can ground free agency. This paper argues that and can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally tracks q. (...) According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, and can’t be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness. (shrink)

Friedrich Heer hat seine 1953 zum ersten Mal erschienene, nun seit Jahrzehnten vergriffene "Europäische Geistesgeschichte" trotz ihres Umfangs von über 700 Seiten einen "Essay" genannt. Bedenkt man den eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes "Essay" - Versuch, Wagnis -, dann entspringt diese Bezeichnung nicht falscher Bescheidenheit. Das Werk zieht einen großen Bogen von Auseinandersetzungen im frühen Christentum bis zur Zeit Goethes und skizzenhaft weiter bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts - immer bemüht, zugleich die gemeineuropäischen geistigen Entwicklungen und die Eigenart der (...) einzelnen Nationen gerecht zu würdigen. Die Perspektive ist eine katholische, nicht in einem engen kirchlichen Sinn, sondern im Bewusstsein der Bedeutung der Kirche für die Herausbildung dessen, was wir als Europa kennen. "Essay" ist das Buch als Versuch, als Wagnis, große (und manchmal verkannte) Linien der europäischen Geistesgeschichte herauszuarbeiten. Zum "Essay" macht es auch die Leidenschaft, mit der es geschrieben ist. Andererseits ist Friedrich Heers "Europäische Geistesgeschichte" ein wissenschaftliches Werk von hohem Rang, in welches das enzyklopädische Wissen seines Autors eingeflossen ist. So werden hier in durchaus spannender Weise Zusammenhänge hergestellt, die ein überzeugendes Bild von Einheit und Unterschiedlichkeit der geistigen Entwicklung dieses Kontinents entstehen lassen. Mit besonderem Engagement werden alle nicht konformen Strömungen dieser Geistesgeschichte vorgestellt. Die Fülle von Anregungen, die dieses Buch bietet, wird kaum von einem anderen übertroffen. Was immer im Einzelnen zu kritisieren sein mag, was immer neue Detailforschungen ergeben haben - die dauernden Tendenzen der geistigen Entwicklung Europas werden nirgends so klar wie hier. Als Ganzes ist das Bild, das Heer von der geistigen Entwicklung Europas zeichnet, nicht überholt. (shrink)

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Many think it is plausible that agents enjoy freedom and responsibility with respect to their actions in virtue of being reasons-responsive. Extant accounts spell out reasons-responsiveness (RR) as a general modal property. The agent is responsive to reasons for and against ϕ-ing, according to this idea, if they ϕ in accordance with the balance of reasons in a suitable proportion of possible situations. This paper argues that freedom and responsibility are not grounded in such modal properties on the basis of (...) a phenomenon I call ‘rational blind spots’. Agents have highly specific local blockages (or openings) that prevent them from seeing or reacting for a particular type of reason. When these blind spots are triggered, agents fail to be responsive to reasons in the sense relevant to freedom and responsibility. Thus, we judge that they are not free and responsible. But bind spots don’t remove the agent’s possession of general modal RR properties. Thus, extant accounts of reasons-responsiveness render the incorrect result that the agents in these cases remain responsible because they remain responsive to reasons in a general sense. (shrink)

Current literature suggests that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can affect consumers’ attitudes towards an organization and is regarded as a driver for reputation-building and fostering sustained consumer patronage. Although prior research has addressed the direct influence of CSR on consumer responses, this research examined the mediating influence of consumer’s perceived organizational motives within an NGO setting. Given the heightened public attention surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, data were collected from consumers of the Games to assess their perceptions of the (...) International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) socially responsible initiatives. We hypothesized that consumers of the Games were likely to cognitively elaborate on CSR messages by way of three specific attribution effects derived from the literature. The results show that, contingent on CSR awareness, consumers responded positively to social efforts judged to be values-driven and stakeholder-driven; and a negative response was seen for efforts judged to be strategic. These attribution effects influenced various types of patronage and perceived organizational reputation. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the period that immediately followed the invention of the Leiden jar. Historians of science have developed narrations that emphasize the role of grounding during the process of charging the jar. In this respect, this episode shows significant aspects that can be used to characterize science, scientific knowledge production, and the nature of science. From our own experimentation, we learned that grounding was not necessary in order to produce the effect. These experiences inspired us to go (...) back to primary sources. In doing so, we came to a new understanding of the early period after Kleist’s and Musschenbroek’s initial creation of the effect. From our analysis, we conclude that it is not the grounding which was perceived as a major innovation during this early period of the discussion but the concept of an electrical circuit. This understanding was fundamental in characterizing the Leiden jar as a new device challenging the then current knowledge of experimental practices in the field of electricity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to create dialectical space for a hitherto under-discussed option in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. The extant literature on the topic almost exclusively assumes that conspiracy theories are a type of explanation. The typical mental attitude towards explanations is belief, a representational attitude that can be assessed as true, false, warranted or unwarranted. I call models based on this assumption alethic models. Alethic models can’t pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental (...) attitudes without latching onto their negative epistemic properties. The extant literature therefore finds itself in an unfortunate situation. It either has to presume that conspiracy theories are epistemically defective in general (generalism). Or it has to deny that conspiracy theories are a distinct class of mental attitudes. Conspiracy theories are then nothing more than theories, theories about conspiracies, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (particularism). Instead, this paper motivates the research program of narrative models. According to narrative models, conspiracy theories are first and foremost stories – structured fictions. And their relevant mental attitudes are the attitudes of fiction – make-believe and imagination. Fictions are not subjects to epistemic norms. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models can therefore pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental attitudes without labeling them as defective in general. In addition, they are able to explain certain features of conspiracy discourse particularly well, and they offer new perspectives on the popularity of conspiracy theories and the means of intervention we have at our disposal. (shrink)

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...) I attempt to resolve this puzzling tension. I argue, first, that PMM is defective insofar as it manifests a failure to respond to reasons. I argue, second, that not every instance of PMM manifests a responsiveness failure. In particular, we need to distinguish between the de dicto final desire to do what is right and the de dicto final desire to do what is right for the right reasons. (shrink)

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In God existence is the same as essence; or—the same thing ·put differently·—it is essential for God to exist. So God is a necessary being, ·a being who exists necessarily·.