In this paper, I defend the view that we can literally perceive the morally right and wrong, or something near enough. In defending this claim, I will try to meet three primary objectives: to clarify how an investigation into moral phenomenology should proceed, to respond to a number of misconceptions and objections that are most frequently raised against the very idea of moral perception, and to provide a model for how some moral perception can be seen as literal perception. Because (...) I take “moral perception” to pick out a family of different experiences, I will limit myself to a discussion of the moral relevance of the emotions. (shrink)
abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to (...) the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions. (shrink)
abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to the dead. My aim in this paper (...) is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions. (shrink)
My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the recent anti-Ticking Bomb argument offered by Bufacchi and Arrigo is unsuccessful. To adequately refute the Ticking Bomb strategy, I claim, requires carefully addressing both policy questions and questions involving exceptional conduct.
In recent literature on moral perception, much attention has been paid to questions about the relationship between metaethical commitments and moral experience. Far less attention has been paid to the nature of moral perception, its context-sensitivity, and the role it might play in carrying out everyday tasks with decency and care. I would like to reflect on just these features of moral perception in the context of healthcare. I will argue that healthcare providers do in fact have at least an (...) imperfect duty to develop their capacities to perceive with sympathy. I will further suggest, for some familiar reasons, that this development is not best accomplished through the model of adherence to ‘ethics codes.’. (shrink)
The most common argument in favor of torture in the current literature is the ticking bomb argument. It asks us to imagine a case where only torture can prevent the detonation of a bomb that will kill millions. In this paper, I argue that the seeming effectiveness of this argument rests on two things: 1) the underdetermined semantic content of the term ‘torture,’ and 2) a philosophical attitude that regards the empirical facts about torture as irrelevant. Once we pay attention (...) to the facts about torture, and particularly about the role time plays in actual torture, the ticking bomb argument becomes incoherent, and hence cannot provide a basis for accepting torture. (shrink)
The aim of this article is to argue for a conception of critical social science based on the model of constitutive rules. The author argues that this model is pragmatically superior to those models that employ notions like "illusion" and " ideology," as it does not demand a specification of the "real (but hidden) interests" of social actors. Key Words: constitutive rules critical theory ideology recommendations social facts.
_A smart philosophical look at the cult hit television show, _Arrested Development__ _Arrested Development_ earned six Emmy awards, a Golden Globe award, critical acclaim, and a loyal cult following—and then it was canceled. Fortunately, this book steps into the void left by the show's premature demise by exploring the fascinating philosophical issues at the heart of the quirky Bluths and their comic exploits. Whether it's reflecting on Gob's self-deception or digging into Tobias's double entendres, you'll watch your favorite scenes and (...) episodes of the show in a whole new way. Takes an entertaining look at the philosophical ideas and tensions in the show's plots and themes Gives you new insights about the Bluth family and other characters: Is George Michael's crush on his cousin unnatural? Is it immoral for Lindsay to lie about stealing clothes to hide the fact that she has a job? Are the pictures really of bunkers or balls? Lets you sound super-smart as you rattle off the names of great philosophers like Sartre and Aristotle to explain key characters and episodes of the show Packed with thought-provoking insights, _Arrested Development and Philosophy_ is essential reading for anyone who wants to know more about their late, lamented TV show. And it'll keep you entertained until the long-awaited _Arrested Development_ movie finally comes out. (shrink)
Hier erfahren Sie, wieso Stephenie Meyers Liebesgeschichte so viele Menschen fasziniert und warum es sich dabei um so viel mehr als oberflächliche Jugendliteratur handelt: - Wieso fühlen sich Menschen von Vampiren magisch angezogen? - Sollte Edward seine Fähigkeit zum Gedankenlesen einsetzen? - Ist Edward ein romantischer Held oder einfach nur ein Stalker? - Was sagt der Kampf der "vegetarischen" Cullen-Familien gegen ihren Durst nach menschlichem Blut über den freien Willen aus? - Wird das ewige Leben nicht sogar an der Seite (...) einer geliebten Person irgendwann langweilig? (shrink)
_ X-Men_ is one of the most popular comic book franchises ever, with successful spin-offs that include several feature films, cartoon series, bestselling video games, and merchandise. This is the first look at the deeper issues of the X-Men universe and the choices facing its powerful "mutants," such as identity, human ethics versus mutant morality, and self-sacrifice. J. Jeremy Wisnewski is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hartwick College and the editor of Family Guy and Philosophy and The Office and Philosophy. (...) Rebecca Housel is a professor at Rochester Institute of Technology, where she teaches about writing and pop culture. For William Irwin's biography, please see below. (shrink)
This paper explores the tension between two views attributed to Plato: 1) that every person in a just society must fulfil his function, and 2) justice requires philosophical wisdom. It is argued that is not Plato’s view in Republic, and that this can be seen as early as Book II.
_Family Guy and Philosophy_ brings together low-brow, potty-mouthed, cartoon humor and high-brow philosophical reflection to deliver an outrageously hilarious and clever exploration of one of TV’s most unrelenting families. Ok, it’s not that high-brow. A sharp, witty and absurd exploration of one of television’s most unrelenting families, the stars of one of the biggest-selling TV series ever on DVD, now in its fourth season Tackles the perennial positions of _Family Guy_ at the same time as contemplating poignant philosophical issues Takes (...) an introspective look at what this show can teach us about ethics, ego, religion, death, and of course, time-travel Considers whether _Family Guy_ is really a vehicle for conservative politics, and whether we should be offended by the show, as well as diving into the philosophy of the cast. (shrink)
Wisnewski provides a concise introduction to Heidegger’s work through the lens of his best-known book, Being and Time. This insightful, new text guides students through Heidegger’s challenging ideas to help them understand his writings as a whole and his influence on modern thought.
My aim in this paper is to offer some critical remarks about the possibility of honestly confronting finitude through the experience of tbe value of the other. I suggest that there is reason to think that an honest confrontation with finitude cannot be so accomplished, and that, moreover, there can be no ‘compensation’ for the fact of finitude. Finally, I suggest that the rhetoric of ‘authenticity’ might not be the most fruitful way of talking about confronting our death.
In the following reply to Joe Frank Jones, Ill's "Analysis, Phenomenology and the Travails of Ontology," I argue that skepticism about method plays an important critical role in philosophical thinking. I further suggest that it may be time for philosophy to rehabilitate metaphysics rather than simply ceding it to the natural sciences.
This book argues that the traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension in these theories and that recognizing this normative dimension allows us to see that a ...