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  1. A Simple Analysis of Harm.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:509-536.
    In this paper, we present and defend an analysis of harm that we call the Negative Influence on Well-Being Account (NIWA). We argue that NIWA has a number of significant advantages compared to its two main rivals, the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) and the Causal Account (CA), and that it also helps explain why those views go wrong. In addition, we defend NIWA against a class of likely objections, and consider its implications for several questions about harm and its role (...)
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  2. Plural harm: plural problems.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):553-565.
    The counterfactual comparative account of harm faces problems in cases that involve overdetermination and preemption. An influential strategy for dealing with these problems, drawing on a suggestion made by Derek Parfit, is to appeal to _plural harm_—several events _together_ harming someone. We argue that the most well-known version of this strategy, due to Neil Feit, as well as Magnus Jedenheim Edling’s more recent version, is fatally flawed. We also present some general reasons for doubting that the overdetermination and preemption problems (...)
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  3. The preemption problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.
    According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and (...)
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  4. Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):420-445.
    A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm. CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable to close variants of some of the problems that beset CCA.
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  5. Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Olle Risberg, Jens Johansson & Erik Carlson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):164-174.
    ABSTRACT Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and well-being levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive accounts of harm (...)
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  6.  78
    Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1539-1548.
    A prominent objection to the counterfactual comparative account of harm is that it classifies as harmful some events that are, intuitively, mere failures to benefit. In an attempt to solve this problem, Duncan Purves has recently proposed a novel version of the counterfactual comparative account, which relies on a distinction between making upshots happen and allowing upshots to happen. In this response, we argue that Purves’s account is unsuccessful. It fails in cases where an action makes the subject occupy a (...)
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  7. Past and Future Non-Existence.Jens Johansson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):51-64.
    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly (...)
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  8. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death.Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...)
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  9. Being and betterness.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):285-302.
    In this article I discuss the question of whether a person’s existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person’s existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those (...)
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  10.  71
    Well-Being without Being? A Reply to Feit.Erik Carlson & Jens Johansson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):198-208.
    In a recent Utilitas article, Neil Feit argues that every person occupies a well-being level of zero at all times and possible worlds at which she fails to exist. Views like his face the problem of the subject': how can someone have a well-being level in a scenario where she lacks intrinsic properties? Feit argues that this problem can be solved by noting, among other things, that a proposition about a person can be true at a possible world in which (...)
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  11. Benefits are Better than Harms: A Reply to Feit.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):232-238.
    We have argued that the counterfactual comparative account of harm and benefit (CCA) violates the plausible adequacy condition that an act that would harm an agent cannot leave her much better off than an alternative act that would benefit her. In a recent paper in this journal, however, Neil Feit objects that our argument presupposes questionable counterfactual backtracking. He also argues that CCA proponents can justifiably reject the condition by invoking so-called plural harm and benefit. In this reply, we argue (...)
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  12. Objections to Virtue Ethics.Jens Johansson & Frans Svensson - 2018 - In Nancy Snow (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. Oxford University Press.
  13.  67
    Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):154-166.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
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  14.  51
    The Significance of Tiny Contributions : Barnett and Beyond.Erik Carlson, Magnus Jedenheim-Edling & Jens Johansson - forthcoming - Utilitas.
    In a discussion of Parfit's Drops of Water case, Zach Barnett has recently proposed a novel argument against “No Small Improvement”; that is, the claim that a single drop of water cannot affect the magnitude of a thirsty person's suffering. We first show that Barnett's argument can be significantly strengthened, and also that the fundamental idea behind it yields a straightforward argument for the transitivity of equal suffering. We then suggest that defenders of No Small Improvement could reject a Pareto (...)
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  15.  74
    Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer.Jens Johansson - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (1):11-18.
    In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against (...)
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  16.  45
    Prudential Problems for the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm and Benefit.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):474-481.
    In this paper, we put forward two novel arguments against the counterfactual comparative account (CCA) of harm and benefit. In both arguments, the central theme is that CCA conflicts with plausible judgements about benefit and prudence.
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  17. Parfit on fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.
    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper (...)
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  18. Higher-Order Control: An Argument for Moral Luck.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Anna Nyman - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, we give a new argument for the existence of moral luck. The argument is based on a manipulation case in which two agents both lack second-order control over their actions, but one of them has first-order control. Our argument is, we argue, in several respects stronger than standard arguments for moral luck. Five possible objections to the argument are considered, and its general significance for the debate on moral luck is briefly discussed.
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  19. What is animalism?Jens Johansson - 2007 - Ratio 20 (2):194–205.
    One increasingly popular approach to personal identity is called ‘animalism.’ Unfortunately, it is unclear just what the doctrine says. In this paper, I criticise several different ways of stating animalism, and put forward one formulation that I find more promising.
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  20.  73
    The Problem of Justified Harm: a Reply to Gardner.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):735-742.
    In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of it are unconvincing. Finally, we briefly suggest an alternative solution to the problem which avoids the difficulties that beset Gardner’s proposal.
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  21.  73
    Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2021 - Utilitas:1-13.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
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  22.  11
    “Recovery” in mental health services, now and then: A poststructuralist examination of the despotic State machine's effects.Jim A. Johansson & Dave Holmes - 2024 - Nursing Inquiry 31 (1):e12558.
    Recovery is a model of care in (forensic) mental health settings across Western nations that aims to move past the paternalistic and punitive models of institutional care of the 20th century and toward more patient‐centered approaches. But as we argue in this paper, the recovery‐oriented services that evolved out of the early stages of this liberating movement signaled a shift in nursing practices that cannot be viewed only as improvements. In effect, as “recovery” nursing practices became more established, more codified, (...)
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  23.  48
    More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner.Jens Johansson - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):341-351.
    John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, (...)
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  24.  91
    The Time of Death's Badness.J. Johansson - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):464-479.
    Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased—a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues—need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from (...)
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  25. Animal Ethics.Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Several attractive principles about prudential concern and moral responsibility seem to speak against animalism. I criticize some animalist responses to this kind of problem, and suggest another answer, which has similarites with the most important argument in favor of animalism: the “thinking animal” argument.
     
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  26.  22
    Poststructuralism and the construction of subjectivities in forensic mental health: Opportunities for resistance.Jim A. Johansson & Dave Holmes - 2024 - Nursing Philosophy 25 (1):e12440.
    Nurses working in correctional and forensic mental health settings face unique challenges in the provision of care to patients within custodial settings. The subjectivities of both patients and nurses are subject to the power relations, discourses and abjection encountered within these practice milieus. Using a poststructuralist approach using the work of Foucault, Kristeva, and Deleuze and Guattari, this paper explores how both patient and nurse subjectivities are produced within the carceral logic of this apparatus of capture. Recognizing that subjectivities are (...)
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  27.  10
    Abjection and the weaponization of bodily excretions in forensic psychiatry settings: A poststructural reflection.Jim A. Johansson & Dave Holmes - 2022 - Nursing Inquiry 29 (4):e12480.
    Nurses working in forensic psychiatric settings face unique challenges in practice, where they take on a dual role of custody and caring. Patient resistance is widespread within these restrictive settings and can take many forms. Perhaps the most disturbing form of resistance entails a patient's weaponization of their bodily fluids, with nurses as their target. The tendency in assigning motive for this act is to relegate to the psychopathology of the patient. This paper will adopt a poststructuralist perspective to reexamine (...)
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  28.  43
    Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem.Erik Carlson & Jens Johansson - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):477-481.
    The ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the contrastive causal account is correct.
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  29.  18
    Constructing a ‘Different’ Strength: A Feminist Exploration of Vulnerability, Ethical Agency and Care.Janet Johansson & Alice Wickström - 2023 - Journal of Business Ethics 184 (2):317-331.
    This article explores how ethical agency, as ‘other-oriented’ caring, emerged from feelings of being ‘different’ in a cultural organization by drawing on feminist ethics of care. By analyzing interview material from an ethnographic study, we centralize the relationship between feelings of being ‘different,’ vulnerability and the development of sensibilities, practices and imaginaries of care. We elaborate on how vulnerability serves as a ground for caring with rather than for others, and illustrate how it allowed individuals to challenge both organizational, normative (...)
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  30.  64
    ‘Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson.Jens Johansson & Simon Rosenqvist - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):435-441.
    A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. (...)
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  31. Kaufman's response to Lucretius.Jens Johansson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):470-485.
    Abstract: The symmetry argument is an objection to the 'deprivation approach'– the account of badness favored by nearly all philosophers who take death to be bad for the one who dies. Frederik Kaufman's recent response to the symmetry argument is a development of Thomas Nagel's suggestion that we could not have come into existence substantially earlier than we in fact did. In this paper, I aim to show that Kaufman's suggestion fails. I also consider several possible modifications of his theory, (...)
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  32. Petersson on Plural Harm.Jens Johansson - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 223–238.
    The counterfactual comparative account of harm has counterintuitive implications in cases involving overdetermination and preemption. A popular strategy for dealing with these problems appeals to plural harm—several events being jointly harmful. Björn Petersson criticizes this strategy on the grounds that it conflicts with a strong intuition that helps to motivate the counterfactual comparative account, namely, that harming someone essentially involves making a difference for the worse for her. In this paper, I argue that Petersson’s argument is unconvincing.
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  33.  17
    Pitcovski’s explanation-based account of harm.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):535-545.
    In a recent article in this journal, Eli Pitcovski puts forward a novel, explanation-based account of harm. We seek to show that Pitcovski’s account, and his arguments in favor of it, can be substantially improved. However, we also argue that, even thus improved, the account faces a dilemma. The dilemma concerns the question of what it takes for an event, E, to explain why a state, P, does not obtain. Does this require that P would have obtained if E had (...)
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  34. Epicureanism, Extrinsic Value, and Prudence.Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield.
  35. Against Pluralism in Metaethics.Jens Johansson & Jonas Olson - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan.
  36. The Importance of a Good Ending: Some Reflections on Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife.Jens Johansson - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):185-195.
    In his recent book, Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that it matters greatly to us that there be other human beings long after our own deaths. In support of this “Afterlife Thesis,” as I call it, he provides a thought experiment—the “doomsday scenario”—in which we learn that, although we ourselves will live a normal life span, 30 days after our death the earth will be completely destroyed. In this paper I question this “doomsday scenario” support for Scheffler’s Afterlife (...)
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  37.  27
    Patient Participation in Decision Making at the End of Life as Seen by a Close Relative.Eva Sahlberg-Blom, Britt-Marie Ternestedt & Jan-Erik Johansson - 2000 - Nursing Ethics 7 (4):296-313.
    The aim of the present study was to describe variations in patient participation in decisions about care planning during the final phase of life for a group of gravely ill patients, and how the different actors’ manner of acting promotes or impedes patient participation. Thirty-seven qualitative research interviews were conducted with relatives of the patients. The patients’ participation in the decisions could be categorized into four variations: self-determination, co-determination, delegation and nonparticipation. The manner in which patients, relatives and caregivers acted (...)
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  38.  86
    The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-existence: Guest Editor’s Introduction.Jens Johansson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):1-4.
    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This (...)
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  39.  35
    Unruh's hybrid account of harm.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):748-754.
    Charlotte Unruh has recently put forward a hybrid account of what it is to suffer harm – one that combines comparative and non‐comparative elements. We raise two problems for Unruh's account. The first concerns killing and death; the second concerns the causing of temporarily low or high welfare.
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  40.  31
    Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (3):229-237.
    In a recent article in this journal, Justin Klocksiem proposes a novel response to the widely discussed failure to benefit problem for the counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA). According to Klocksiem, proponents of CCA can deal with this problem by distinguishing between facts about there being harm and facts about an agent's having done harm. In this reply, we raise three sets of problems for Klocksiem's approach.
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  41.  8
    Assembling packs: Outreach nurses, disaffiliated persons, and sorcerers.Jim A. Johansson, Pier-Luc Turcotte & Dave Holmes - 2024 - Nursing Philosophy 25 (3).
    Nurses working in outreach capacities frequently encounter disaffiliated or ‘hard to reach’ populations, such as those experiencing homelessness, those who use substances, and those with mental health concerns. Despite best efforts, nurses regularly fail to find meaningful engagement with these populations. Mobilizing the work of Deleuze and Guattari, this paper will critically examine conventional outreach nursing practices as rooted in the royal science of psychiatry, which many ‘survivors’ of psychiatric interventions reject. The field of Mad Studies offers an understanding of (...)
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  42.  35
    Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr.Jens Johansson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):215-221.
    In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought (...)
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  43.  35
    The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time.Jens Johansson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (3):239-250.
    If a person’s death is bad for him for the reason that he would have otherwise been intrinsically better off, as the Deprivation Approach says, does it not follow that his prenatal nonexistence is bad for him as well? Recently, it has been suggested that the “A-theory” of time can be used to support a negative answer to this question. In this paper, I raise some problems for this approach.
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  44. Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247-256.
    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person —can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long (...)
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  45.  82
    The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: an Essay in Practical Realism – Lynne Rudder Baker.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):365-368.
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  46. Constituted simples?Jens Johansson - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):87-89.
    Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble. I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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  47.  18
    Patients accept therapy using embryonic stem cells for Parkinson’s disease: a discrete choice experiment.Jennifer Viberg Johansson, Mats Hansson, Elena Jiltsova, Trinette van Vliet, Hakan Widner, Dag Nyholm, Jorien Veldwijk, Catharina Groothuis-Oudshoorn, Jennifer Drevin & Karin Schölin Bywall - 2023 - BMC Medical Ethics 24 (1):1-13.
    BackgroundNew disease-modifying ways to treat Parkinson’s disease (PD) may soon become a reality with intracerebral transplantation of cell products produced from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). The aim of this study was to assess what factors influence preferences of patients with PD regarding stem-cell based therapies to treat PD in the future.MethodsPatients with PD were invited to complete a web-based discrete choice experiment to assess the importance of the following attributes: (i) type of treatment, (ii) aim of treatment, (iii) available (...)
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  48. Non-reductionism and special concern.Jens Johansson - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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  49.  15
    Toward an ontology of the mutant in the health sciences: Re/defining the person from Cronenberg's perspective.Dave Holmes, Pier-Luc Turcotte, Simon Adam, Jim Johansson & Lauren Orser - 2024 - Nursing Inquiry 31 (1):e12599.
    Traditional health sciences (including nursing) paradigms, conceptual models, and theories have relied heavily upon notions of the ‘person’ or ‘patient’ that are deeply rooted in humanistic principles. Our intention here, as a collective academic assemblage, is to question taken‐for‐granted definitions and assumptions of the ‘person’ from a critical posthumanist perspective. To do so, the cinematic works of filmmaker David Cronenberg offer a radical perspective to revisit our understanding of the ‘person’ in nursing and beyond. Cronenberg's work explores bodily transformation and (...)
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    Against the Worse Than Nothing Account of Harm: A Reply to Immerman.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (3-4):233-242.
    The counterfactual comparative account of harm (cca) faces well-known problems concerning preemption and omission. In a recent article in this journal, Daniel Immerman proposes a novel variant of cca, which he calls the worse than nothing account (wtna). According to Immerman, wtna nicely handles the preemption and omission problems. We seek to show, however, that wtna is not an acceptable account of harm. In particular, while wtna deals better than cca with some cases that involve preemption and omission, it has (...)
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