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J. Kevin O'Regan [16]J. K. O'Regan [5]
  1. To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    Methods. We employed a "flicker" technique, in which an original and a modified image (each of duration 240 ms) continually alternated, with a blank field (duration 80 ms) between each display. Images were all of real-world scenes. One of three kinds of change (appearance/disappearance, color, or translation) was made to an object or region in each scene. Changes were large and easily seen under normal conditions. Subjects viewed the flicker display, and pressed a key when they noticed the change.
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  2.  72
    Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness.J. K. O'Regan - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    The catastrophe of the eye -- A new view of seeing -- Applying the new view of seeing -- The illusion of seeing everything -- Some contentious points -- Towards consciousness -- Types of consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness, raw feel, and why they're hard -- Squeeze a sponge, drive a porsche : a sensorimotor account of feel -- Consciously experiencing a feel -- The sensorimotor approach to color -- Sensory substitution -- The localization of touch -- The phenomenality plot -- (...)
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  3.  32
    Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology?Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
    We address the thesis recently proposed by Andy Clark, that skill-mediated access to modality implies phenomenal feel. We agree that a skill theory of perception does indeed offer the possibility of a satisfactory account of the feel of perception, but we claim that this is not only through explanation of access to modality but also because skill actually provides access to perceptual property in general. We illustrate and substantiate our claims by reference to the recently proposed 'sensorimotor contingency' theory of (...)
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  4.  87
    Picture Changes During Blinks: Looking Without Seeing and Seeing Without Looking.J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & R. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized.
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  5. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting Out Our Sensory Experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & A. Noe - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011.
  6.  56
    Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  7.  69
    Acting Out Our Sensory Experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011-1021.
    The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a (...)
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  8.  13
    The Emergence of Use of a Rake-Like Tool: A Longitudinal Study in Human Infants.Jacqueline Fagard, Lauriane Rat-Fischer & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  9. Induced Dependence of Colour Perception on Eye-Movements.A. Bompas & J. K. O'Regan - 2004 - In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 17-18.
  10.  46
    Experience is Not Something We Feel but Something We Do: A Principled Way of Explaining Sensory Phenomenology, with Change Blindness and Other Empirical Consequences.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology.
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  11.  22
    Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
    The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
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  12.  15
    Letter Legibility and Visual Word Recognition.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Word recognition performance varies systematically as a function of where the eyes fixate in the word. Performance is maximal with the eye slightly left of the center of the word, and decreases drastically to both sides of this 'Optimal Viewing Position'. While manipulations of lexical factors have only marginal effects on this phenomenon, previous studies have pointed to a relation between the viewing position effect and letter legibility: When letter legibility drops, the viewing position effect becomes more exaggerated. To further (...)
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  13.  12
    The World as an Outside Iconic Memory – No Strong Internal Metric Means No Problem of Visual Stability.J. Kevin O'Regan - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):270-271.
  14.  27
    The ‘Feel’ of Seeing.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
  15.  19
    For Peer Review.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Call u the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is incident on a surface, and v the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is reflected off that surface. Philipona & O'Regan (2006) present results from numerical calculations showing that: 1. each surface can be associated with a 3 by 3 matrix A such that the relation v = A u to a very high degree of accuracy for any natural illuminant, 2. the vast majority (...)
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  16.  30
    Change Blindness.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
  17.  25
    How to Build a Robot That Feels.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Overview. Consciousness is often considered to have a "hard" part and a not-so-hard part. With the help of work in artificial intelligence and more recently in embodied robotics, there is hope that we shall be able solve the not-so-hard part and make artificial agents that understand their environment, communicate with their friends, and most importantly, have a notion of "self" and "others". But will such agents feel anything? Building the feel into the agent will be the "hard" part.
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  18.  25
    No Evidence for Neural Filling-in – Vision as an Illusion – Pinning Down “Enaction”.J. K. O'Regan - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):767-768.
    (1) The purported evidence for neural filling-in is not evidence for filling-in, but just for long-range dynamic interactions. (2) Vision is perhaps not an “illusion,” but at any rate it is not “pictorial.” (3) The idea of the “world as an outside memory” as well as MacKay's “conditional readiness for action” may help approach an “enactive” theory of vision.
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  19.  17
    Thoughts on Change Blindness.J. K. O'Regan - unknown
    Recent results showing that large changes in a scene are not noticed if they occur at the same time as a global visual disturbance caused by saccades, flicker, "mudsplashes", or film cuts, are generally explained in terms of a theory in which it is assumed that the observer's internal representation of the outside world is very sparse, containing only what the observer is currently processing. The present paper presents some clarifications of the theory, and some new implications and predictions that (...)
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  20. The 'Feel'of Seeing:: An Interview with J. Kevin O'Regan.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
  21.  5
    How the Sensorimotor Approach to Consciousness Bridges Both Comparative and Absolute Explanatory Gaps: And Some Refinements of the Theory.J. K. O'Regan - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (5-6):39-65.
    The problem of understanding how physical processes in the brain could give rise to consciousness has been identified with the 'comparative explanatory gap', the problem of explaining why different experiences have the differing qualities they do, and the 'absolute explanatory gap', the problem of explaining why anything can be conscious at all. The main innovation of the sensorimotor theory is that it provides a very appealing way of closing the comparative gap by postulating that the quality of experiences corresponds to (...)
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