13 found
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  1. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  2. What It is Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):79-103.
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also (...)
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  3. Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):393-407.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience (...)
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  4. Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’T Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”.J. Kevin O’Regan & Ned Block - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):89-108.
    Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of Philosophy and (...)
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  5. How to Build a Robot That is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  6. Phenomenal Consciousness Explained (Better) in Terms of Bodiliness and Grabbiness.J. Kevin O’Regan, Erik Myin & Alva NOë - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  7.  11
    Commentary on Mossio and Taraborelli: Is the Enactive Approach Really Sensorimotor?☆.Frédéric Pascal & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1341-1342.
  8.  6
    Commentary on Mossio and Taraborelli: Is the Enactive Approach Really Sensorimotor?Frédéric Pascal & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1341-1342.
  9.  60
    A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts.Lucia Foglia & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):181-196.
    Traditionally, the “Imagery Debate” has opposed two main camps: depictivism and descriptivism. This debate has essentially focused on the nature of the internal representations thought to be involved in imagery, without addressing at all the question of action. More recently, a third, “embodied” view is moving the debate into a new phase. The embodied approach focuses on the interdependence of perception, cognition and action, and in its more radical line this approach promotes the idea that perception is not a process (...)
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  10.  15
    On Words and Their Letters.Tatjana A. Nazir, J. Kevin O’Regan & Arthur M. Jacobs - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (2):171-174.
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  11.  44
    Comparison of Active and Purely Visual Performance in a Multiple-String Means-End Task in Infants.Lauriane Rat-Fischer, J. Kevin O’Regan & Jacqueline Fagard - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):304-316.
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  12.  11
    Why Early Tactile Speech Aids May Have Failed: No Perceptual Integration of Tactile and Auditory Signals.Aurora Rizza, Alexander V. Terekhov, Guglielmo Montone, Marta Olivetti-Belardinelli & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  13.  5
    What Would the Robots Play? Interview with J. Kevin O’Regan.J. Kevin O’Regan, Włodzisław Duch, Przemysław Nowakowski & Witold Wachowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
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