Results for 'J. Kevin O���Regan'

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  1. Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’T Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”.J. Kevin O’Regan & Ned Block - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):89-108.
    Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of (...)
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  2. The 'Feel'of Seeing:: An Interview with J. Kevin O'Regan.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
  3.  6
    What Would the Robots Play? Interview with J. Kevin O’Regan.J. Kevin O’Regan, Włodzisław Duch, Przemysław Nowakowski & Witold Wachowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
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  4. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  5. What It is Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):79-103.
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also (...)
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  6. How to Build a Robot That is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
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  7. Solving the "Real" Mysteries of Visual Perception: The World as an Outside Memory.Kevin J. O'Regan - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Psychology 46:461-88.
  8.  89
    Picture Changes During Blinks: Looking Without Seeing and Seeing Without Looking.J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & R. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized.
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  9.  47
    Change Blindness as a Result of Mudsplashes.Kevin J. O'Regan, Ronald A. Rensink & James J. Clark - 1999 - Nature 398 (6722):34-34.
  10.  8
    Phenomenal Consciousness Explained (Better) in Terms of Bodiliness and Grabbiness.J. Kevin O’Regan, Erik Myin & Alva NOë - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  11. To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to Perceive Changes in Scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    Methods. We employed a "flicker" technique, in which an original and a modified image (each of duration 240 ms) continually alternated, with a blank field (duration 80 ms) between each display. Images were all of real-world scenes. One of three kinds of change (appearance/disappearance, color, or translation) was made to an object or region in each scene. Changes were large and easily seen under normal conditions. Subjects viewed the flicker display, and pressed a key when they noticed the change.
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  12.  63
    Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  13. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting Out Our Sensory Experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & A. Noe - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011.
  14.  36
    The Redness of Red. Introduction to an Interview with J. Kevin O'Regan.Jakub R. Matyja - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
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  15. What Would the Robots Play? Interview with J. Kevin O’Regan.Wlodzislaw Duch, Przemyslaw Nowakowski & Witold Wachowski - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2):21-34.
  16. Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):393-407.
    The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience (...)
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  17.  75
    Acting Out Our Sensory Experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011-1021.
    The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a (...)
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  18.  49
    Experience is Not Something We Feel but Something We Do: A Principled Way of Explaining Sensory Phenomenology, with Change Blindness and Other Empirical Consequences.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology.
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  19.  38
    Perceptual Consciousness, Access to Modality and Skill Theories: A Way to Naturalize Phenomenology?Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
    We address the thesis recently proposed by Andy Clark, that skill-mediated access to modality implies phenomenal feel. We agree that a skill theory of perception does indeed offer the possibility of a satisfactory account of the feel of perception, but we claim that this is not only through explanation of access to modality but also because skill actually provides access to perceptual property in general. We illustrate and substantiate our claims by reference to the recently proposed 'sensorimotor contingency' theory of (...)
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  20.  34
    Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness.Kevin J. O'Regan - 2005
  21. On Failures to Detect Changes in Scenes Across Brief Interruptions.Ronald A. Rensink, Kevin J. O'Regan & James J. Clark - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):127-145.
    When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at (...)
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  22.  25
    Phenomenal Consciousness Lite: No Thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
    The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
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  23.  85
    Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness".Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No - 2001 - In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes.
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  24.  96
    Explaining What People Say About Sensory Qualia.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2010 - In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 31--50.
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  25.  79
    A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts.Lucia Foglia & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):181-196.
    Traditionally, the “Imagery Debate” has opposed two main camps: depictivism and descriptivism. This debate has essentially focused on the nature of the internal representations thought to be involved in imagery, without addressing at all the question of action. More recently, a third, “embodied” view is moving the debate into a new phase. The embodied approach focuses on the interdependence of perception, cognition and action, and in its more radical line this approach promotes the idea that perception is not a process (...)
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  26.  19
    Letter Legibility and Visual Word Recognition.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Word recognition performance varies systematically as a function of where the eyes fixate in the word. Performance is maximal with the eye slightly left of the center of the word, and decreases drastically to both sides of this 'Optimal Viewing Position'. While manipulations of lexical factors have only marginal effects on this phenomenon, previous studies have pointed to a relation between the viewing position effect and letter legibility: When letter legibility drops, the viewing position effect becomes more exaggerated. To further (...)
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  27. Perception, Attention, and the Grand Illusion.Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
    This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking (...)
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  28.  13
    Commentary on Mossio and Taraborelli: Is the Enactive Approach Really Sensorimotor?☆.Frédéric Pascal & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1341-1342.
  29.  31
    Change Blindness.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
  30. On the Brain-Basis of Visual Consciousness: A Sensorimotor Account.Alva Noë & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - In A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press. pp. 567--598.
  31.  13
    The World as an Outside Iconic Memory – No Strong Internal Metric Means No Problem of Visual Stability.J. Kevin O'Regan - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):270-271.
  32.  6
    Commentary on Mossio and Taraborelli: Is the Enactive Approach Really Sensorimotor?Frédéric Pascal & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1341-1342.
  33.  19
    For Peer Review.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Call u the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is incident on a surface, and v the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is reflected off that surface. Philipona & O'Regan (2006) present results from numerical calculations showing that: 1. each surface can be associated with a 3 by 3 matrix A such that the relation v = A u to a very high degree of accuracy for any natural illuminant, 2. the vast majority (...)
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  34.  16
    On Words and Their Letters.Tatjana A. Nazir, J. Kevin O’Regan & Arthur M. Jacobs - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (2):171-174.
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  35.  28
    How to Build a Robot That Feels.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Overview. Consciousness is often considered to have a "hard" part and a not-so-hard part. With the help of work in artificial intelligence and more recently in embodied robotics, there is hope that we shall be able solve the not-so-hard part and make artificial agents that understand their environment, communicate with their friends, and most importantly, have a notion of "self" and "others". But will such agents feel anything? Building the feel into the agent will be the "hard" part.
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  36. Sensorimotor Approach to (Phenomenal) Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2009 - In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 588--593.
     
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  37.  27
    The ‘Feel’ of Seeing.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
  38.  25
    The Emergence of Use of a Rake-Like Tool: A Longitudinal Study in Human Infants.Jacqueline Fagard, Lauriane Rat-Fischer & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  39. Sensorimotor Theory of Consciousness.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2015 - Scholarpedia 10:4952.
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  40.  76
    Comparison of Active and Purely Visual Performance in a Multiple-String Means-End Task in Infants.Lauriane Rat-Fischer, J. Kevin O’Regan & Jacqueline Fagard - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):304-316.
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  41.  15
    Why Early Tactile Speech Aids May Have Failed: No Perceptual Integration of Tactile and Auditory Signals.Aurora Rizza, Alexander V. Terekhov, Guglielmo Montone, Marta Olivetti-Belardinelli & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  42.  1
    6-Month-Old Infants’ Sensitivity to Contingency in a Variant of the Mobile Paradigm With Proximal Stimulation Studied at Fine Temporal Resolution in the Laboratory.Sergiu Tcaci Popescu, Alice Dauphin, Judith Vergne & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    Infants’ ability to monitor “sensorimotor contingencies,” i.e., the sensory effects of their own actions, is an important mechanism underlying learning. One method that has been used to investigate this is the “mobile paradigm,” in which a mobile above an infant’s crib is activated by motion of one of the infant’s limbs. Although successfully used in numerous experiments performed in infants’ homes to investigate memory and other types of learning, the paradigm seems less robust for demonstrating sensitivity to sensorimotor contingencies when (...)
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  43.  77
    Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness.J. K. O'Regan - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    The catastrophe of the eye -- A new view of seeing -- Applying the new view of seeing -- The illusion of seeing everything -- Some contentious points -- Towards consciousness -- Types of consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness, raw feel, and why they're hard -- Squeeze a sponge, drive a porsche : a sensorimotor account of feel -- Consciously experiencing a feel -- The sensorimotor approach to color -- Sensory substitution -- The localization of touch -- The phenomenality plot -- (...)
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  44.  27
    Kevin O'Regan, Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell. Understanding the Feel of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 224 Pp., £22.99, ISBN 978‐0‐19‐977522‐4. [REVIEW]Ophelia Deroy - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):473-476.
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  45.  37
    Commentary on J.K O’Regan and A Noe: A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):979-980.
    O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will (...)
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  46.  30
    Review of Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe “Does Functionalism Really Deal with the Phenomenal Side of Experience?”. [REVIEW]Allen Lane - unknown
    Sensory Motor Contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not give any explanation about why and how objective functional relations should produce phenomenal experience. O’Regan and Noe as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
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  47.  5
    How the Sensorimotor Approach to Consciousness Bridges Both Comparative and Absolute Explanatory Gaps: And Some Refinements of the Theory.J. K. O'Regan - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (5-6):39-65.
    The problem of understanding how physical processes in the brain could give rise to consciousness has been identified with the 'comparative explanatory gap', the problem of explaining why different experiences have the differing qualities they do, and the 'absolute explanatory gap', the problem of explaining why anything can be conscious at all. The main innovation of the sensorimotor theory is that it provides a very appealing way of closing the comparative gap by postulating that the quality of experiences corresponds to (...)
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  48. Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.) - 2015 - MIT Press.
    In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which (...)
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  49. Induced Dependence of Colour Perception on Eye-Movements.A. Bompas & J. K. O'Regan - 2004 - In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception. Malden Ma: Blackwell. pp. 17-18.
  50.  38
    Humour Production May Enhance Observational Learning of a New Tool-Use Action in 18-Month-Old Infants.Rana Esseily, Lauriane Rat-Fischer, Eszter Somogyi, Kevin John O'Regan & Jacqueline Fagard - 2016 - Cognition and Emotion 30 (4).
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