15 found
  1. To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided, showing that poor visibility is not the cause of (...)
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  2. Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking.J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...)
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  3.  54
    Perceptual consciousness, access to modality and skill theories: A way to naturalize phenomenology?Erik Myin & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1):27-45.
    We address the thesis recently proposed by Andy Clark, that skill-mediated access to modality implies phenomenal feel. We agree that a skill theory of perception does indeed offer the possibility of a satisfactory account of the feel of perception, but we claim that this is not only through explanation of access to modality but also because skill actually provides access to perceptual property in general. We illustrate and substantiate our claims by reference to the recently proposed 'sensorimotor contingency' theory of (...)
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  4. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & A. Noe - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011.
  5.  73
    Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
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  6.  83
    Acting out our sensory experience.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1011-1021.
    The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by dismissing qualia, but, on the contrary, by explaining why sensations have a (...)
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  7.  55
    Experience is not something we feel but something we do: a principled way of explaining sensory phenomenology, with Change Blindness and other empirical consequences.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology.
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  8.  30
    The emergence of use of a rake-like tool: a longitudinal study in human infants.Jacqueline Fagard, Lauriane Rat-Fischer & J. Kevin O'Regan - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  9.  28
    Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!J. Kevin O'Regan & Erik Myin - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):520-521.
    The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
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  10.  37
    Change blindness.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
  11.  25
    For Peer Review.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Call u the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is incident on a surface, and v the triplet of cone quantum catch for the light that is reflected off that surface. Philipona & O'Regan (2006) present results from numerical calculations showing that: 1. each surface can be associated with a 3 by 3 matrix A such that the relation v = A u to a very high degree of accuracy for any natural illuminant, 2. the vast majority (...)
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  12.  35
    How to build a robot that feels.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Overview. Consciousness is often considered to have a "hard" part and a not-so-hard part. With the help of work in artificial intelligence and more recently in embodied robotics, there is hope that we shall be able solve the not-so-hard part and make artificial agents that understand their environment, communicate with their friends, and most importantly, have a notion of "self" and "others". But will such agents feel anything? Building the feel into the agent will be the "hard" part.
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  13.  25
    Letter legibility and visual word recognition.J. Kevin O'Regan - unknown
    Word recognition performance varies systematically as a function of where the eyes fixate in the word. Performance is maximal with the eye slightly left of the center of the word, and decreases drastically to both sides of this 'Optimal Viewing Position'. While manipulations of lexical factors have only marginal effects on this phenomenon, previous studies have pointed to a relation between the viewing position effect and letter legibility: When letter legibility drops, the viewing position effect becomes more exaggerated. To further (...)
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  14. The 'feel'of seeing:: an interview with J. Kevin O'Regan.J. Kevin O'Regan - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):278-279.
  15.  16
    The world as an outside iconic memory – no strong internal metric means no problem of visual stability.J. Kevin O'Regan - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):270-271.