Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung. Von E. MACH Emer. Professor an der Unlversltlt Wlen. LEIPZIG Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth 1905. INTRODUCTION XIII On a number of occasions Mach expressed the sentiment, especially in his correspondence, that America was the land of intellectual freedom and opportunity, the coming frontier for a new radical empiricism that would help to wash metaphysics out of philosophy. In 1901 he sponsored the German edition of Concepts and Theories of Modern (...) Physics (1881) 2 by J. B. Stallo, Cincinnati lawyer and philosopher. Mach warmly endorsed Stallo's book because his scientific aims so closely approximated his own, and because Stallo rejected the latent metaphysical elements and concealed ontological assumptions of the mechanical-atomistic inter­ pretation of the world. The second edition of Wiirmelehre was dedicated to Stallo in 1900. The fourth edition of Populiir-wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen (1910), containing seven new essays, was dedicated to Harvard Professor of physiology, philosophY, and psychology, William James. Mach had a strong intellectual affinity for James' pragmatism because, like himself, he recognized that James had come to radically empirical views from science. Both men took pure pre-conceptualized experience, from which the mental and physical predicates of experience are composed, to be neutral rather than real, unreal, objective or subjective. (shrink)

What if gravity satisfied the Klein-Gordon equation? Both particle physics from the 1920s-30s and the 1890s Neumann-Seeliger modification of Newtonian gravity with exponential decay suggest considering a "graviton mass term" for gravity, which is _algebraic_ in the potential. Unlike Nordström's "massless" theory, massive scalar gravity is strictly special relativistic in the sense of being invariant under the Poincaré group but not the 15-parameter Bateman-Cunningham conformal group. It therefore exhibits the whole of Minkowski space-time structure, albeit only indirectly concerning volumes. Massive (...) scalar gravity is plausible in terms of relativistic field theory, while violating most interesting versions of Einstein's principles of general covariance, general relativity, equivalence, and Mach. Geometry is a poor guide to understanding massive scalar gravity: matter sees a conformally flat metric due to universal coupling, but gravity also sees the rest of the flat metric in the mass term. What is the 'true' geometry, one might wonder, in line with Poincaré's modal conventionality argument? Infinitely many theories exhibit this bimetric 'geometry,' all with the total stress-energy's trace as source; thus geometry does not explain the field equations. The irrelevance of the Ehlers-Pirani-Schild construction to a critique of conventionalism becomes evident when multi-geometry theories are contemplated. Much as Seeliger envisaged, the smooth massless limit indicates underdetermination of theories by data between massless and massive scalar gravities---indeed an unconceived alternative. At least one version easily could have been developed before General Relativity; it then would have motivated thinking of Einstein's equations along the lines of Einstein's newly re-appreciated "physical strategy" and particle physics and would have suggested a rivalry from massive spin 2 variants of General Relativity. The Putnam-Grünbaum debate on conventionality is revisited with an emphasis on the broad modal scope of conventionalist views. Massive scalar gravity thus contributes to a historically plausible rational reconstruction of much of 20th-21st century space-time philosophy in the light of particle physics. An appendix reconsiders the Malament-Weatherall-Manchak conformal restriction of conventionality and constructs the 'universal force' influencing the causal structure. Subsequent works will discuss how massive gravity could have provided a template for a more Kant-friendly space-time theory that would have blocked Moritz Schlick's supposed refutation of synthetic _a priori_ knowledge, and how Einstein's false analogy between the Neumann-Seeliger-Einstein modification of Newtonian gravity and the cosmological constant \Lambda generated lasting confusion that obscured massive gravity as a conceptual possibility. (shrink)

The present article is the second in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article are Skinner’s academic and research experiences between 1928, when he entered graduate school at Harvard, and the late 1930s, when he had assumed his first academic position. The article also examines the intellectual climate that emerged during the second quarter of the twentieth century, which is the (...) context out of which radical behaviorism developed as a unique position. Overall, the views for which Skinner is recognized were significantly influenced by such figures as Francis Bacon, Percy Bridgman, William Crozier, Jacques Loeb, Ernst Mach, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson. (shrink)

We compare a “Mach-Zehnder interferometer in time” for cold neutrons with its well-known spatial counterpart and demonstrate the intimate connection between space and time for both setups. Further, we outline a combined space-time interferometer, which coherently splits a wavepacket in longitudinal and lateral direction. On the way towards time interferometry “neutron computer holography” seems to be an attractive application. It allows the three-dimensional reconstruction of an object from the scattered intensity, but in contrast to holography with light, there is (...) no need for a reference wave. On the other hand, the possible resolution is worse than in the light case. (shrink)

The present authors have given a mathematical model of Mach's principle and of the Mach–Einstein doctrine about the complete induction of the inertial masses by the gravitation of the universe. The analytical formulation of the Mach–Einstein doctrine is based on Riemann's generalization of the Lagrangian analytical mechanics (with a generalization of the Galilean transformation) on Mach's definition of the inertial mass and on Einstein's principle of equivalence. All local and cosmological effects—which are postulated as consequences of (...) Mach's principle by C. Neumann, Mach, Friedländer and Einstein—result from the Riemannian dynamics with the Mach–Einstein doctrine. In celestial mechanics it follows, in addition, Einstein's formula for the perihelion motion. In cosmology, the Riemannian mechanics yields two models of an evolutionary universe with the expansion lows R ~ t or R ~ t2. In this paper, secular consequences of the Mach–Einstein doctrine are examined concerning palaeogeophysics and celestial mechanics. The research predicted secular decrease of the Earth's flattening and secular acceleration of the motion of the Moon and of the planets. The numerical values of this secular effect agree very well with the empirical facts. In all cases, the secular variation $\dot{\alpha}$ of the parameter α is the order of magnitude $\dot{\alpha}=-H_0 \alpha$ , where H0 is the instantaneous value of the Hubble constant: $H_0 =\left({\dot{R}/R} \right)_0 \approx \left( {0.5-1.0} \right) \times 10^{-10}a^{-1}$ . The relation of the secular consequences of the Mach–Einstein doctrine to those of Dirac's hypothesis on the expanding Earth, and to Darwin's theory of tidal friction are also discussed. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s favourable comments about science and the senses have recently been taken as evidence of naturalism. Others focus on his falsification thesis: our beliefs are falsifying interpretations of reality. Clark argues that Nietzsche eventually rejects this thesis. This article utilizes the multiple ways of being science friendly in Nietzsche’s context by focussing on Mach’s neutral monism. Mach’s positivism is a natural development of neo-Kantian positions Nietzsche was reacting to. Section 15 of Beyond Good and Evil is crucial to (...) Clark’s interpretation. The presented interpretation makes better sense of this passage and shows that Nietzsche can accept both falsification and empiricism. (shrink)

La polémica Mach-Planck acerca del estado cognitivo de las teorías científicas nos permite llegar a las siguientes conclusiones. No siempre el que defendió las posturas luego asentadas científicamente desarrolló los mejores argumentos en la polémica. Por ejemplo, Planck malinterpretó las tesis de Mach acerca de la imagen científica, sus conceptos y leyes. La postura de ambos estaba fundada en distintas filosofías y, por ende, en distintos sistemas de valores y en modos diferentes de priorizarlos. Hay una relatividad temporal (...) de un aparente vencedor por sobre otro que se invierte en otro momento del desarrollo histórico de la física. No hay algoritmo o argumento definitivo alguno para declarar vencedora a ninguna de las posturas. Dicotomías filosóficas como realismo-instrumentalismo son insuficientes para captar la complejidad de las posturas epistemológicas y ontológicas de los científicos. Finalmente, la polémica enfatiza el rol decisivo de la dimensión filosófica en cuestiones teóricas de la física. The Mach-Planck controversy about the cognitive status of scientific theories lead us to the following conclusions. Not always the one who maintains some theses that look better is the one who advanced the best arguments for criticizing his opponent. Their views were grounded in different philosophies, and consequently, in different valuesystems. There was no absolute winner-loser; each one might look like a winnerloser depending upon de historical and scientific context relative to which the choice is being made. There is no algorithm and definitive argument for declaring a final winner-loser. Standard philosophical dichotomies like realism vs. instrumentalism are insufficient for grasping the complexity of the epistemological and ontological positions of scientists. Finally, the controversy emphasizes the decisive role played by philosophy in the theoretical issues of physics. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans divides the selections into (...) several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans divides the selections into (...) several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

It is argued that, under the assumption that the strong principle of equivalence holds, the theoretical realization of the Mach principle (in the version of the Mach-Einstein doctrine) and of the principle of general relativity are alternative programs. That means only the former or the latter can be realized—at least as long as only field equations of second order are considered. To demonstrate this we discuss two sufficiently wide classes of theories (Einstein-Grossmann and Einstein-Mayer theories, respectively) both embracing (...) Einstein's theory of general relativity (GRT). GRT is shown to be just that “degenerate case” of the two classes which satisfies the principle of general relativity but not the Mach-Einstein doctrine; in all the other cases one finds an opposite situation.These considerations lead to an interesting “complementarity” between general relativity and Mach-Einstein doctine. In GRT, via Einstein's equations, the covariant and Lorentz-invariant Riemann-Einstein structure of the space-time defines the dynamics of matter: The symmetric matter tensor Ttk is given by variation of the Lorentz-invariant scalar densityL mat, and the dynamical equations satisfied by Tik result as a consequence of the Bianchi identities valid for the left-hand side of Einstein's equations. Otherwise, in all other cases, i.e., for the “Mach-Einstein theories” here under consideration, the matter determines the coordinate or reference systems via gravity. In Einstein-Grossmann theories using a holonomic representation of the space-time structure, the coordinates are determined up to affine (i.e. linear) transformations, and in Einstein-Mayer theories based on an anholonomic representation the reference systems (the tetrads) are specified up to global Lorentz transformations. The corresponding conditions on the coordinate and reference systems result from the postulate that the gravitational field is compatible with the strong equivalence of inertial and gravitational masses. (shrink)

Which offers the better philosophical explanation, a philosophy of nature or a philosophy of space? Yves Simon posed this question in a series of lectures at the University of Chicago in 1959. Aristotle champions the philosophy of nature which recognizes a world of substantiality, individuality, qualitative differences, and mutability. Such a world is best explained in terms of causes; causes of real things. Descartes advocates a philosophy of space which ignores or denies qualitatively distinct realities and establishes "appearance saving" laws. (...) Thus Simon establishes the protagonists of the great dialogue: Nature versus Space, real things versus phenomena, causality versus laws, Aristotle versus Descartes. Simon does not pretend to be neutral in this debate. He favors Aristotle's theory of causality with its metaphysical-based view of nature. The Cartesian physics pays too great a price in "saving the appearances." In fact, Simon contends, it leads to an erroneous notion of science. Simon is critical of modern thinkers who have defined science in such a way that "Nature" is excluded. He is critical of early positivists in general, and Comte and Mach in particular, for giving inadequate descriptions of science. Simon contends that an Aristotelian framework is helpful in understanding science's role. In his style and approach to Aristotle's philosophy of Nature, Simon is similar to Frederick Woodbridge in the latter's efforts to show the relevance of Aristotle's view of nature. Because of his terminal illness, Yves Simon was not able to revise and publish the lectures he began in 1959. This collection of rather informal talks shows why he was a popular teacher and lecturer.--J. J. R. (shrink)

This is a review essay of what is probably the best contribution to the history of the philosophical investigation into thought experiments.

In the most recent edition of Language, Truth and Logic , Professor A. J. Ayer still maintains that pure mathematics is analytic, being in fact merely a vast system of tautology. He is much more confident about this than are most contemporary professional mathematicians who have investigated the foundations of their subject. Following the breakdown of the efforts both of Frege and of Russell and Whitehead to derive pure mathematics from logic, i.e. to prove that the denial of any one (...) proposition of mathematics would necessarily be self-contradictory, Hilbert attempted to prove the more modest thesis that pure mathematics is consistent, i.e. that no two propositions of mathematics can contradict each other; but in 1931 Gödel discovered that even this thesis was undecidable according to the “rules of the game.” As Weyl has recently lamented, “From this history one thing should be clear: we are less certain than ever about the ultimate foundations of mathematics.” The sense in which Ayer uses the terms analytic and tautology implies also that in his view the activities of pure mathematicians lead to nothing new. It is true that he remarks that “there is a sense in which analytic propositions do give us new knowledge. They call attention to linguistic usages of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they reveal unsuspected implications in our assertions and beliefs.” But, he continues, “we can also see that there is a sense in which they may be said to add nothing to our knowledge. For they may be said to tell us what we know already. ” This denial of novelty in mathematics is as typical of contemporary positivism as the prophecy of Comte that the composition of the stars would never be revealed to us and the objections of Mach to the atomic hypothesis were characteristic of nineteenth century positivism. Indeed, one wonders why the term positivism should have been appropriated by successive philosophers whose common outlook could be so much more fittingly described as negativism. (shrink)

The philosophical roots of Malinowski's functionalism are in the academic circles of Krakow, where three figures seem to have exerted a particularly strong influence: Pawlicki, Straszewski, and Heinrich. The predominant trend in philosophy at that time was empiriocriticism, as developed by Mach and Avenarius. Also important were F. A. Lange's interpretation of Marburg neo-Kantianism. It should be noted that the historical philosophy field was extremely broad and diverse. Functionalism, a philosophically open concept, cannot be subordinated to any one philosophical (...) system, although the "openness" of functionalism is not absolute but complemented by its "closedness" to certain other philosophies. Praxism pervades functionalist theory and even creates its foundation. Malinowski approach is entirely scientific, but functionalism is never just empirical. Malinowski realized that pure experience is as impossible as pure reasoning. (shrink)

According to the Einstein-Mayer theory of the Riemanniann space-time with Einstein-Cartan teleparallelism, the local Lorentz invariance is broken by the gravitational field defining Machian reference systems. This breaking of symmetry implies the occurrence of “hidden matter” in the Einstein equations of gravity. The hidden matter is described by the non-Lorentz-invariant energy-momentum tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ satisfying the relation $\hat \Theta _{i;k}^k = 0$ . The tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ is formed from the Einstein-Cartan torsion field given by the anholonomy objects, (...) FAik=2hA[i,k], and appears together with Hilbert’s energy-momentum tensor T* ik and Poincaré’s pressure λgik on the right-hand side of Einstein’s equations so that one has $$R_{ik} - (1/2)g_{ik} R = - \kappa T*_{ik} - \lambda g_{ik} - \hat \Theta _{ik}$$ According to this theory, in the universe and in cosmic systems one must excep “invisible masses” described by the Poincaré and Einstein-Cartan terms to exist. The torsion field FAik makes the space-time a Machian universe; it is of the same nature as the “weak interacting matter” discussed in astrophysics. (shrink)

Empirical and theoretical evidence show that the astrophysical problem of dark matter might be solved by a theory of Einstein-Mayer type. In this theory, up to global Lorentz rotations, the reference system is determined by the motion of cosmic matter. Thus, one is led to a “Riemannian space with teleparallelism” realizing a geometric version of the Mach-Einstein doctrine. The field equations of this gravitational theory contain hidden matter terms, where the existence of hidden matter is inferred solely from its (...) gravitational effects. It is argued that, in the nonrelativistic mechanical approximation, they provide an inertia-free mechanics, where the inertial mass of a body is induced by the gravitational action of the comic masses. Interpreted from the Newtonian point of view, this mechanics shows that the effective gravitational mass of astrophysical objects depends on r such that one expects the existence of dark matter. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been asserted or implied by Mach and more recent writers, the law of illumination and the study of photometry were not ignored in the years between Kepler's first enunciation of the former in 1609 and Bouguer's Essai on the latter in 1729. The law of illumination was in fact denied in 1613 by Aguilonius. It was probably rediscovered independently and certainly reformulated in more modern terms by Mersenne and Castelli in 1634, and by Boulliau in (...) 1638. It was again formulated and this time demonstrated empirically by Montanari no later than 1676, and possibly as early as 1634 by Castelli. Although neither the law nor photometry were major concerns before Bouguer, they were not completely neglected either. (shrink)

A considerable body of research supports the link between Machiavellianism and antisocial forms of behavior at work. Yet, meta-analytic findings and existing theory allude to a more complex story, whereby Machiavellian employees’ engagement in antisocial acts is likely to be simultaneously influenced by countervailing situational forces. To promote more nuanced, contextualized knowledge of high Machs’ antisocial tendencies at work, we developed and tested a social context model that describes how multiple situational factors may, at once, provoke _and_ constrain the tendency (...) of such individuals to engage in one notable form of antisocial behavior at work: social undermining. Specifically, we argue that Machiavellian employees likely experience competing motivations to undermine their colleagues as a result of two countervailing situational factors that are relevant to their self-interests: anticipated organizational change and perceptions of coworkers’ exchange quality. To develop our predictions, we draw on trait activation theory’s core assertion that employees’ behavior is multiply determined, such that trait–behavior relations stem from a complex interplay among diverse and potentially competing trait-relevant situational cues. The results of a three-wave, time-lagged survey supported our predictions that anticipated change would strengthen the positive relation between Machiavellianism and undermining, while perceptions of coworkers’ exchange quality would attenuate it. Additionally, the results supported our three-way interaction hypothesis that perceived coworker exchange quality would weaken the two-way interaction effect of Machiavellianism and anticipated organizational change on social undermining. We discuss the implications of our findings, as well as avenues for future research. (shrink)

Afshar et al. claim that their experiment shows a violation of the complementarity inequality. In this work, we study their claim using a modified Mach-Zehnder setup that represents a simpler version of the Afshar experiment. We find that our results are consistent with Afshar et al. experimental findings. However, we show that within standard quantum mechanics the results of the Afshar experiment do not lead to a violation of the complementarity inequality. We show that their claim originates from a (...) particular technique they use to analyze their results. In their analysis, they assume a classical concept, that particles have a definite trajectory before detection, thus, they obtain which-way information by particle detection plus path extrapolation by applying momentum conservation. This analysis technique is standard in experimental particle physics. Important discoveries such as the detection of vector bosons have been made through the application of this technique. We note that particle detection plus path extrapolation is a suitable technique within de Broglie-Bohm theory of quantum mechanics. (shrink)