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Jesse Prinz [74]Jesse J. Prinz [41]Janosch Prinz [9]J. Prinz [4]
Jessica Prinz [3]J. J. Prinz [1]Joachim Prinz [1]Jesse Jonathan Prinz [1]
See also
Janosch Prinz
University of East Anglia
  1. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  2. The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing (...)
  3.  67
    The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience.Jesse Prinz - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.
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  4. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
  5.  80
    The Emotional Construction of Morals * by Jesse Prinz * Oxford University Press, 2007. XII + 334 Pp. 25.00: Summary. [REVIEW]Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
    The Emotional Construction of Morals is a book about moral judgements – the kinds of mental states we might express by sentences such as, ‘It's bad to flash your neighbors’, or ‘You ought not eat your pets’. There are three basic questions that get addressed: what are the psychological states that constitute such judgements? What kinds of properties do such judgements refer to? And, where do these judgements come from? The first question concerns moral psychology, the second metaethics and the (...)
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  6. Political Realism as Ideology Critique.Janosch Prinz & Enzo Rossi - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (3):334-348.
    This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams (...)
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  7. The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
    Recent work in cognitive science provides overwhelming evidence for a link between emotion and moral judgment. I review?ndings from psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and research on psychopathology and conclude that emotions are not merely correlated with moral judgments but they are also, in some sense, both necessary and suf?cient. I then use these?ndings along with some anthropological observations to support several philosophical theories:?rst, I argue that sentimentalism is true: to judge that something is wrong is to have a sentiment of disapprobation (...)
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  8. Against Empathy.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.
    Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. (...)
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  9. Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies.Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
    When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in (...)
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  10. Is Empathy Necessary for Morality.Jesse J. Prinz - 2011 - In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 211--229.
  11. Is the Mind Really Modular?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 22--36.
    When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized (...)
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  12. Is Love and Emotion?Arina Pismenny & Jesse Prinz - 2017 - In Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love. New York, NY, USA:
    What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of (...)
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  13. The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 174--196.
  14. Is Attention Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness?Jesse Prinz - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 174--204.
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  15. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
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  16.  25
    Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape the Human Mind.Jesse J. Prinz - 2012 - W.W. Norton.
    A timely and uniquely compelling plea for the importance of nurture in the ongoing nature-nurture debate. In this era of genome projects and brain scans, it is all too easy to overestimate the role of biology in human psychology. But in this passionate corrective to the idea that DNA is destiny, Jesse Prinz focuses on the most extraordinary aspect of human nature: that nurture can supplement and supplant nature, allowing our minds to be profoundly influenced by experience and culture. Drawing (...)
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  17.  52
    Raymond Geuss’ Radicalization of Realism in Political Theory.Janosch Prinz - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (8):777-796.
    Raymond Geuss has been viewed as one of the figureheads of the recent debates about realism in political theory. This interpretation, however, depends on a truncated understanding of his work of the past 30 years. I will offer the first sustained engagement with this work which allows understanding his realism as a project for reorienting political theory, particularly the relationship between political theory and politics. I interpret this reorientation as a radicalization of realism in political theory through the combination of (...)
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  18. The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):117-144.
    Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are (...)
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  19. Is Consciousness Embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 419--437.
  20.  73
    Aesthetic Emotions Reconsidered.Joerg Fingerhut & Jesse J. Prinz - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):223-239.
    We define aesthetic emotions as emotions that underlie the evaluative assessment of artworks. They are separated from the wider class of art-elicited emotions. Aesthetic emotions historically have been characterized as calm, as lacking specific patterns of embodiment, and as being a sui generis kind of pleasure. We reject those views and argue that there is a plurality of aesthetic emotions contributing to praise. After presenting a general account of the nature of emotions, we analyze twelve positive aesthetic emotions in four (...)
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  21. Attention and Consciousness.Felipe de Brigard & J. Prinz - 2010 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 1 (1):51-59.
    For the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In this paper we survey some of the most important recent findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first (...)
     
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  22. Is Morality Innate?Jesse Prinz - manuscript
    Thus declares Francis Hutcheson, expressing a view widespread during the Enlightenment, and throughout the history of philosophy. According to this tradition, we are by nature moral, and ourS concern for good and evil is as natural to us as our capacity to feel pleasure and pain. The link between morality and human nature has been a common theme since ancient times, and, with the rise of modern empirical moral psychology, it remains equally popular today. Evolutionary ethicists, ethologists, developmental psychologists, social (...)
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  23. Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
  24. A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  25. Beyond Appearances : The Content of Sensation and Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 434--460.
    There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally.
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  26.  70
    Diachronic Identity and the Moral Self.Jesse Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2016 - In Julian Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 449-464.
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  27.  57
    The Aesthetic Self. The Importance of Aesthetic Taste in Music and Art for Our Perceived Identity.Joerg Fingerhut, Javier Gomez-Lavin, Claudia Winklmayr & Jesse J. Prinz - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral (...)
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  28. Siegel’s Get Rich Quick Scheme.Jesse Prinz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):827-835.
  29. A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness.Jesse Prinz - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  30.  87
    Emotion Recognition as a Social Skill.Gen Eickers & Jesse J. Prinz - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York City, New York, USA: pp. 347-361.
    This chapter argues that emotion recognition is a skill. A skill perspective on emotion recognition draws attention to underappreciated features of this cornerstone of social cognition. Skills have a number of characteristic features. For example, they are improvable, practical, and flexible. Emotion recognition has these features as well. Leading theories of emotion recognition often draw inadequate attention to these features. The chapter advances a theory of emotion recognition that is better suited to this purpose. It proposes that emotion recognition involves (...)
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  31. All Consciousness is Perceptual.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
  32. Against Illusionism.J. Prinz - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):186-196.
    Illusionism is the view that phenomenal qualities are an illusion. It contrasts with both dualist theories and reductive realist theories, which identify phenomenal qualities with physical or functional states. Here I defend reductive realism against three lines of objection derived from Keith Frankish, and I offer two arguments against illusionism. According to one argument, illusionism collapses into realism, and according to the other, it introduces a deep puzzle akin to the hard problem. I conclude that reductive realism is more compelling.
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  33. Emotion and Aesthetic Value.Jesse Prinz - 2014
    Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are (...)
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  34. Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 189--208.
  35. Embodied Emotions.Jesse Prinz - 2004 - In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oup Usa.
     
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  36. Financial Power and Democratic Legitimacy.Janosch Prinz & Enzo Rossi - 2022 - Social Theory and Practice 48 (1):115-140.
    To what extent are questions of sovereign debt a matter for political rather than scientific or moral adjudication? We answer that question by defending three claims. We argue that (i) moral and technocratic takes on sovereign debt tend to be ideological in a pejorative sense of the term, and that therefore (ii) sovereign debt should be politicised all the way down. We then show that this sort of politicisation need not boil down to the crude Realpolitik of debtor-creditor power relations—a (...)
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  37. Are Emotions Feelings?Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
    The majority of emotion researchers reject the feeling theory of emotions; they deny that emotions are feelings. Some of these researchers admit that emotions have feelings as components, but they insist that emotions contain other components as well, such as cognitions. I argue for a qualified version of the feeling theory. I present evidence in support William James's conjecture that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. When such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But the bodily (...)
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  38. Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 137-160.
  39. Emotions Embodied.Jesse Prinz - 2004 - In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a (...)
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  40. The Moral Emotions.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
     
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  41.  72
    Sound Morality: Irritating and Icky Noises Amplify Judgments in Divergent Moral Domains.Angelika Seidel & Jesse Prinz - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):1-5.
    Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment. Anger is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against persons, such as battery and unfairness, and disgust is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against nature, such as sexual transgressions and cannibalism. To date, however, it has not been shown that induction of these two emotions has divergent effects. In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgust. We use sounds to elicit (...)
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  42. The Aesthetics of Punk Rock.Jesse Prinz - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):583-593.
    Philosophers should listen to punk rock. Though largely ignored in analytic aesthetics, punk can shed light on the nature, limits, and value of art. Here, I will begin with an overview of punk aesthetics and then extrapolate two lessons. First, punk intentionally violates widely held aesthetic norms, thus raising questions about the plasticity of taste. Second, punk music is associated with accompanying visual styles, fashion, and attitudes; this points to a relationship between art and identity. Together, these lessons suggest that (...)
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  43. Which Emotions Are Basic?Jesse Prinz - 2004 - In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 69--87.
    There are two major perspectives on the origin of emotions. According to one, emotions are the products of natural selection. They are evolved adaptations, best understood using the explanatory tools of evolutionary psychology. According to the other, emotions are socially constructed, and they vary across cultural boundaries. There is evidence supporting both perspectives. In light of this, some have argued both approaches are right. The standard strategy for compromise is to say that some emotions are evolved and others are constructed. (...)
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  44. The Return of Concept Empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  45. Against Moral Nativism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 167--189.
  46.  96
    For Valence.Jesse Prinz - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):5-13.
    In a provocative and important article, Robert Solomon argues that emotion researchers should abandon the notion of valence: it is used many different ways, and no single construct captures the pretheoretical distinction between positive and negative emotions. I echo Solomon in arguing that some of the most popular theories of valence are unlikely to succeed, though my case against these constructs comes from a noncognitive, as opposed to cognitive, perspective. I then argue that there is one notion of valence, related (...)
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  47. When is Perception Conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.
    Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality. But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. That’s a matter of controversy. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some (...)
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  48.  46
    Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
  49. The Fractionation of Introspection.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.
    Edward Titchener, one of the great champions of introspectionist psychology, declared that 'the term Introspection, as we find it used today, is highly equivocal, and that the procedure which it connotes may be scientifically illegitimate, or even wholly imaginary' . He made the point because he wanted to insulate his preferred method of doing psychological research from criticisms that were directed against forms of introspection that he conceded to be unreliable. The point, however, is not just that we can introspect (...)
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  50.  26
    Emotion and Political Polarization.Jesse Prinz - 2021 - In Ana Falcato (ed.), The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1-25.
    Political polarization is a major source of conflict in multiparty democracies, and there is evidence that it is on the rise. Polarization can be analyzed as an emotional phenomenon. First, it is governed by negative feelings towards members of opposing political factions. Members of opposing political factions regard each other with contempt, fear, and disgust, among other negative feelings. Second, it is associated with ideologies: beliefs that are held with a degree of passion that is disproportionate to the available reasons, (...)
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