Let κ be a cardinal which is measurable after generically adding ${\beth_{\kappa+\omega}}$ many Cohen subsets to κ and let ${\mathcal G= ( \kappa,E )}$ be the κ-Rado graph. We prove, for 2 ≤ m < ω, that there is a finite value ${r_m^+}$ such that the set [κ] m can be partitioned into classes ${\langle{C_i:i (...) ${\mathcal G}$ in ${\mathcal G}$ such that ${[\mathcal{G} ^\ast ] ^m\cap C_i}$ is monochromatic. It follows that ${\mathcal{G}\rightarrow (\mathcal{G} ) ^m_{<\kappa/r_m^+}}$ , that is, for any coloring of ${[ \mathcal {G} ] ^m}$ with fewer than κ colors there is a copy ${\mathcal{G} ^{\prime}}$ of ${\mathcal{G}}$ such that ${[\mathcal{G} ^{\prime} ] ^{m}}$ has at most ${r_m^+}$ colors. On the other hand, we show that there are colorings of ${\mathcal{G}}$ such that if ${\mathcal{G} ^{\prime}}$ is any copy of ${\mathcal{G}}$ then ${C_i\cap [\mathcal{G} ^{\prime} ] ^m\not=\emptyset}$ for all ${i 2 we have ${r_m^+ > r_m}$ where r m is the corresponding number of types for the countable Rado graph. (shrink)

What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...) that will concern me in this paper is that the story fails to include an agent-or, more precisely, fails to cast the agent in his proper role. (shrink)

Providing an original and systematic treatment of foundational issues in philosophy of religion, J. L. Schellenberg's new book addresses the structure of..

Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.

Nous ne pouvons pas laisser l'avenir de l'humanité et les questions écologiques à l'appréciation de quelques-uns. Ce problème mérite un véritable débat scientifique, philosophique et politique. Au milieu des incertitudes grandissantes, cet ouvrage se propose comme une lecture critique d'une culture dominée par la raison technoscientifique et la puissance capitaliste. Si l'humanité doit continuer à exister, comme le pense Hans Jonas, comment la vulnérabilité peut-elle devenir une force, un levier pour sa préservation? Le devoir-être des générations futures implique un devoir-agir (...) urgent de la part des générations actuelles. Lorsque cette exigence est menacée, la responsabilité s'impose comme un devoir de type kantien. L'humanité doit redécouvrir un nouveau rapport au monde : elle doit reconnaître que la nature est limitée et qu'elle n'est pas disponible à volonté. L'amour de la nature, la sobriété, la justice semblent incontournables dans l'exercice de cet impératif: 'Agis de façon que les effets de ton action soient compatibles avec la permanence d'une vie authentiquement humaine sur terre'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Retributive theories of punishment argue that punishing a criminal for a crime she committed is sufficient reason for a justified and morally permissible punishment. But what about when the state gets lucky in its decision to punish? I argue that retributive theories of punishment are subject to “Gettier” style cases from epistemology. Such cases demonstrate that the state needs more than to just get lucky, and as these retributive theories of punishment stand, there is no anti-luck condition. I’ll argue that (...) Gettier-style cases demonstrate an impermissible instance of punishment, even though they meet the conditions of retributive theories of punishment. Retributive theories are, therefore, too weak. The safety condition from epistemology provides the anti-luck condition needed for permissible punishment. I argue that two forms of retributivism, rights-forfeiture and what I call standard retributivism, are both subject to Gettier-style cases. Unlike the literature on standards of proof, this paper argues that safety is a condition on punishment itself, i.e., in all nearby possible worlds, the accuser must correctly accuse the convicted for the crime they actually committed. (shrink)

J.L. Schellenberg offers a path to a new kind of religious outlook. Reflection on our early stage in the evolutionary process leads to skepticism about religion, but also offers a new answer to the problem of faith and reason, and the possibility of a new, evolutionary form of religion.

Supervaluationism is often described as the most popular semantic treatment of indeterminacy. There’s little consensus, however, about how to fill out the bare-bones idea to include a characterization of logical consequence. The paper explores one methodology for choosing between the logics: pick a logic thatnorms beliefas classical consequence is standardly thought to do. The main focus of the paper considers a variant of standard supervaluational, on which we can characterizedegrees of determinacy. It applies the methodology above to focus ondegree logic. (...) This is developed first in a basic, single-premise case; and then extended to the multipremise case, and to allowdegreesof consequence. The metatheoretic properties of degree logic are set out. On the positive side, the logic is supraclassical—all classical valid sequents are degree logic valid. Strikingly, metarules such as cut and conjunction introduction fail. (shrink)

Hailed by the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society as "undoubtedly a major addition to the literature of mathematical logic," this volume examines the essential topics and theorems of mathematical reasoning. No background in logic is assumed, and the examples are chosen from a variety of mathematical fields. Starting with an introduction to symbolic logic, the first eight chapters develop logic through the restricted predicate calculus. Topics include the statement calculus, the use of names, an axiomatic treatment of the statement (...) calculus, descriptions, and equality. Succeeding chapters explore abstract set theory—with examinations of class membership as well as relations and functions—cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, and the axiom of choice. An invaluable reference book for all mathematicians, this text is suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students. Numerous exercises make it particularly appropriate for classroom use. (shrink)

Ultimism and the aims of human immaturity -- Faith without details, or how to practice skeptical religion -- Simple faith and the complexities of tradition -- The structure of faith justification -- How skeptical faith is true to reason -- Anselm's idea -- Leibniz's ambition -- Paley's wonder -- Pascal's wager -- Kant's postulate -- James's will -- Faith is positively justified : the many modes of religious vision.

Prispevek obravnava nekatere pojme politične filozofije Clauda Leforta. Pokazati želi, da za rekonstrukcijo politične filozofije, ki se je loteva Lefort, ni toliko konstitutiven njen prelom z znanstvenim diskurzom, ampak vse prej pojem simbolnega, ime za družbeno, ki je zavezano razliki in delitvi.

The objective of the present essay is to show that the traditional dilemma of philosophy, namely, does science think or does not think, has today become the problem that science itself has to solve. To assert that science thinks means first that science, when it thinks, constructs its object in an always specific manner; second, in construing its object, it adds to it the real, i.e., a reference, external to the scientific construction itself, which science then discovers as the basis (...) and source of its construction. This article argues that it is for strictly scientific reasons that science is today faced with the task of affirming itself as a domain of thought in both aforementioned meanings. Affirming the view that science thinks is a scientific struggle for the existence of politics of emancipation. (shrink)

Der Beitrag geht, sich auf die Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten und die Kritik der praktischen Vernunft beziehend, der Frage nach, ob es möglich ist, Kants praktische Philosophie, jenseits des Dilemmas abstrakter moralischer Universalismus vs. Rechte des Partikulären als Ansatz einer Theorie des subjektivierten Handelns zu begreifen. Das heisst eines Handelns, in dem das Individuum nicht nur im "Dienste der Güter" bzw. seiner empirisch-pathologischen Interessen und Neigungen steht. In der Beantwortung dieser Frage wird die Aussage des kategorischen Imperativs "ich soll (...) so oder so handeln, ob ich gleich nichts anderes wollte" im ersten Schritt als eine Forderung verstanden, die nicht einfach nichts Empirisches zu wollen verlangt, sondern das Wollen an ein Nichts als Etwas bindet. Im zweiten Schritt wird dann gezeigt, dass am Ort dieses Nichts als Etwas das Vernunftfaktum als abgründiger Grund eines Handelns steht, das mit dem Anspruch auftritt, für niemanden zu gelten, wenn es nicht bedingungslos für alle geltend gemacht werden kann. (shrink)

A partir la thèse avancée par Monique David-Ménard, selon laquelle l’entendement réussi là où la raison échoue, il s’agit d’examiner la révolution kantienne dans la manière de penser. Pour tirer les conséquences du renversement dans la pensée mis en oeuvre par la philosophie kantienne, l’auteur interroge la constitution de la réalité dans la perspective transcendantale comme double opération avec le non-savoir portant respectivement sur le sujet et le noumène. Sur le fond de cette interrogation, il montre que la réalité à (...) laquelle a affaire la philosophie kantienne n’est ni la réalité objective constituée, ni la réalité hallucinée du désir de la raison transgressant les limites de la connaissance, mais à une réalité subjectivée, constituée par la mise en scène de la double destitution : celle de la réalité phénoménale et celle de la raison. C’est sur ce point que peut s’établir une alliance militante entre la philosophie et la psychanalyse, alliance dont l’enjeu principal, pour l’une comme pour l’autre, consiste justement en ceci que chacune, pour son propre compte, pense la réalité comme une telle scène du Deux. (shrink)

Članek utemeljuje trditev, da za transcendentalno teorijo objektivnosti nista značilni le občost in nujnost, ampak tudi refleksivnost. Teorija objektivnosti se vselej tudi že obrača nazaj nase in določa pomen lastne določitve objektivnega spoznanja. Samonanašalnost spoznavne konstitucije objekta pa se izraža v nujnosti zveze med realnim nasprotjem in dialektičnim nasprotjem. Skozi to razmerje spoznanje ni le določeno kot objektivno, ampak je vselej tudi že naddoločeno kot uspeh. Pomen konstitucije spoznavnega objekta je uspeh, analiza Kantove fasciniranosti z nevarno bližino uma in norosti (...) pa pokaže, da misli njegova filozofija uspeh kot dejanje, s katerim se uspe um razmejiti od lastne norosti. (shrink)

This article aims at clarifying the status of the Idea in two of Badiou's recent works: Second manifeste pour la philosophie and L'hypothèse communiste. Badiou sets out from the assumption that the operation with the Idea implies an affirmation of the materialism of a philosophy that is under the conditon of four generic procedures. In his attempt to elaborate Badiou's materialism of the Idea, the author does not turn to Plato, as one would expect, but, rather, to Kant's theory of (...) ideas such as it is presented in the Transcendental Dialectics of the first Critique. In so doing, the author seeks to develop Kant's idea in terms of the act. Posing the question of the Idea in terms of the act has at least two advantages: it shows how the pure reason separates itself from the Thing in itself that affects it while allowing for its appearance in the world. (shrink)

Analysing the role of Kant’s third and final Critique, the _Critique of Judgement_, in the system of Kant’s three Critiques (_Critique of Pure Reason_, _Critique of Practical Reason_, _Critique of Judgement_), the paper posits that with the conclusion of the system of critiques in the third _Critique_, Kant succeeds in presenting it as a point of a transfinitisation of knowledge within the critiques’ system.

It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression (...) in one or another natural language; for example, they try to figure out how the temperature could be rising compatibly with the substitutivity of identicals. The philosophers, by contrast, keep an eye on the large, foundational issues, such as: what's the relation between sense and denotation; what's the relation between thought and language; whether translation is determinate; and whether life is like a fountain. Every now and then the philosophers and the semanticists are supposed to get together and compare notes on their respective progress. Or lack thereof. (shrink)

This paper offers an alternate explanation of cases from the doxastic wronging literature. These cases violate what I call the degree of inquiry right—a novel account of zetetic obligations to inquire when interests are at stake. The degree of inquiry right is a moral right against other epistemic agents to inquire to a certain threshold when a belief undermines one’s interests. Thus, the agents are sometimes obligated to leave inquiry open. I argue that we have relevant interests in reputation, relationships, (...) and the well-being of our social groups. These interests generate obligations against others to “do their homework” before closing inquiry. This alternate account makes better sense of puzzles that accounts of doxastic wronging fall prey to. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to elaborate on the phenomenological approach to expertise as proposed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus and to give an account of the extent to which their approach may contribute to a better understanding of how athletes may use their cognitive capacities during high-level skill execution. Dreyfus and Dreyfus's non-representational view of experience-based expertise implies that, given enough relevant experience, the skill learner, when expert, will respond intuitively to immediate situations with no recourse to deliberate actions (...) or mental representations. The paper will subsequently outline some implications and consequences of such an approach and will also examine to what extent Dreyfus and Dreyfus's skill model is capable to resist different attacks that have been made against their view, and in particular regarding the practical application of their approach to the skill domain of competitive sport. (shrink)