Norman Kretzmann's recent analysis of the natural law slogan ``lex iniusta non est lex'' (an unjust law is not a law) demonstrates the coherence of the slogan and makes a case for its practical value, but I shall argue that it also ends up showing that the slogan fails to mark any interesting conceptual or practical division between natural law and legal positivist views about the nature of law. I argue that this is a happy result. The non-est-lex slogan has (...) been used to exaggerate the extent of disagreement about the nature of law and has diverted critics of natural law theory from recognizing that the main disagreement between natural lawyers and legal positivists centres on theories of practical reason and how they affect our understanding of the relationship between law and morality. This extends the debate about the nature of law somewhat beyond the traditional boundaries of philosophy of law, but these boundaries are due in part to the diversion created by debate over the non-est-lex slogan. Recognizing that the non-est-lex slogan fails on its own to mark any interesting practical or conceptual division between natural law theories and legal positivism should therefore focus and encourage debate on matters of genuine substance between these outlooks. The disagreement, however, may turn out to be primarily metaphysical and explanatory and not normative in nature. (shrink)
Cohen states in the last sentence of his book that his analysis in no way presupposes the controversial labor theory of value. For him, the contradictions of capitalist production result from the fact that its function is to create exchange value. The statements themselves and the fact that they come very late in the book illustrate two distinctive characteristics of the work. First, Cohen espouses what he calls a technological interpretation of Marx. For him, the driving force of history is (...) the steady increase in the capacity of productive forces. Capitalism supersedes feudalism because of its ability to produce more. This technological interpretation of Marx is a theory of history because only certain production relations allow for the development and expansion of productive forces. For example, the levels of production attained by capitalism would be unthinkable within the context of lord and serf. Secondly, it is not really clear that Cohen is defending a theory of history until he formulates the primacy thesis in chapter 6 and elaborates upon it and the rise of capitalism in chapter 7. The primacy thesis states that the production relations of society are explained by the level of development of its productive forces. Cohen seems to dispense with what is often thought of as the philosophy of history in his discussion of the Hegelian roots of Marxism in the first chapter. He proceeds to analyze the distinction between productive forces and production relations and its consequences for the phenomenon of fetishism in chapters 2-5. These first chapters, and some later ones as well, seem to have the property of belaboring at great length elementary problems raised by the preface to the Critique of Political Economy, and Capital as well. For example, in his distinction between productive forces and production relations, Cohen says that the two must not be confused because relations hold between objects while forces are properties of objects. He says that a soldier who guards peasants tilling the soil is not part of the labor power because he fulfills a social rather than an economic need. Then he presents and elaborates upon a list of production relations. Cohen might have avoided the need for such involved analysis if he had clearly delineated the methodological import of his work in the introduction or the first chapter. I refer to his theory of functional explanation. It is, however, only after he has discussed the problem of base and superstructure in chapter 8 that he comes to examine functional analysis in chapters 9 and 10. Since functional explanation is the crux of his defence of Marxism as a theory of history, the reader deserves a more thorough preparation for it in an introduction. (shrink)
This book of twelve essays is interdisciplinary, in the sense that it contains the lectures of experts in various disciplines—six in philosophy, three in psychology, one in electronic design and communication, one in English and American studies, and one in linguistics—all of whom focus on communication and understanding from their own perspectives.
The six essays in this book grew out of guest lectures presented during an interdisciplinary seminar at Purdue University in the spring of 1974. The authors, from departments of English, philosophy, and speech communication, share authority in the discipline of rhetoric, the unifying concept and focal point for the seminar and the book.
Fekete, describing his study as a "theoretical critique" of "modern critical theory in the Anglo-American tradition," sets out to "discover and elucidate... the historical interests" behind "bourgeois critical theory" and to show how this theory militates against human freedom. Fekete contends that modern critical theory, particularly as embodied in the work of Marshall McLuhan, has become the "theoretical face" of neocapitalism and that it has become absorbed into neocapitalist society. The Critical Twilight, designed to reveal the social causes and bias (...) of modern critical theory, grew out of the student unrest of the nineteen-sixties, when Fekete discovered the power of neocapitalist culture. (shrink)
El deseo y oraciones de Juan XXIII pidiendo que el Vaticano II fuera un Pentecostés para la Iglesia, fue ampliamente escuchado por el Señor. El Vaticano II fue una auténtica irrupción del Espíritu sobre la Iglesia, un acontecimiento salvífico, un kairós. Hay un “antes” un “después” del Vaticano II.