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Julia Tanney [54]J. Tanney [7]Julia Lynn Tanney [1]
  1.  96
    Real Rules.Julia Tanney - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):499-507.
    Wright is correct in surmising that Wittgenstein's refusal to be drawn into the metaphysical and epistemological questions that his own discussion of rules allegedly raises results from his rejection of the assumptions that pit the Platonist against the communitarian. This paper shows why the entire idea (which continues to dazzle philosophers)—that in speaking a language or in engaging in other normative practices we are operating a calculus according to strict rules—has to be rejected. It results, in part, from the conflation (...)
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  2.  5
    Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and Theoretical Knowledge.Julia Tanney - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    In the introduction to the special volume, Gilbert Ryle: Intelligence, Practice and Skill, Julia Tanney introduces the contributions of Michael Kremer, Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson, and Will Small, each of which indicates concern about the appropriation of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that in seminal work in contemporary epistemology. Expressing agreement with the authors that something has gone awry in these borrowings from Ryle, Tanney takes this criticism to a deeper level. She argues that the very notion of content-bearing, (...)
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  3.  56
    Normativity and Judgement.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):17 - 61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  4. Why Reasons May Not Be Causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126.
  5.  95
    On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures.Julia Tanney - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):173-186.
    In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude (...)
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  6. Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations.Julia Tanney - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 94--111.
    forthcoming in New Essays on the Explanation of Action Abstract Philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein rejected the idea that the explanatory power of our ordinary interpretive practices is to be found in law-governed, causal relations between items to which our everyday mental terms allegedly refer. Wittgenstein and those he inspired pointed to differences between the explanations provided by the ordinary employment of mental expressions and the style of causal explanation characteristic of the hard sciences. I believe, however, that the particular non-causalism (...)
     
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  7.  12
    Ryle's Regress and The Philosophy of Cognitive Science.Julia Tanney - unknown
  8.  32
    Normativity and Judgment II.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (73):45-61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  9.  63
    Playing the Rule-Following Game.Julia Tanney - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (292):203-224.
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  10. Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind.Julia Tanney - unknown
    The more empirical, ‘naturalistic’ turn in the approach of many contemporary philosophers, their search for ‘theories’ and their appeal to general ‘theoretical’ considerations apparently continuous with natural science...puts [contemporary] philosophy...farther from the spirit as well as the letter of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical problems. He thought that ‘philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads (...)
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  11.  1
    Normativity and Judgement.David Papineau & Julia Tanney - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 73:17-61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  12.  55
    Gilbert Ryle.Julia Tanney - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Although Gilbert Ryle published on a wide range of topics in philosophy (notably in the history of philosophy and in philosophy of language), including a series of lectures centred on philosophical dilemmas, a series of articles on the concept of thinking, and a book on Plato, The Concept of Mind remains his best known and most important work. Through this work, Ryle is thought to have accomplished two major tasks. First, he was seen to have put the final nail in (...)
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  13.  47
    Review: Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW]J. Tanney - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):727-732.
  14.  68
    Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind.Julia Tanney - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):338-351.
    i> This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non-philosophical and non- theoretical) judgments about a person.
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  15.  22
    Normativity and Judgement: Julia Tanney.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):45–61.
    [David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...)
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  16.  34
    Rule-Following, Intellectualism, and Logical Reasoning: On the Importance of a Type-Distinction Between Performances and ‘Propositional Knowledge’ of the Norms That Govern Them.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  17.  25
    Rethinking Ryle: A Critical Discussion of The Concept of Mind.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  18. The Colour Flows Back: Intention and Interpretation in Literature and in Everyday Action.Julia Tanney - manuscript
    The notion of the author’s intention is logically tied to the interpretation we give to her work as the notion of the agent’s intention is logically tied to the interpretation we give to her action. When we find a discrepancy between what the author or agent says and the meaning we find in her work or the sense we make of what she does, this does not show that the intention is irrelevant in determining this meaning or sense. As Frank (...)
     
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  19.  20
    Rule-Following, Intellectualism, and Logical Reasoning: On the Importance of a Type-Distinction Between Performances and ‘Propositional Knowledge’ of the Norms That Govern Them.Julia Tanney - 2014 - In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 21-34.
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  20.  25
    Causation Vs. Reasons in Action Explanation.Julia Tanney - unknown
  21.  41
    De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (3):237 - 258.
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  22.  49
    Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas * by Robert Brandom.J. Tanney - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):595-597.
  23.  48
    Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Conceptual Elucidation.Julia Tanney - unknown
    Almost a half century after the publication of the Philosophical Investigations, it seems important to ask why Wittgenstein"s ideas have had so little impact on contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. A clue can be discerned by what Georges Rey says in the introduction to his book on contemporary philosophy of mind. Rey announces at the outset to his readers that his treatment of the mind aspires to be continuous with science, not with literature. He explains that there is (...)
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  24.  59
    Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction.Julia Tanney - 2002 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37-55.
    1. Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind in the ‘analytic’ tradition has presupposed, since Descartes, what might be called a realist view about the mind and the mental. According to this view there are independently existing, determinate items (states, events, dispositions or relations) that are the truth-conferrers of our ascriptions of mental predicates.[1] The view is also a cognitivist one insofar as it holds that when we correctly ascribe such a predicate to an individual the correctness consists in (...)
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  25.  57
    Investigating Cultures: A Critique of Cognitive Anthropology.Julia Tanney - 1998 - Journal of the Royal Institute for Anthropological Studies 4 (4):669-688.
    This paper considers Dan Sperber’s arguments that a more scientific, ‘natural’, approach to anthropology might be pursued by abstracting from interpretive questions as much as possible, and replacing them with questions amenable to a cognitive psychological investigation. It attempts to show that Sperber’s main argument rests on controversial assumptions about the nature of the mental states that are ascribed within our commonsense psychological practices and that any theoretical psychology that accepts these assumptions will be revisionist concerning mental concepts. Sperber is (...)
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  26.  1
    II–Julia Tanney: Normativity and Thought.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):45-61.
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  27. Normativity and Judgement: Julia Tanney.Julia Tanney - 1999 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (1):45-61.
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  28. On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status Of.Julia Tanney - unknown
    Zombies are presently generating much discussion in the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.2 For if a creature could be physically, functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable from humans (in the rich sense implied) yet lack conscious experience, then the theories of mind that tie the nature of the mental too closely to physical, functional, or behavioural conditions will seem to have left something crucially mental out of their theories. If having conscious experiences is necessary for being conscious – as these discussions (...)
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  29.  13
    Ryle's Conceptual Cartography.Julia Tanney - 2013 - In Erich H. Reck (ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  30.  24
    The Myths We Live By.Julia Tanney - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):268-269.
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  31.  12
    How to Resist Mental Representations.Julia Tanney - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):264-278.
    Reviews the book 'The Mechanical Mind - A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation,' by Tim Cranes.
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  32.  34
    A Constructivist Picture of Self-Knowledge.Julia Tanney - 1996 - Philosophy 71 (277):4-5.
    How are we to account for the authority granted to first-person reports of mental states? What accounts for the immediacy of these self-ascriptions; the fact that they can be ascribed without appeal to evidence and without the need for justification? A traditional, Cartesian conception of the mind, which says that our thoughts are presented to us directly, completely, and without distortion upon mere internal inspection, would account for these facts, but there is good reason to doubt the cogency of the (...)
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  33.  12
    Prolegomena to a Cartographical Investigation of Cause and Reason.Julia Tanney - unknown
  34. Une Cartographie des Concepts Mentaux'.Julia Tanney - unknown
    Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind was published over 50 years ago to wide acclaim, but his legacy has been tempered because of important misconceptions, including a) that contemporary philosophy has sufficiently absorbed what is valuable about his contribution; b) that he is responsible for propounding a version of philosophical behaviourism; and c) that Ryle travels down a substantially different philosophical track from that of Wittgenstein. This critical introduction sets out to overturn these misconceptions. It is extremely rare for a (...)
     
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  35.  2
    Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction.Julia Tanney - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:37-55.
    He tried to look into her face, to find out what she thought, but she was smelling the lilac and the lilies of the valley and did not know herself what she was thinking—what she ought to say or do. Oblomov Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind in the ‘analytic’ tradition has presupposed, since Descartes, what might be called a realist view about the mind and the mental. According to this view there are independently existing, determinate items that (...)
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  36.  4
    Review of Beth Savickey, 'Wittgenstein's Art of Investigation. [REVIEW]Julia Tanney - unknown
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  37.  4
    Review of Crispin Wright, 'Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes From Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. [REVIEW]Julia Tanney - unknown
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  38.  4
    Conceptual Cartography and Aesthetics.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  39.  3
    Review of Owen Flanagan, 'Self Expressions - Mind, Morals, and The Meaning of Life'. [REVIEW]Julia Tanney - unknown
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  40.  3
    Review of Mary Midgley, 'The Myths We Live By'. [REVIEW]Julia Tanney - unknown
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  41.  2
    Cognitive Drive. Review of Ray Jackendoff, 'Languages of the Mind'.Julia Tanney - unknown
  42.  2
    Review of Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. [REVIEW]Julia Tanney - 2006 - Ratio 19 (1):121-125.
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  43.  2
    The Ability to Think About Causes. Review of 'Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Approach'.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  44.  2
    Wittgenstein's Contribution. Review of A.P. Griffiths , 'Wittgenstein's Centenary Essays.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  45.  2
    Wittgenstein's Centenary Essays.Julia Tanney - 1994 - History of European Ideas 18 (6):970-973.
  46.  2
    Foreword.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  47.  1
    Enduring Personality. Review of John Foster, 'The Immaterial Self' and Vinit Haksar, 'Indivisible Selves and Moral Practice'.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  48.  1
    Naturalizing Meaning. Review of Ruth Millikan, 'White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice'.Julia Tanney - unknown
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  49.  1
    Causal Cognition-A Multidisciplinary Debate-Sperber, D, Premack, D, Premack, AJ.J. Tanney - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1).
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  50. A Peg for Some Thoughts.Julia Tanney - unknown
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1 — 50 / 59