Probably colour is the best worked-out example of allegedly neurophysiologically innate response categories determining percepts and percepts determining concepts, and hence biology fixing the basic categories implicit in the use of language. In this paper I argue against this view and I take C. L. Hardin's Color for Philosophers [1988] as my main target. I start by undermining the view that four unique hues stand apart from all other colour shades (Section 2) and the confidence that the solar spectrum is (...) naturally divided into four categories (Section 3). For such categories to be truly universal, they have to be true for all peoples and in Section 4 I show that Berlin and Kay's [1969] widely quoted theory of basic colour categories is not sufficiently supported to lend it any credibility.Having disposed of the view that inspection of language or ‘pure’ perception unveils the universal colour categories. I turn to neurophysiological and psychophysical theories of colour vision to see whether they provide a more solid basis for deciding what the innate response categories are. In Section 5 I show that Hardin's account of the opponent-process theory neither supports his view that ‘colour-coding’takes place early in the visual neural pathway, nor his view that knowledge of colour vision science will help us solve many philosophical mysteries about colour.In Section 6 I give a more detailed review of what is known today about the neurophysiology of colour vision and I show that there's nothing in the brain which could be called a colour module, let alone a module with homunculi for particular basic colour categories. In Section 7 I show that psychophysical models do not support such rigid constraints on category formation either. Hence (Section 8), at least in the case of colour, current science supports a plasticity in the formation of categories that goes far beyond the requirements of those naturalistic philosophers who would like to ground primitive concepts in biology. (shrink)

In this paper we extend Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance to translation, interpretation, and comparison across traditions. There is no need for universals. This holds for everyday concepts such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion and qing 情, as well as philosophical categories such as form of life and dao 道. These notions as well as all other concepts from whatever tradition are family resemblance concepts. We introduce the notion of quasi-universal, which connects family resemblance concepts (...) from a limited number of traditions. The possibility and necessity of extending family resemblance concepts across traditions dissolves the false antinomy of universalism versus relativism. (shrink)

In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy. We advocate the approach of “de-essentialization” across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. “De-essentialization” applies to all “levels” of concepts: everyday notions such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, and philosophical categories such (...) as forms of life and dao 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that “the other” is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed. There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and qing 情). (shrink)

In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O.

Modern technology (Technik, la technique) has constituted the gears on which the wheels of the modern world keep turning. The later Heidegger devotes sustained reflection to this unprecedented phenomenon in human history. It is notable that, compared with other figures from twentieth-century continental philosophy, Heidegger has served as the most frequent reference point in current philosophy of technology (Technikphilosophie). This field of philosophy came into being after the so-called empirical turn of “Science and Technology Studies.” While relevant scholars focus mainly (...) on “Die Frage nach der Technik” of 1953, “Das Ge-stell” of 1949,1 and some other texts written in that period,2 the time span of Heidegger’s .. (shrink)

Using the notorious bridge law “water is H 2 O” and the relation between molecular structure and quantum mechanics as examples, I argue that it doesn’t make sense to aim for specific definition(s) of intertheoretical or interdiscourse relation(s) between chemistry and physics (reduction, supervenience, what have you). Proposed definitions of interdiscourse and part-whole relations are interesting only if they provide insight in the variegated interconnected patchwork of theories and beliefs. There is “automatically” some sort of interdiscourse relation if different discourses (...) claim to have something to say about the same situation (event, system), which is the basis of (contingent) local supervenience relations, which, proper empirically support being provided, can be upgraded to ceteris paribus bridge laws. Because of the ceteris paribus feature, and the discourse dependence of event identification, there is at best only global supervenience of the “special sciences” on the physical (and of parts of physics on other parts of physics). (shrink)

Discusses the conditions of possibility for intercultural and comparative philosophy, and for crosscultural communication at large. This innovative book explores the preconditions necessary for intercultural and comparative philosophy. Philosophical practices that involve at least two different traditions with no common heritage and whose languages have very different grammatical structure, such as Indo-Germanic languages and classical Chinese, are a particular focus. Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel look at the necessary and not-so-necessary conditions of possibility of interpretation, comparison, and other forms (...) of interaction and how we can speak of similarities and differences in this context. The authors posit that it is necessary to dissolve the question of universalism versus relativism by replacing the ideal language paradigm with a paradigm of family resemblances and that it is not necessary to share a common language to engage in comparison. Numerous case studies are presented, including many comparisons of Western and Chinese concepts. (shrink)

In this article we focus on the famous dialogue between Zhuangzi 莊子 and Huizi 惠子 concerning the question whether or not ren 人 (in particular the shengren 聖人) have qing 情. Most scholars have understood qing in this exchange as referring to “feelings” or “emotions.” We take issue with such readings. First, we demonstrate that, while Huizi probably understands qing as something like feelings or emotions, Zhuangzi’s view is that having qing is connected with making shifei 是非 judgments whereas having (...) no qing means that shifei has no grip on those ren, especially the shengren. What follows is that the expression wuqing 無情 should not be identified as a “doctrine of nonemotion.” Instead, wuqing implies that Zhuangzi advises us to lead a life of tranquility, calmness, and stillness. We show that these peaceful attitudes are associated with the idea of wuwei 無為 in the Zhuangzi. (shrink)

We argue that all general concepts are family resemblance concepts. These include concepts introduced by ostension, such as colour(s). Concepts of colour and of each of the specific colours are family resemblance concepts because similarities concerning an open‐ended range of colour or of appearance features crop up and disappear. After discussing the notion of “same colour” and Wittgenstein's use of the phrase “our colours”, we suggest family resemblance concepts in one tradition can often be extended to family resemblance concepts in (...) another tradition, illustrated by Wittgenstein's use of the words Spiel and “game”. (shrink)

Amidst the progress being made in the various (sub-)disciplines of the behavioural and brain sciences a somewhat neglected subject is the problem of how everything fits into one world and, derivatively, how the relation between different levels of discourse should be understood and to what extent different levels, domains, approaches, or disciplines are autonomous or dependent. In this paper I critically review the most recent proposals to specify the nature of interdiscourse relations, focusing on the concept of supervenience. Ideally supervenience (...) is a relation between different discourses which has all the advantages of reduction, but without its disadvantages. I apply the more abstract considerations to two concrete cases: schizophrenia and colour. Usually an interlevel or interdiscourse relation is seen as asymmetrical: the overlaying discourse depends on the underlying discourse (and not vice versa), where the out- or un-spoken assumption is that the ultimate underlying discourse is physical. Instead I argue that scientific categories referred to in interdiscourse relations are, ultimately, dependent on common sense categories and common sense normative criteria. It is the manifest categories and common sense ideas about what is reasonable and what is right that determine the relevant categorisations at the deeper, underlying levels. I suggest that the implications of this are not merely methodological or epistemological. (shrink)

Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that “the other” is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation is not thwarted (...) by the “danger” of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I evaluate the soundness of the prototype paradigm, in particular its basic assumption that there are pan-human psychological essences or core meanings that refer to basic-level natural kinds, explaining why, on the whole, human communication and learning are successful. Instead I argue that there are no particular pan-human basic elements for thought, meaning and cognition, neither prototypes, nor otherwise. To illuminate my view I draw on examples from anthropology. More generally I argue that the prototype paradigm exemplifies (...) two assumptions that dominate cognitive science: (1) If human beings use words they mean something particular and what they mean can be discovered by scientific methods. (2) There is a fixed number of domains of categorization, each made up of a fixed number of basic categories. I suggest that these two assumptions lead to Brave New World. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philosophy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of current philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contribution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics.

Throughout the history of philosophy, chemical concepts and theories have appeared in the work of philosophers, both as examples and as topics of discussion in their own right, and scientists themselves have often engaged with theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues that fall within what one would now recognize as philosophy of chemistry. This chapter offers a summary of the history of philosophy of chemistry since Kant, alongside a critical examination of why chemistry has been relegated to the sidelines so frequently (...) in recent philosophy of science. This history offers a unique vantage point from which to consider the interests and assumptions, often implicit, that underlie 20th-century philosophy's view of what science is or perhaps should be. These include the inheritance of logical positivism and empiricism, with its particular focus on theories expressed in the language of mathematics and understood as axiomatic systems, and the widespread acceptance of reductionist views of theoretical explanation. Against this background, much of chemistry disappears. Being perhaps too grounded in laboratory and experimental practice, and often practical in its aims and correspondingly pragmatic in its methods, chemical science seldom resembles an orderly top-down enterprise from fundamental theoretical principles. Many of its central "theories," like molecular structure, are expressed in systems of visual representation rather than mathematical equations. This chapter is further is devoted to brief discussions of historical individuals, both chemists and philosophers, whose work is relevant for contemporary philosophy of chemistry. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The primary purpose here is to ascertain what Heidegger's comportment toward East-West dialogue is most plausibly like in the light of his philosophical concerns and orientations. Considering that one should not uncritically take at face value occasional remarks by Heidegger that seem to suggest that he is preparing an East-West dialogue, we will proceed from Heidegger's own path of thinking and bring to light fundamental presuppositions in his thought and the response he may accordingly give to the issue of East-West (...) dialogue. (shrink)

In this article, I look at those passages in the Zhuangzi usually associated with “uselessness.” I discuss in what way these passages may have been suggestive to Martin Heidegger to explain his ideas of the necessity of the other thinking and of the “waiting people” being entirely unusable to others. Then I make some brief comments concerning basic conditions of interpretation, using examples taken from the Zhuangzi passages discussed. These conditions include family resemblance across the board, a principle of agreement, (...) and the issue of “planetarization”. (shrink)

According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only "works" if we read "objective laws" as "OBJECTIVE LAWS". Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special sciences and what not (...) depends upon our values. Hence, "objective laws" cannot be read as "OBJECTIVE LAWS". It follows that the reference of natural kind terms cannot be fixed by the world, not even partly. The final conclusion applies to a variety of realisms. (shrink)

Recent discussions about the anthropic principle and the argument from design can perhaps be summarized as follows : The world is very unusual, so it must have been made by an intelligent creator. The world is very unusual, but unusual things do occur by chance. Both and , in their ordinary interpretations, have been labelled probabilistic fallacies. In my paper I will discuss in particular the following two aspects: The contemporary relevance of Cicero's discussions on chance. The fact that any (...) talk of chance events is only possible subject to the more encompassing idea of "limited belief in chance". (shrink)

In this article, we trace and elucidate Heidegger’s radical re-thinking on the relation between science and technology from about 1940 until 1976. A range of passages from the Gesamtausgabe seem to articulate a reversal of the primacy of science and technology in claiming that “Science is applied technology.” After delving into Heidegger’s reflection on the being of science and technology and their “coordination,” we show that such a claim is essentially grounded in Heidegger’s idea that “Science and technology are the (...) Same [das Selbe].” In addition, we argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, the change from an “epoch of objectivity” to an “epoch of orderability [Bestellbarkeit]” cannot be considered to be an ontological shift. Furthermore, it is not right to ascribe to Heidegger the view that the development of quantum physics signals the beginning of a new ontological Epoch. (shrink)

: According to a consensus of psycho-physiological and philosophical theories, color sensations (or qualia) are generated in a cerebral "space" fed from photon-photoreceptor interaction (producing "metamers") in the retina of the eye. The resulting "space" has three dimensions: hue (or chroma), saturation (or "purity"), and brightness (lightness, value or intensity) and (in some versions) is further structured by primitive or landmark "colors"—usually four, or six (when white and black are added to red, yellow, green and blue). It has also been (...) proposed that there are eleven semantic universals—labeling the previous six plus the "intermediaries" of orange, pink, brown, purple, and gray. There are many versions of this consensus, but they all aim to provide ontological, epistemological and semantic blueprints for the brute fact of the reality of color ordained by Nature (evolution). In contrast to this consensus, we have argued that "seeing color" is not a matter of light waves impacting on our eyes, producing sensations to be categorized and labeled in the "color space" in the brain. While electrochemical events may unproblematically be regarded as the causal precondition for seeing color, the reception of sensations in "the color space" as semantically labeled natural categories, kinds, or information, is a "just so" story: it is Wittgenstein's beetle in a box. In contrast we consider that the authority of this consensus might better be regarded not as the result of the truth-tracking of nature, but as the sociohistorical outcome of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological apparatus, and their feed forward into the lifeworld. The question we shall therefore explore is whether, or to what extent, we ourselves are changed, as the conditions of production of color science change. Thus we are doing a kind of anthropology at two levels: of color science itself (and its effect on our own lifeworld), and of those studied by the "anthropology of color". As befits this stance we are agnostic about the theoretical entities of color science (cf. van Fraassen 2001), and within this new context, we propose to cross-cut object-and-subject, organism-and-environment (the bedrock of color science) in socio-historical ways. Our approach is in part inspired by, but not the same as, that of Gibson, in that we wish to pursue the notion of "social affordances" (Burmudez 1995). We suggest that color has become a naturalization through science-based technologies, which, through praxes and materializations, have become the perceptual and cultural entities that structure experience and understanding in the lifeworld. It is this naturalization that we shall refer to and characterize as "the historically inflected exosomatic organ". Consequently we shall explore the historical ontology of "color" without assuming an underlying biological constant (Dupré 2001). In part 1 we show the flimsiness of the evidence for the three dimensions of color, borrowed from physics, and fine-tuned to a "standard observer" (a "spectral creature" with a phenomenal "color space"). In part 2 we address the structuring of hue through the development of color circles and color spaces. This is followed by a review of the evidence for unique hues. Again the evidence is shown to be flimsy. We then show that an isolated domain of color is a particular kind of model, not a "natural given". In part 3, after reviewing what is referred to as "the isomorphy thesis," we discuss the exemplary case study of Berlin and Kay (1969). This illustrates the pull of stadial models presupposed by their evolutionary theory of color language. The Berlin and Kay paradigm proposes that American English color terms are incorrigible and can provide the universal metalanguage. We conclude by presenting an alternative account, namely that we ourselves are changed as the conditions of production of color science change. We argue that it is better to regard "seeing-color" as a historically inflected exosomatic organ that provides social affordances for those trained to grasp them. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that all proposals for demarcation criteria distinguishing between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, have failed. Moreover, there is not a single set of epistemic virtues that characterizes 'good' knowledge, nor is there such a set that characterizes science. There are many different epistemic virtues and no universal rules about how they are to be applied in particular cases. Different virtues may dominate in different knowledge domains. In the 'same' domain there are neither universal nor domainspecific rules (...) as to how to weigh different virtues. Different virtues may provide conflicting assessments of a knowledge claim. After glancing at contemporary epistemology in the analytic tradition, I conclude there is little interest in the question of metajustification of epistemic virtues. When it does come up, appeal is made to intuitions that are not grounded in philosophy , but in manifest life forms. Finally, I present pointers that should guide the application of the very general meta-epistemic virtues 'fitting with experience' and 'fitting with earlier knowledge': [i] rationality should be understood as bridled irrationality, [ii] knowledge should be evaluated in terms of rightness, not truth, [iii] any final grounding of epistemic virtues has to fall back on the manifest life forms. (shrink)

According to the state of the art in psychology and philosophy, colour sensations are located in a 'quality space'. This space has three dimensions: hue , saturation , and brightness. This space is structured further via a small number of primitive hues or landmark colours, usually four or six . It has also been suggested that there are eleven semantic universals — the six colours previously mentioned plus orange, pink, brown, purple, and grey. Against the standard view, we argue that (...) colour might better be regarded as the outcome of a social-historical developmental trajectory in which there is mutual shaping of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological tools, rhetorical frameworks, and their intercalated and recursive interactions with the lifeworld. That is: the domain of colour is the outcome of interactive processes of scientific, instrumental, industrial, and everyday lifeworlds. (shrink)

In this essay, we explore the various aspects of hermeneutic relativity that have rarely been explicitly discussed. Our notion of “hermeneutic relativity” can be seen as an extension, with significant revisions, of Gadamer’s notion of Vorurteil. It refers to various choices and constraints of the interpreter, including beliefs concerning the best way of doing philosophy, what criteria are to be used to evaluate competing interpretations, and so on. The interpreter cannot completely eliminate the guidance and constraint originating from his/her “background.” (...) However, in principle the interpreter can “choose” to be guided by other constraints. Hence, we speak of “choices” or “commitments.” Hermeneutic relativity is the major cause for the variation of competing interpretations. (shrink)

In this paper I present an ordered selection of citations from František Wald's publications and correspondence to give some idea of how he fitted in his times, how his views were received by contemporaries, and to illustrate his epistemological views. I highlight the originality of Wald's aim to develop a theory of chemistry on the basis of the concept of 'phase', instead of the concepts of compound and element. In chemistry there has been a vast increase in substances that are (...) phases, which makes Wald's work still relevant. © 2013 by HYLE and Jaap van Brakel. (shrink)

Models underlying the use of similarity considerations, dimensionless numbers, and dimensional analysis in chemical engineering are discussed. Special attention is given to the many levels at which models and ceteris paribus conditions play a role and to the modeling of initial and boundary conditions. It is shown that both the laws or dimensionless number correlations and the systems to which they apply are models. More generally, no matter which model or description one picks out, what is being modeled is itself (...) a model of something else. Instead of saying that the artifact S models the given B, it is therefore better to say that S and B jointly make up B and S. (shrink)

In this paper my aim is to shed light on the common behavior of human beings by looking at '' first contacts '': the situation where people with unshared histories first meet. The limits of the human life form are given by what is similar in the common behavior of human beings. But what is similar should not be understood as something that is biologically or psychologically or transcendentally shared by all human beings. What is similar is what human beings (...) would recognize as similar in first or other contacts-a similarity that is, in a way, transcendentally grounded, but the content of this grounding remains tied to the local situation of actual encounters. To be a human person, it is both an empirical and a transcendental precondition that one knows the certainties of particular form of life and that one is capable of recognizing and dealing with an indefinite variety of human behaviors. Because I participate in form of life, I can interact with other form of life. By considering first contacts and by interacting with other communities, one can learn to understand better what the common behavior of human beings is/are. (shrink)

The main argument of the book under review, 'Theories of Truth in Chinese Philosophy,' is to show that one can find a pluralistic theory of shí 實 in the Lunheng, “prepared” by a range of sources in the Warring States Period in China. This argument is not convincing because of small inconsistencies and major unsupported stipulations. Nevertheless the book contains many perceptive and suggestive remarks concerning the texts discussed.

The main argument of the book under review, 'Theories of Truth in Chinese Philosophy,' is to show that one can find a pluralistic theory of shí 實 in the Lunheng, “prepared” by a range of sources in the Warring States Period in China. This argument is not convincing because of small inconsistencies and major unsupported stipulations. Nevertheless the book contains many perceptive and suggestive remarks concerning the texts discussed.