In this paper, I discuss, as carried out by Gaven Kerr, a reconstruction of Aquinas’s argument for the existence of God from his work De Ente et Essentia. My analysis leads to complementing Kerr’s proposal with the following elements: a summarization of the presented argument in a more formal manner; a specification of the main presuppositions of the Thomistic conception of existence; a drawing of attention to the fact that the essence–esse composition is a borderline case of the array of (...) potency–act compositions; a distinguishing of the empirical and speculative interpretations or versions of Aquinas’s argument; a clarification of what is the Divine exception from the essence–esse composition; a distinguishing of the three models of participation and a defence of the moderate model. I regard the following two issues to be of key importance for the argument under discussion: the relation between the Aristotelian compositional model and the Platonic model of participation as well as the defence of the Thomistic conception of the essence–esse composition. (shrink)

In this article I outline two epistemological theistic arguments. The first one starts from the dilemma between our strong conviction that we possess some knowledge of the world and the belief that there are some serious reasons which undermine it. In my opinion theism opens the possibility of the way out of the dilemma. The second argument depends on the premise that in every time every worldly thing is actually perceived or known. I support it by four considerations and claim (...) that the simplest explanation of the epistemic ‘non-loneliness’ of the world is the existence of the Supreme Cogniser. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious (...) arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). I analyse various versions of this principle (and their structure) and various ways of justifying it. Then I present and attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR. One can distinguish three versions of the PSR: for each state of affairs there is a sufficient reason for its obtaining (PSR-O); for each true proposition there is a direct or indirect justification (PSR-E); (...) for each state of affairs there exists an intellectual duty to search for a sufficient reason for obtaining of that state of affairs, and for each known true proposition - to search for its justification (PSR-M). There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-O stand can be only valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious (yet debatable) arguments against the possibility of such infinity. The necessary condition of the PSR-O non-stand universal working is the existence of a necessary substance (thing): that substance would be a (free) reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be reasons for all other contingent state of affairs and things. (The principle does not require a necessary substance to have its own reason). Limiting the chain of reasons to contingent states of affairs ended with a necessary state (if this state is a reason by necessity) would lead to the paradox of universal necessarism. An ontological \"cost\" of holding the PSR-O non-stand is a postulate of the existence of the necessary, supra-natural substance, i.e. God. However, there are serious advantages of the view which accepts that the PSR-O non-stand is generally valid: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity. (shrink)

Philosophers are mainly focused on the epistemological concept of truth. However, if we want to maintain this concept in the classical version (correspondence one) we have to assume at least some minimal ontology (metaphysics), and hence some ontological (metaphysical) concept of truth. Items I. and II. are an attempt at explicating this ontology in the context of Aris-totle\'s and Tarski\'s conceptions, and item IV. is (in discussion with P. Horwich and D. Lewis) taking an attitude towards contemporary challenges that deflationism (...) brings to them. It seems that today one may defend the correspondence conception of truth and its ontological assump-tions, that boil down to stating a certain form of the world\'s \"rationality\". (shrink)

The text analyses various examples of moral arguments for the existence of God. Taking advantage of the ideas from the writings of Kant and his interpreters, we sought to reconstruct them logically, conferring on them a form as reliable as possible. All the arguments have been divided into three groups: practical version, theoretical version, mixed version (thought to be optimal). 1) Practical version. It starts from our desires, beliefs, obligations etc. and combines them with desires, beliefs, and obligations with regard (...) to God. There are different varieties of this version. We have discussed in more detail its deontic variety based on the assumption: ,,we should carry out the ultimate good\" (the state of happiness conditioned by virtue). Owing additional assumptions (conceptual and psychological) and corresponding simple logical operations we arrive at the conclusion: ,,we should believe that God exists.\" Reliability, however, of such a week conclusion is undermined by the ambiguous character of the statement ,,we should carry out the ultimate good.\" Rather, we should say that we are obliged to carry out moral law, and thereby expect a just reward. Faith in God is conducive to such efforts, inasmuch as they refer to the morality comprehended in a maximalist manner, justice, and happiness. 2) Theoretical version. We have pinpointed its two varieties: ,,the requirement of the lawgiver\" and ,,the requirement of justice.\" In the first variety on the basis of the existence of morality we deduce the existence of God as its ,,author,\" for no other creature has a corresponding power, moral and metaphysical, to establish (execute) universal and unconditional moral obligations. In the second variety God appears to safeguard the carrying out a just reward (punishment, inherent in morality itself) for the satisfaction (violation) of these obligations. The debate about the value of the first argument is reduced to the debate about whether morality is indeed characterized by such features whose existence cannot be explained without reference to God. The main debate connected with the second argument is whether the fact of morality entails the ontic (not only deontic) necessity of a just judgement (and its related reward or punishment) of those who are submitted to morality. 3) Mixed version. According to some varieties of the practical version, it takes on a human desire to reach the ultimate good at the point of departure. This desire, natural and right, regards the existence of this good as an indicator. Hence it is possible to transfer from the practical sphere to the theoretical one. If it is well-known that the ultimate good exists, we can ask about its cause. Reasoning - similar to the one given in the previous point - leads to a belief that God is this cause. One may doubt, however, whether our natural and right desires are always reliable indicators that their objects exist. 4) The above analyses have unveiled the assumptions and difficulties of all the versions of the family of arguments under consideration. Does this mean that the arguments are not efficient? Not in the least. This means only that they are efficient under certain conditions. These conditions, like anything in philosophy, make up the object of everlasting debates. (shrink)

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

The paper contains a survey of existence problems in the folowing calculi of formal logic: calculi of classes, syllogistics, classic predicate calculus, Lesniewski's ontology, quantificational modal calculi, quantificational tense logics, sentential calculi. The particular attention is given to metaphysical (ontological) presuppositions and commitments of logical calculi especially to the problems of empty set, existential axiom (axiom of the non-emptiness of universe of discourse), existential operators (quantifiers and functors), possible worlds, temporal predicates and operators, objects of sentences.

The author attempts to analyze and classify various meanings and functions of existential notions (such as „to be”, „to exist”). Special attention is put on the use of these notions in contemporary philosophical discussions.

The aim of this article is to present the main results of investigations in the domain of object theory, carried out by the representants of three Polish philosophical schools: M. Borowski (the Lvov-Warsaw School), R. Ingarden (the phenomenological Lvov-Cracow School), and M. Krapiec (the neo-tomist Lublin School).

In the article I reconstruct Karol Wojtyła’s argument against atheism. According to Wojtyła, an atheist is unjust because of not rendering absolute honour to God. In my opinion the argument is sound if one applies it to theists or negative atheists and if one presupposes that there are moral obligations to only supposed persons. The argument meets some objections. A discussion of them leads me to an interpretation of the theism-atheism controversy as being the conflict of two imperatives: the imperative (...) of justice and the imperative of evidence. (shrink)

The paper is a polemic with Richard Swinburne. According to him, both the possible worlds -- the ’world with God’ and the ’world without God’ -- contain moral properties. The ’world with God’, however, is morally "richer" because the existence of God entails some additional obligations; God may affect moral "facts" through creating some nonmoral facts; God may formulate some additional commands. I think that these differences lead to a greater difference in understanding morality: in the ’world without God’ morality (...) is at most a consequence of some contingent nonmoral states of affairs; whereas in the ’world with God’ it is the correlate and intended "work" of a perfect personal being. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł stanowi polemikę z esejem Saula Smilansky’ego pt. O wątpliwej warości moralnej pewnych rozpowszechnionych form modlitwy. Według Smilansky’ego niektóre modlitwy prośby, a zwłaszcza modlitwy o czyjeś dobra kosztem kogoś innego, są niemoralne. Zgadzam się, że nie każda modlitwa jest moralnie akceptowalna, lecz jednocześnie argumentuję, że jego uzasadnienie tej tezy zakłada lub zawiera fałszywe przesłanki. W szczególności formułuję cztery zastrzeżenia wobec jego argumentu: punktem wyjścia filozofii modlitwy powinny być nie prywatne przekonania filozofa, lecz ortodoksja lub ortopraksja określonej religii ; modląca (...) się osoba nie rozważa konsekwencji wysłuchania swej modlitwy ; zgodnie z modelem biblijnym każda modlitwa prośby zawiera warunek ‘jeśli Bóg chce’ ; pomimo powszechnej opinii, modlitwa prośby nie jest działaniem w zwykłym znaczeniu tego słowa. Tej ostatniej tezy bronię, posługując się rozróżnieniem Charlesa Taliaferro na Świat Omodlony i Świat Nieomo- dlony. Poza tym próbuję podać własne kryterium moralności modlitwy prośby: modlitwa taka jest moralnie dobra, jeśli buduje pozytywną relację z Bogiem lub innymi ludźmi oraz jest wypowiadana wraz z uzupełnieniem ‘Boże, bądź wola Twoja!’. (shrink)