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Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
  1.  82
    What is Hope?Jack M. C. Kwong - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):243-254.
    According to the standard account, to hope for an outcome is to desire it and to believe that its realization is possible, though not inevitable. This account, however, faces certain difficulties: It cannot explain how people can display differing strengths in hope; it cannot distinguish hope from despair; and it cannot explain substantial hopes. This paper proposes an account of hope that can meet these deficiencies. Briefly, it argues that in addition to possessing the relevant belief–desire structure as allowed in (...)
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  2.  84
    Resisting Aliefs: Gendler on Belief-Discordant Behaviors.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):77 - 91.
    This paper challenges T. S. Gendler's notion of aliefs, a novel kind of mental state which she introduces to explain a wide variety of belief-discordant behaviors. In particular, I argue that many of the cases which she uses to motivate such a mental state can be fully explained by accounts that make use only of commonplace attitudes such as beliefs and desires.
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  3.  76
    Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (2):337-351.
    In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit-based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open-mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed-minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open-mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue-theoretical (...)
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  4.  31
    Open‐Mindedness as Engagement.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):70-86.
    Open-mindedness is an under-explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open-minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open-minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open-mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel (...)
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  5.  41
    Is Open‐Mindedness a Moral Virtue?Anna Cremaldi & Jack M. C. Kwong - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):343-358.
    Is open-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case (...)
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  6.  96
    Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?Jack M. C. Kwong - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
    Conceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A centralreason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view toachieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel (...)
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  7.  89
    Why Concepts Can't Be Theories.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):309-325.
    In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the 'theory-theory' of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the 'theory-theory' is supposed (...)
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  8.  25
    Cultivating Open‐Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2019 - Educational Theory 69 (4):507-515.
    Open-mindedness is widely regarded as an epistemic virtue and, more recently, a moral one: its exercise is supposed to be conducive not only to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth, knowledge, and understanding, but also to the development of moral goods such as the promotion of social cohesion and the fostering of people’s respect and care for one another. This glossy view of open-mindedness, however, has come under challenge. Critics have argued that adopting a default stance of openness (...)
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  9.  9
    Edouard Machery, Doing Without Concepts. [REVIEW]Jack M. C. Kwong - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (2):115-117.
  10.  40
    Hope and Hopefulness.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):832-843.
    This paper proposes a new framework for thinking about hope, with certain unexpected consequences. Specifically, I argue that a shift in focus from locutions like “x hopes that” and “x is hoping that” to “x is hopeful that” and “x has hope that” can improve our understanding of hope. This approach, which emphasizes hopefulness as the central concept, turns out to be more revealing and fruitful in tackling some of the issues that philosophers have raised about hope, such as the (...)
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  11.  11
    Julia Langkau and Christian Nimtz, Eds. , New Perspectives on Concepts . Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Jack M. C. Kwong - 2012 - Philosophy in Review 32 (1):37-39.
  12. Owen Flanagan, The Really Hard Problem. [REVIEW]Jack M. C. Kwong - 2008 - Philosophy in Review 28 (4):257-260.
  13.  40
    Shame and Moral Autonomy.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2021 - Wiley: Ratio 34 (1):44-55.
    Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this (...)
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  14.  20
    The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness by herself; that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but (...)
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  15.  45
    Why Concepts Should Not Be Pluralized or Eliminated.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):7-23.
    Concept Pluralism and Concept Eliminativism are two positions recently proposed in the philosophy and the psychology of concepts. Both of these theories are motivated by the view that all current theories of concepts are empirically and methodologically inadequate and hold in common the assumption that for any category that can be represented in thought, a person can possess multiple, distinct concepts of it. In this paper, I will challenge these in light of a third theory, Conceptual Atomism, which addresses and (...)
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