Machine generated contents note: 1. Introducing persons and the psychology of personhood Jack Martin and Mark H. Bickhard; Part I. Philosophical, Conceptual Perspectives: 2. The person concept and the ontology of persons Michael A. Tissaw; 3. Achieving personhood: the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology Charles Guignon; Part II. Historical Perspectives: 4. Historical psychology of persons: categories and practice Kurt Danziger; 5. Persons and historical ontology Jeff Sugarman; 6. Critical personalism: on its tenets, its historical obscurity, and its future prospects James T. (...) Lamiell; Part III. Social-Developmental Perspectives: 7. Conceiving of self and others as persons: evolution and development John Barresi, Chris Moore and Raymond Martin; 8. Position exchange theory and personhood: moving between positions and perspectives within physical, sociocultural and psychological space and time Jack Martin and Alex Gillespie; 9. The emergent ontology of persons Mark H. Bickhard; 10. Theorising personhood for the world in transition and change: reflections from a transformative activist stance on human development Anna Stetsenko; Part IV. Narrative Perspectives: 11. Identity and narrative as root metaphors of personhood Amia Lieblich and Ruthellen Josselson; 12. Storied persons: the double triad of narrative identity Mark Freeman. (shrink)

In their search for more communal forms of agency that might guide education, contemporary educational psychologists have mostly neglected the theorizing of George Herbert Mead. In this essay, Jack Martin aims to remedy such oversight by interpreting Mead’s social‐psychological and educational theorizing of selfhood and agency through the lenses of the perspectival realism Mead developed in the last decade of his life. This interpretation understands education as concerned with the cultivation and coordination of cultural, societal, interpersonal, and personal perspectives. Within (...) this framework, communal agency is understood as a self‐interpreting, self‐determining capability of persons. This agentive capability derives from immersion and participation with others within sociocultural practices and perspectives, but also includes reactivity to those same practices and perspectives. The education of communal agents as envisioned here emphasizes the social nature of education, students’ experience and development, and the critical role of the teacher as a mediator between student development and social process. Such an education is grounded in the immediate experiences and perspectives of learners, but increasingly assists learners to move beyond their own experiences through engaged interaction with others and with resources for acquiring broader, more organized perspectives on themselves, others, and the world. (shrink)

G. H. Mead developed an alternative "metaphysics" of selfhood and agency that underlies, but is seldom made explicit in discussions of, his social developmental psychology. This is an alternative metaphysics that rejects any pregiven, fixed foundations for being and knowing. It assumes the emergence of social psychological phenomena such as mind, self, and deliberative agency through the activity of human actors and interactors within their biophysical and sociocultural world. Of central importance to the emergence of self-consciousness and deliberative forms of (...) human agency is the ability of developing individuals to take the perspectives of others within their own conduct. However, precisely what is involved in this process, and whether or not it assumes the preexistence of exactly those forms of selfhood and agency, the emergence of which it seeks to explain, have been much disputed. In this essay, recent reinterpretations of Mead's "metaphysics" are used to argue that his overall theoretical program contains resources necessary to overcome charges of ontological and epistemological circularity. In particular, once his interactionism, perspectivism, emergentism, and compatibilism are explicated, it is possible to see that Mead's "taking the perspective of the other" is not primarily a process of internalization that requires a preexisting "internalizer," but a process of participation with others within conventionalized sequences of interactivity. This participatory process enables the development of prereflective forms of perspective taking and self-other differentiation that serve as necessary conditions for the further emergence of more reflective forms of perspective taking, self-consciousness, and deliberative agency. Compatibilist interpretations of deliberative agency, thus understood, also are discussed. (shrink)

Following an initial discussion of the general nature of interpretation in contemporary psychology, and social and natural science, relevant views of Charles Taylor and Thomas Kuhn are considered in some detail. Although both Taylor and Kuhn agree that interpretation in the social or human sciences differs in some ways from interpretation in the natural sciences, they disagree about the nature and origins of such difference. Our own analysis follows, in which we consider differences in interpretation between the natural and social (...) sciences in terms of Ian Hacking's use of Elizabeth Anscombe's conceptualization of actions as intentional acts under particular descriptions. We conclude that both Taylor and Kuhn are correct to point to differences in interpretation between the natural and social sciences. We also argue that in psychology, such interpretive differences, contra Kuhn and pro Taylor, are qualitative rather than quantitative. They arise from the nature of persons as self-interpretive, reactive beings who act under socioculturally sanctioned, linguistic descriptions. The actions of psychological persons may display qualitative differences over time and across contexts as these descriptions, including social scientific and psychological findings and interpretations, change. In contrast, even when descriptions in natural science change, such changes do not spawn changes in the self-interpretations and intentional actions of the focal phenomena of natural science. We also make the point that much current confusion surrounding interpretation in science arises from the unwarranted tendency of some commentators to treat interpretation as subjective, in ways that ignore the objective grounding of interpretation within regulated social practices, including scientific practices sanctioned by scientific communities. (shrink)

For different reasons, some modern and postmodern psychologists are skeptical about the reality of psychological phenomena as irreducible, influential entities. Nonetheless, much psychological inquiry presumes precisely such a reality. The authors present a "levels of reality" approach to psychological reality that they believe can assuage some of the concerns of psychological skeptics. This approach treats psychological reality as inseparably embedded in sociocultural, biological, and physical levels of reality, without being reducible to any of these other levels. The authors develop their (...) "levels of reality" approach in relation to four different doctrines of realism, and elaborate its implications for understanding psychological phenomena. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Jason Brown started his career as a neurologist specializing in language disorders, perceptive illusions, and impaired action. But beyond his activity as a physician he is a man of genuinely theoretical appetite. As satisfying as it is to help improve the situation of sick fellow humans, this alone does not characterize him well. Those who know him closer know his insistent urge to find a philosophical framework for his clinical practice and research, together with his desire for a more humane (...) society. Those who do not know him will see this immediately when they read his most recent book Process and the authentic life (Brown 2006). This is, in a nutshell, how and why Brown came to look into process philosophy, as an alternative to philosophical systems focusing on substances such as the Cartesian res cogitans and res extensa, on which science and technology are essentially based. Process philosophy holds some radical deviations from these systems, and may be regarded as complementary to them (Roemer 2006), although any such convergence is hotly contested (e.g., Bickhard 2004). Best known among adherents of a process worldview is Whitehead with his opus magnum Process and Reality. Brown’s approach is clearly in the spirit of Whitehead’s. However, due to his medical and psychological background it differs in motivation, and consequently it differs in the way it is carried out. While Whitehead, originally a mathematician, tried to be as precise and detailed as possible in his definitions, arguments and conclusions, Brown strives for his humanistic goal more directly. His accounts are based on examples rather than formal inferences, everyday experiences rather than abstract constructions. (shrink)

The central argument of this paper is that compatibilist theories that understand human agent causation as self-determination are consistent with, and can accommodate, important insights from evolutionary and developmental psychology. Agent causation is nothing more than the non-mysterious self-determining capability of persons, understood as embodied, emergent ontological entities whose nature is not fixed due to their uniquely evolved and developed capabilities of language use, cultural construction, self-consciousness and self-understanding, and moral concern. Relevant arguments of Dennett and Searle are adapted to (...) fit within the author's own emergentist, developmental theorizing that treats the self-determining capability of persons as arising within relevant biophysical and sociocultural contexts without being reducible to these contexts. Persons are self-determining in ways that require explanation not only in terms of materialistic efficient causal explanations appropriate to our evolved biophysical nature, but also in terms of final purposive explanations appropriate to our emergence as culture- capable, self-reflective agents, and formal explanations consistent with our evolved and developed nature as particular bio-cultural hybrids. (shrink)

Within the interactivist, process approach to metaphysics, Bickhard (Social life and social knowledge: toward a process account of development. Lawrence Erlbaum, New York, 2008a; Topoi 27: 139–149, 2008b; New Ideas Psychol, in press) has developed a social ontology of persons that avoids many well-known philosophical difficulties concerning the genesis, development, and application of the rational and moral capabilities and responsibilities that characterize persons. Interactivism positions developing persons inside sets of social conventions within which they participate in their own constitution as (...) rational and moral agents who constantly transform themselves and their world. Following a description of Bickhard’s social ontology and an evaluation of its philosophical merits, two suggestions are offered with the intention of extending the explanatory reach of an interactivist ontology of persons. One of these suggestions concerns a recommended shift from processes of interaction and constructivism to processes of coordination and constitutionism. A second, related recommendation concerns the need for a more precise detailing of processes of coordinated constitution that explain the developing person’s embodied and enactive transformation from a social to a psychological being. (shrink)

A theory intended to bridge social constructionist and cognitive constructivist thought is presented, and some of its implications for psychotherapy and education are considered. The theory is mostly concerned with understanding the emergence and development of the psychological from its biological and sociocultural origins. It is argued that the psychological is underdetermined by the biological and sociocultural, and possesses a shifting, dynamic ontology that emerges within a developmental context. Increasingly sophisticated capabilities of memory and imagination mediate and support the emergence (...) of genuinely agentic psychological phenomena from appropriated sociocultural forms and practices. (shrink)

It is proposed that psychologists need a working theory of knowledge for conceptual and discourse purposes. Arguments are made from a pragmatist view of science for a conception of inquiry practice that may resolve current paradigm conflicts and support a viable methodological pluralism. The suggestion is made that a naturalized approach to research practice, such as historical-descriptive case study, may illuminate the judgments and intentions constitutive of our applied epistemology and methodological choices. Implications of such meta-methodological understanding for research training (...) and a contingent theory of knowledge for psychological science are discussed. (shrink)

A wide variety of theoretical tasks is inescapably part of psychological research, practice, and public policy initiatives. A classification and illustrated summary of these theoretical tasks is provided, an important purpose of which is to remind providers and users of psychological research and interventions of important theoretical dimensions of these activities. A larger purpose, however, is the promotion of theoretical psychology as an orientation toward, and a set of understandings and tools with which psychologists might approach, an appropriately contextualized self-understanding (...) of their practices as researchers and practitioners. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The subject matter of psychology is humans and their experiences and actions. This subject matter differs from the subject matter of physical science by being more highly contextualized, uncertain, and morally saturated. As a consequence, psychological theory must concern itself with context and moral significance and with the formulation of principles rather than causal laws. The development of psychological theory can be assisted by programs of inquiry that emphasize conceptual clarification and moral consideration, in addition to empirical demonstration. Programs of (...) inquiry in psychology also should place a high value on reasoned criticism derivative from a wider array of scholarly methods and traditions. In all of this, psychology should be guided first and foremost by the nature of its subject matter. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Frequently cited problems of dualism, as it pertains to the relation of psychological mind to sociocultural world, arise from assumptions of fixed societal and psychological ontologies. If, instead, societal and psychological ontologies are understood to be both emergent and mutable, as a consequence of their dynamic relation, many of the metaphysical and epistemological difficulties encountered by classic psychological-sociocultural dualism are avoided. To this end, an ontological and epistemological position, called societal-psychological constructionism, is presented. The merits of this position relative to (...) postmodern textualist and social constructionist alternatives to classic psychological-sociocultural dualism are discussed. The major advantages of societal-psychological constructionism stem from its metaphysical claim that the psychological derives largely from the sociocultural, but is not reducible to the sociocultural, and in the epistemological implications of this claim. These advantages are particularly significant when contrasted with postmodern textualist and social constructionist accounts that mistakenly conflate the origins of psychological phenomena with psychological experience. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Responds to S. C. Yanchar and K. B. Kristensen's comments on L. T. Hoshmand and J. Martin's proposal for a naturalistic epistemological approach. Further clarification of the proposal is provided and implications for the development of a theory of method and issues of communal evaluation and intelligibility are discussed. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).