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Jack Ritchie
University of Cape Town
  1.  77
    Understanding Naturalism.Jack Ritchie - 2006 - Routledge.
    Many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers describe themselves as naturalists. But what do they mean by that term? Popular naturalist slogans like, "there is no first philosophy" or "philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences" are far from illuminating. "Understanding Naturalism" provides a clear and readable survey of the main strands in recent naturalist thought. The origin and development of naturalist ideas in epistemology, metaphysics and semantics is explained through the works of Quine, Goldman, Kuhn, Chalmers, Papineau, Millikan and others. The most (...)
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  2. Naturalized Metaphysics.Jack Ritchie - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):673-685.
  3.  82
    Causal Compatibilism -- What Chance?Jack Ritchie - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.
    Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation.
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  4. Styles for Philosophers of Science.Jack Ritchie - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):649-656.
    In this paper I discuss the bearing of Hacking’s ideas about Scientific Styles on traditional debates in the philosophy of science concerning rationality and realism. I argue that a kind of deflationary position with regard to realism debates is a natural consequence of Hacking’s claim that styles are self-authenticating. I then go on to argue, using an example of van Fraassen’s, that Hacking should allow a methodological role for realism debates and hence they are not idle, as he has claimed, (...)
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  5. Structural Realism and Davidson.Jack Ritchie - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):85 - 100.
    Structural realism is an attempt to balance the competing demands of the No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. In this paper I trace the development of the structuralist idea through the work of one of its leading advocates, John Worrall. I suggest that properly thought through what the structuralist is offering or should be offering is not an account of how to divide up a theory into two parts—structure and ontology—but (perhaps surprisingly) a certain kind of theory of meaning—semantic (...)
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  6.  41
    Styles of Thinking: The Special Issue.Jack Ritchie - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):595-598.
  7.  19
    The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World, by Thomas Sattig: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, Pp. Xiv + 259, £40. [REVIEW]Jack Ritchie - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):828-831.
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  8.  9
    Is Ontic Structural Realism a Viable Form of Naturalized Metaphysics?Jack Ritchie - 2015 - Dissertatio 41 (S2):78-93.
    Às vezes o naturalismo é apresentado como uma visão de mundo geral. Na maioria das vezes quando o naturalismo é assim apresentado, ele é identificado com o fisicalismo: a visão de que tudo é físico ou em algum sentido dependente do que é físico. Mas o fisicalismo enfrenta um problema muito sério e bastante conhecido, o dilema de Hempel. O problema pode ser colocado do seguinte modo: quando dizemos que tudo é físico, o que fazemos é utilizar o termo “físico” (...)
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  9.  58
    William James.Jack Ritchie - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 28 (28):80-81.
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  10.  49
    C S Peirce & Immanuel Kant.Jack Ritchie - 1999 - The Philosophers' Magazine 6 (6):30-31.
  11.  35
    Hilary Putnam.Jack Ritchie - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 13:52-52.
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  12.  6
    C S Peirce & Immanuel Kant.Jack Ritchie - 1999 - The Philosophers' Magazine 6:30-31.
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  13.  5
    William James.Jack Ritchie - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 28:80-81.
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  14.  1
    Hilary Putnam.Jack Ritchie - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 13:52-52.
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