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Frank Jackson [257]F. Jackson [18]F. L. Jackson [8]F. C. Jackson [5]
Francis L. Jackson [3]Frank Cameron Jackson [3]Fatimah Jackson [2]F. J. Foakes Jackson [2]

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Profile: Frank Jackson (Australian National University, Princeton University)
Profile: Francesca Jackson (University of Birmingham)
  1. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
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  2. Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  3. Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no.
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  4.  37
    Procrastinate Revisited.Frank Jackson - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):634-647.
    How is what an agent ought to do at time t related to what they ought to do over a period of time that includes t? I revisit an example that sheds light on this question, taking account of issues to do with the agent's intentions and the distinction between subjective and objective obligation.
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  5.  56
    Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and (...)
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  6. What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.
  7. Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.Frank Jackson & Michael Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.
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  8.  54
    Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1987 - Blackwell.
  9. Program Explanation: A General Perspective.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107-17.
    Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation.
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  10. Three Theses About Dispositions.Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.
    I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
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  11.  74
    Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
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  12. Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection.Frank Jackson - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):461-482.
  13. Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature.Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & Adam Elga - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):67 – 76.
    The 'best-system' analysis of lawhood [Lewis 1994] faces the 'zero-fit problem': that many systems of laws say that the chance of history going actually as it goes--the degree to which the theory 'fits' the actual course of history--is zero. Neither an appeal to infinitesimal probabilities nor a patch using standard measure theory avoids the difficulty. But there is a way to avoid it: replace the notion of 'fit' with the notion of a world being typical with respect to a theory.
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  14. Oughts, Options, and Actualism.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.
  15. Reference and Description Revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):201-218.
  16. On Gettier Holdouts.Frank Jackson - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):468-481.
    How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are (...)
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  17. Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves.Frank Jackson, Graham Priest & Rae Langton - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129 – 136.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in 'Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic (proposed elsewhere) should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of (...)
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  18. Ethical Particularism and Patterns.Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--99.
     
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  19. Functionalism and Broad Content.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1988 - Mind 97 (July):318-400.
  20. Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.
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  21.  76
    In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenicalism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1992 - Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):1--21.
    Many of the things that we try to explain, in both our common sense and our scientific engagement with the world, are capable of being explained more or less finely: that is, with greater or lesser attention to the detail of the producing mechanism. A natural assumption, pervasive if not always explicit, is that other things being equal, the more finegrained an explanation, the better. Thus, Jon Elster, who also thinks there are instrumental reasons for wanting a more fine-grained explanation, (...)
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  22.  50
    Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Routledge.
    This collection brings together some of Frank Jackson's most influential essays on mind, action, conditionals, method in metaphysics, and ethics. These have each been revised for this edition, and are presented along with his challenge to orthodoxy on the new riddle of induction.
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  23. Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson - 1996 - Blackwell.
  24. Armchair Metaphysics.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23--42.
  25. Why We Need A-Intensions.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):257-277.
    I think recent discussions of content and reference have not paid enough attention to the role of language as a convention-governed system of communication. With this as a background theme, I explain the role of A-intensions in elucidating one important notion of content and correlative notions of reference.
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  26. A Problem for Expressivism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):239–251.
    Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs.
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  27. On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):565-589.
    I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature.
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  28. Colour, Disjunctions, Programming.F. Jackson - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):86-88.
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  29. Is There a Good Argument Against the Incorrigibility Thesis?Frank Jackson - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):51-62.
    "the incorrigibility thesis", The thesis that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such things as whether I am now in pain or am seeing or seeming to see something red, Is very widely supposed to be false. I consider the arguments designed to show this, And argue that they all fail.
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  30. Locke, Expressivism, Conditionals.F. Jackson & P. Pettit - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):86-92.
    The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to (...)
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  31. Mental Causation.Frank Jackson - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):377-413.
    I survey recent work on mental causation. The discussion is conducted under the twin presumptions that mental states, including especially what subjects believe and desire, causally explain what subjects do, and that the physical sciences can in principle give a complete explanation for each and every bodily movement. I start with sceptical discussions of various views that hold that, in some strong sense, the causal explanations offered by psychology are autonomous with respect to those offered by the physical sciences. I (...)
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  32.  83
    On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation.Frank Jackson - 1985 - Mind 94 (374):177-195.
    This paper develops an informal semantics for 'ought to be' and 'ought to be given...' and argues for its plausibility. A feature of the semantics is that it invalidates 'if a entails b, And o(a), Then o(b)' and 'if o(a) & o(b), Then o(a&b)', While validating detachment for conditional obligation.
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  33.  86
    The Primary Quality View of Color.Frank Jackson - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.
  34. A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):3 – 21.
  35. Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 421--442.
    Much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the clash between certain strongly held intuitions and what science tells us about the mind and its relation to the world. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind.
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  36.  91
    Causation and the Philosophy of Mind.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:195-214.
  37. Colour for Representationalists.Frank Jackson - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85.
    Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the (...)
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  38. Thought Experiments and Possibilities.Frank Jackson - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):100-109.
    1. Reflecting on possible cases can be very valuable in differing ways. Sometimes it makes clear a consequence of a theory, a consequence that then plays an important role in debates about the theory. Utilitarians who favour maximising average happiness confront utilitarians who favour maximising total happiness with possible cases where there are enormously many sentient beings whose lives are barely worth living. Sometimes reflecting on possible cases serves to clarify a doctrine. Classical versions of consequentialism value equity for its (...)
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  39.  79
    Response-Dependence Without Tears.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):97-117.
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  40.  17
    Viii Notes on Contributors Alvin Goldman is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. His Principal Research Areas Are Episte-Mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Cognitive Science. His Most Recent Book is Simulating Minds (2006). [REVIEW]Frank Jackson, Jesse J. Prinz, Ernest Sosa & Kim Sterelny - 2009 - In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.
  41. The Autonomy of Mind.Frank Jackson - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):170-184.
  42. In Defense of Folk Psychology.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.
    It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
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  43.  41
    Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith have been at the forefront of philosophy in Australia for much of the last two decades, and their collaborative work has had widespread influence throughout the world. Mind, Morality, and Explanation collects the best of that work in a single volume, showcasing their seminal contributions to philosophical psychology, the theory of psychological and social explanation, moral theory, and moral psychology.
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  44. The Argument From the Persistence of Moral Disagreement.Frank Jackson - 2008 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.
  45.  4
    Causation in the Philosophy of Mind.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1996 - In Andy Clark & P. J. R. Millican (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Clarendon Press. pp. 195-214.
  46. Narrow Content and Representation--Or Twin Earth Revisited.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.
    Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the (...)
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  47. Structural Explanation in Social Theory.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 97--131.
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  48. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism.Frank Jackson - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 52--64.
  49.  48
    All That Can Be at Issue in the Theory-Theory/Simulation Debate.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):77-96.
  50. The Teleological Theory of Content.David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):474-89.
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