Samuel Shirley's splendid new translation, with critical annotation reflecting research of the last half-century, is the only edition of the complete text of Spinoza's correspondence available in English. An historical-philosophical Introduction, detailed annotation, a chronology, and a bibliography are also included.

Are the divine attributes intrinsic or relational properties of God? That is, can we ascribe the attributes to God, without relation to the things which God produces;or can we ascribe them to God only in relation to those things? In discussing the various aspects of this very old question, I argue that both views find strong support in the Ethics and other works. Spinoza’s “pantheism” removes the apparent contradiction between the two conceptions.

An early description and illustration of the liquid-in-glass thermometer is found in J. S. Delmedigo's Hebrew work, Ma"yan Ganim . This publication predates by over 20 years the usually accepted date for the invention of this instrument and may in fact constitute its first published description and illustration.

Most people who write about punishment ask, Why may we punish the guilty? I want to ask, Why should the guilty put up with it? or, more specifically, To what extent does a person guilty of an offense have a duty to submit to punishment? ;This question forms the topic of the thesis. The work is divided into two parts, of three chapters each. In Part 1, I argue for the importance of the question. In Part 2, I try to (...) answer the question. ;In Chapter 1, I argue for the claim that the question of submission to punishment is in fact the central question of the theory of punishment. This being conceded, I argue in chapters 2 and 3 that we must consequently change our conception of punishment. We cannot define 'punishment' in the traditional way, as necessarily involving pain, suffering, or other sorts of disvalue ; rather, 'punishment' is to be defined by the justificatory connection between punishment and offense . ;In Chapter 4, I develop what I call the rectificatory theory of punishment. This theory views some punishments as required in order to maintain the equality of basic liberties: people who commit certain offenses thereby arrogate excess basic liberties, and must by way of punishment give up an equivalent body of liberties. In Chapter 5, I incorporate the rectificatory theory into a more general theory of punishment, a theory derived from John Rawls's version of the social contract. I argue there that punishment derives from the social contract in three distinct ways: by literal application, by reinterpretation, and by repudiation. Finally, in Chapter 6, I argue that this theory of punishment requires us to look at the contract in a certain way: the contract establishes a relationship of fraternity among the parties, not merely as a pleasant after-effect, but as something essential to the contract. (shrink)