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  1.  24
    Private Employers Don't Need Formal Risk Adjustment.Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire - 2001 - Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing 38 (3):260-269.
  2. Private Employers and Risk Adjustment: An Overview.Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire - 2001 - Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing 38 (3):260-269.
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  3.  26
    A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach.Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the speaker chooses. A persuasion rule specifies which statements the listener finds persuasive. We study persuasion rules that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request if and only (...)
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  4.  23
    Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions.Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two ``cultures.'' In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the (...)
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  5.  19
    An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game.Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein - unknown
    We show that for solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal game form does not provide information on how to carry out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game does. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through (...)
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  6.  4
    Why Don't Private Employers Use Risk Adjustment? Conference Overview.Jacob Glazer & Thomas G. McGuire - 2001 - Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing 38 (3):242-244.