Abrevando de la filosofía de la mente y de la ética filosófica, el perceptualismo moral argumenta que podemos tener experiencias perceptuales de propiedades morales, como “bueno” o “malo”, de la misma forma en que tenemos experiencias perceptuales de colores y formas. Es decir: el perceptualismo moral argumenta que podemos, literal, directa y simplemente ver la maldad, por ejemplo. A pesar de su amplio campo de estudio, estas perspectivas se han topado con objeciones formidables, como la objeción de las apariencias o (...) las críticas de corte humeano, para las cuales no se han dado respuestas satisfactorias. Este texto se propone sostener que gran parte de los problemas a los que se enfrenta el perceptualismo moral son producto de una vaga caracterización de las propiedades morales a las que pretendidamente se aplica la percepción, y postular un tipo de propiedad alternativa que pueda ser, al mismo tiempo, moralmente relevante y aprehensible por la experiencia perceptual. Para ello, se van a postular las llamadas propiedades de persona como opción alternativa, y se fundamentará su valor ético y su pertinencia para el perceptualismo moral mediante la noción de superveniencia ética. Se destacará que esta ruta merece ser explorada en virtud de su potencial para superar las críticas usuales que se le oponen al perceptualismo moral. (shrink)

La caracterización de la ética postulada por Foucault en sus últimas investigaciones choca con la concepción del sujeto de sus primeros escritos, donde este se presenta como el paciente de las diversas presiones institucionales que le dan forma. El presente texto propone delimitar las tensiones que surgen al contrastar ambas concepciones. Para ello, se esbozarán las particularidades de la ética en Foucault para luego perfilar las oposiciones que esta encuentra en las regulaciones del campo de las relaciones de poder. A (...) través de esta indagación, se buscará dar respuesta a la pregunta de si es posible la vida ética en la filosofía foucaultiana. (shrink)

The autopoietic theory and the enactive approach are two theoretical streams that, in spite of their historical link and conceptual affinities, offer very different views on the nature of living beings. In this paper, we compare these views and evaluate, in an exploratory way, their respective degrees of internal coherence. Focusing the analyses on certain key notions such as autonomy and organizational closure, we argue that while the autopoietic theory manages to elaborate an internally consistent conception of living beings, the (...) enactive approach presents an internal tension regarding its characterization of living beings as intentional systems directed at the environment. (shrink)

Context: The majority of contemporary enactivist work is influenced by the philosophical biology of Hans Jonas. Jonas credits all living organisms with experience that involves particular “existential” structures: nascent forms of concern for self-preservation and desire for objects and outcomes that promote well-being. We argue that Jonas’s attitude towards living systems involves a problematic anthropomorphism that threatens to place enactivism at odds with cognitive science, and undermine its legitimate aims to become a new paradigm for scientific investigation and understanding of (...) the mind. Problem: Enactivism needs to address the tension between its Jonasian influences and its aspirations to become a new paradigm for cognitive science. By relying on Jonasian phenomenology, contemporary enactivism obscures alternative ways in which phenomenology can be more smoothly integrated with cognitive science. Method: We outline the historical relationship between enactivism and phenomenology, and explain why anthropomorphism is problematic for a research program that aspires to become a new paradigm for cognitive science. We examine the roots of Jonas’s existential interpretation of biological facts, and describe how and why Jonas himself understood his project as founded on an anthropomorphic assumption that is incompatible with a crucial methodological assumption of scientific enquiry: the prohibition of unexplained natural purposes. We describe the way in which phenomenology can be integrated into Maturana’s autopoietic theory, and use this as an example of how an alternative, non-anthropomorphic science of the biological roots of cognition might proceed. Results: Our analysis reveals a crucial tension between Jonas’s influence on enactivism and enactivism’s paradigmatic aspirations. This suggests the possibility of, and need to investigate, other ways of integrating phenomenology with cognitive science that do not succumb to this tension. Implications: In light of this, enactivists should either eliminate the Jonasian inference from properties of our human experience to properties of the experience of all living organisms, or articulate an alternative conception of scientific enquiry that can tolerate the anthropomorphism this inference entails. The Maturanian view we present in the article’s final section constitutes a possible framework within which enactivist tools and concepts can be used to understand cognition and phenomenology, and that does not involve a problematic anthropomorphism. Constructivist content: Any constructivist approach that aims for integration with current scientific practice must either avoid the type of anthropomorphic inference on which Jonas bases his work, or specify a new conception of scientific enquiry that renders anthropomorphism unproblematic. (shrink)

Building on the original formulation of the autopoietic theory (AT), extended enactivism argues that living beings are autopoietic systems that extend beyond the spatial boundaries of the organism. In this article, we argue that extended enactivism, despite having some basis in AT’s original formulation, mistakes AT’s definition of living beings as autopoietic entities. We offer, as a reply to this interpretation, a more embodied reformulation of autopoiesis, which we think is necessary to counterbalance the (excessively) disembodied spirit of AT’s original (...) formulation. The article aims to clarify and correct what we take to be a misinterpretation of AT as a research program. AT, contrary to what some enactivists seem to believe, did not (and does not) intend to motivate an extended conception of living beings. AT’s primary purpose, we argue, was (and is) to provide a universal individuation criterion for living beings, these understood as discrete bodies that are embedded in, but not constituted by, the environment that surrounds them. However, by giving a more explicitly embodied definition of living beings, AT can rectify and accommodate, so we argue, the enactive extended interpretation of autopoiesis, showing that although living beings do not extend beyond their boundaries as autopoietic unities, they do form part, in normal conditions, of broader autopoietic systems that include the environment. (shrink)

In this paper we will demonstrate that a computational system can meet the criteria for autonomy laid down by classical enactivism. The two criteria that we will focus on are operational closure and structural determinism, and we will show that both can be applied to a basic example of a physically instantiated Turing machine. We will also address the question of precariousness, and briefly suggest that a precarious Turing machine could be designed. Our aim in this paper is to challenge (...) the assumption that computational systems are necessarily heteronomous systems, to try and motivate in enactivism a more nuanced and less rigid conception of computational systems, and to demonstrate to computational theorists that they might find some interesting material within the enactivist tradition, despite its historical hostility towards computationalism. (shrink)

This article analyzes the legal-philosophical situation of Artificial Intelligence and the intelligent robot on being a subject of Law to be considered a creative person or author. The contradiction involved in allowing an object to present the legal duality of being protected as an object that it is and at the same time being considered a subject by the resulting work is analyzed, an impairment or vulgarization for the subject of Law as a moral subject when proposing the fictio legis (...) de a moral object, which is not conceivable. Instead, an alternative to such an aporia is proposed, more fictitious than real. (shrink)

Businesses and governments in postcolonial countries frame investments in wind energy as efforts to address climate change and sustainable development. However, when wind energy projects encroach on indigenous peoples’ lives and land, there is often a lack of recognition and participation of these peoples and an unequal distribution of cost and benefits of such projects toward them, which leads to opposition against wind energy projects and often triggers conflicts for justice. Worryingly, such conditions have repeatedly resulted in the assassination of (...) human rights defenders, which further inflames the conflict. Herein, I discuss these concepts based on a longitudinal study centered on a wind energy project in Oaxaca, Mexico, with the aim of exploring and understanding the conditions under which wind energy investments fail to respect current laws and norms, as well as the consequences of such negligence. My in-depth analysis of the actions of the government, businesses, and indigenous peoples revealed a phenomenon that is less discussed in environmental justice research: the gradual and continuous transformation of indigenous peoples’ norms and behaviors away from their traditional economic and cultural livelihoods. This phenomenon helps to extend the conceptual understanding of environmental justice with regard to social turbulence, which is defined as the unpredictable behavior of political and social systems in contexts in which existing laws, regulations, and norms regarding environmental justice are not observed. The concept of social turbulence of environmental justice helps to explain how indigenous peoples sacrifice their territories, norms, and traditions to a technical solution to climate change and sustainable development. (shrink)

En reacción al platonismo de Quine acerca de los objetos matemáticos han surgido las posiciones ficcionalistas, tanto las revisionistas como las hermenéuticas. En mi parecer las tres posiciones son defendibles. Cuál elige uno (si es que decidimos elegir una de ellas), depende de convicciones filosóf..

The paper examines a recent proposal of substitution of classic (normative) philosophy of science by a post-positivist and pluralistic axiology governed by aesthetic or formal values. The author of the paper proposes a different set of values that can enconpass not only “internal” values, but is also open to the examination of the ethical limits of tecnoscience and the principles that can govern scientific development in oru “risk societies”, which depends heavily on the general evolution of science.

El autor se propone demostrar en este ensayo que: (i) la cantidad de gente pobre en Chile es al menos el doble de la que se anuncia oficialmente; (ii) la brecha que separa a los más ricos de los más pobres es bastante mayor que la estimada; (iii) la estructura de poder determina que los beneficios del desarrollo se acumulen en los estratos más ricos, por lo cual altas tasas de crecimiento económico no redundan necesariamente en una disminución de la (...) pobreza; (iv) la inequidad se da también por actividades económicas específicas, por regiones y por género; (v) se produce constantemente un masivo traslado de riqueza desde los salarios y desde los recursos naturales a la masa de excedentes empresariales; (vi) se necesita una firme intervención del Estado para corregir esta situación. (shrink)

El presente trabajo estudia el pensamiento musical de Alfred Schutz durante el denominado período bergsoniano que abarca los años 1924 a 1928. Partiendo de la teoría de las formas de vida como estratos de la conciencia profundizaremos en el concepto bergsoniano de durée en el ámbito musical y seguiremos las reflexiones de Schutz sobre la combinación de palabra, música, gesto y acción en la ópera, así como de las dos diferentes maneras de abordar la esencia de la ópera, esto es, (...) la presentación e interpretación de la relación Tú delante del espectador, en la obra de Mozart y Wagner. (shrink)

Por la encrucijada que la figura de Søren Kierkegaard supone en la historia del pensamiento, siendo comúnmente considerado como gozne entre el idealismo y las filosofías de la existencia, entre la creencia en un espíritu objetivo y la reivindicación subjetivista que halla acomodo en el agitado siglo XX, parecería obligado identificar y aislar la cuestión propiamente filosófica, en el seno de una producción tan peculiar como la suya. Una producción abundante en incógnitas, pistas falsas y autores ficticios, con preocupaciones que (...) pertenecen a ámbitos contrastados, de la estética a la teología. Por su problematicidad inherente, el concepto de ambigüedad -que él mismo tematizó- puede entenderse clave en la aproximación crítica a su obra, como verdadero “contra-concepto”. (shrink)

This paper examines a fundamental philosophical difference between two radical postcognitivist theories that are usually assumed to offer the same view of cognition; namely the autopoietic theory and the enactive approach. The ways these two theories understand cognition, it is argued, are not compatible nor incompatible but rather incommensurable. The reason, so it is argued, is that while enactivism, following the traditional stance held by most of the cognitive theories, understands cognitive systems as constituting a natural kind, the autopoietic theory (...) understands them as constituting only a conventional kind. Additionally, the paper shows that AT’s conventionalist stance about cognition, far from being an undesirable or useless position, offers some methodological virtues that might be timely and welcome in the agitated and revolutionary climate of current cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper attempts to bring to the attention of the readers a concept that broadens ethical considerations for Alzheimer's disease research. We propose we move away from the ethical paradigm that focuses on avoidance of coercion for participation in studies as well as privacy and safety to a more inclusive paradigm that will not only include the principles outlined above but will also guarantee access to new treatments for individuals that participate in research and other members of society. Specifically, if (...) the research being performed results in a new treatment for Alzheimer's disease, would the individuals participating in the research and other members of their community have access to and benefit from these treatments, given the availability of financial and other resources in the society that will allow for the implementation of these treatments. This paper will propose a model that will facilitate the achievement of these broader ethical considerations. (shrink)

Research traditions on cognition and depression focus on relatively unconnected aspects of cognitive functioning. On one hand, the neuropsychological perspective has concentrated on cognitive control difficulties as a prominent feature of this condition. On the other hand, the clinical psychology perspective has focused on cognitive biases and repetitive negative patterns of thinking for emotional information. A review of the literature from both fields reveals that difficulties are more evident for mood-congruent materials, suggesting that cognitive control difficulties interact with cognitive biases (...) to hinder cognitive switching, working memory updating, and inhibition of irrelevant information. Connecting research from these two traditions, we propose a novel integrative cognitive model of depression in which the interplay between mood-congruent cognitive control difficulties, cognitive biases, and rumination may ultimately lead to ineffective emotion-regulation strategies to downregulate negative mood and upregulate positive mood. (shrink)

Se analizan los desafíos de futuro de la sociedad digital. Desde perspectiva fenomenológico-hermenéutica, la idea de una ética de la tecnología considera la sociedad digital como dispositivo técnico. La literatura pertinente permite, primero, estudiar la tecnología disruptiva como generadora de cambios sociales, los cuales, a su vez, transforman las formas de la facticidad de la vida. De esta manera, la ética de la sociedad material, sirve de argumento para analizar la ética en la sociedad digital. Tomando la bioética filosófica como (...) instrumento, se concluye que la sociedad digital antepone retos para la vida, los cuales debe afrontar para la supervivencia. (shrink)

Las entradas principales incluyen una bibliografía esencial absolutamente actualizada. La obra incorpora un completo índice de materias con referencias a las voces del diccionario en las que se trata cada tema en cuestión, lo que permite una perfecta interrelación de temas y autores.

“Una sociedad emancipada no sería un estado de uniformidad, sino la realización de lo general en la conciliación de las diferencias. La política, que ha de tomarse esto bien en serio, no debería por eso propagar la igualdad abstracta de los hombres ni siquiera como idea. En lugar de ello debería señalar la mala igualdad existente hoy, la identidad de los interesados en las filmaciones y en los armamentos, pero concibiendo la mejor situación como aquella en la que se pueda (...) ser diferente sin temor”. Th. W. Adorno. (shrink)

El objetivo a perseguir por el presente artículo, es analizar tres de las principales teorías humanístico-filosóficas, respecto a la concepción del ciclo vital de que han sido participes diversas comunidades humanas a lo largo de la historia. Con base en tres propuestas de periodización histórica, se expondrán los enfoques temporales sobre los procesos y el fin de la historia teorizados por los filósofos e historiadores Giambatista Vico, Oswald Spengler y Arnold Joseph Toynbee.

Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is (...) the persistence of cognitively relevant asymmetries between its purported cognitive systems and the environment. Complementarily, we argue that an antirepresentationalist ancestor of enactivism, the autopoietic theory of cognition, is able to deliver and secure externalism, thus offering the explosive combination that Wheeler claims us needed for a revolution in cognitive science. (shrink)

In contrast to Capra’s interpretation of Maturana’s work, I argue that the autopoietic theory does not establish an intrinsic, necessary link between life and cognitive/mental phenomena, and that given its functionalist approach, the theory helps very little to overcome the Cartesian division between mind and body.