17 found
Order:
See also
Profile: Jake Chandler (La Trobe University)
  1. Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  2. Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  39
    Contrastive Confirmation: Some Competing Accounts.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):129-138.
    I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called 'Law of Likelihood' is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  5.  9
    Descriptive Decision Theory.Jake Chandler - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  83
    The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.
    In a recent article, Douven and Williamson offer both (i) a rebuttal of various recent suggested sufficient conditions for rational acceptability and (ii) an alleged ‘generalization’ of this rebuttal, which, they claim, tells against a much broader class of potential suggestions. However, not only is the result mentioned in (ii) not a generalization of the findings referred to in (i), but in contrast to the latter, it fails to have the probative force advertised. Their paper does however, if unwittingly, bring (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  7. The Transmission of Support: A Bayesian Re-Analysis.Jake Chandler - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):333-343.
    Crispin Wright’s discussion of the notion of ‘transmission-failure’ promises to have important philosophical ramifications, both in epistemology and beyond. This paper offers a precise, formal characterisation of the concept within a Bayesian framework. The interpretation given avoids the serious shortcomings of a recent alternative proposal due to Samir Okasha.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results.Jake Chandler - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):579-602.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of Preservation for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of Commutativity, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of modus ponens —are problematic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Transmission Failure, AGM-Style.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to be suffcient to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Defeat Reconsidered.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):49-51.
    It appears to have gone unnoticed in the literature that Pollock's widely endorsed analysis of evidential defeat entails a remarkably strong symmetry principle, according to which, for any three propositions D, E and H, if both E and D provide a reason to believe H, then D is a defeater for E's support for H if and only if, in turn, E is a defeater for D's support for H. After illustrating the counterintuitiveness of this constraint, a simple, more suitable, (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  2
    Extending the Harper Identity to Iterated Belief Change.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2016 - In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
    The field of iterated belief change has focused mainly on revision, with the other main operator of AGM belief change theory, i.e. contraction, receiving relatively little attention. In this paper we extend the Harper Identity from single-step change to define iterated contraction in terms of iterated revision. Specifically, just as the Harper Identity provides a recipe for defining the belief set resulting from contracting A in terms of (i) the initial belief set and (ii) the belief set resulting from revision (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  4
    Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Implications, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 624 Pp., £87 , ISBN 9780199697502. [REVIEW]Jake Chandler - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):141-146.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  83
    Review of Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds. Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW]Jake Chandler - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 296 (6):422-424.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  61
    Self-Respect Regained.Jake Chandler & Adam Rieger - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):311-318.
    In a recent article, David Christensen casts aspersions on a restricted version of van Fraassen's Reflection principle, which he dubs ‘Self-Respect’(sr). Rejecting two possible arguments for sr, he concludes that the principle does not constitute a requirement of rationality. In this paper we argue that not only has Christensen failed to make a case against the aforementioned arguments, but that considerations pertaining to Moore's paradox indicate that sr, or at the very least a mild weakening thereof, is indeed a plausible (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  44
    Contrastive Support: Some Competing Accounts.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1).
    I outline four competing probabilistic accounts of contrastive evidential support and consider various considerations that might help arbitrate between these. The upshot of the discussion is that the so-called ‘Law of Likelihood’ is to be preferred to any of the alternatives considered.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  15
    Discussion Note Whyte on Desire Fulfilment Conditions: A Simple Problem.Jake Chandler - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds., Degrees of Belief Reviewed By.Jake Chandler - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (6):422-424.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography