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  1.  25
    What is an Object File?E. J. Green & Jake Quilty-Dunn - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx055.
    The notion of an object file figures prominently in recent work in philosophy and cognitive science. Object files play a role in theories of singular reference, object individuation, perceptual memory, and the development of cognitive capacities. However, the philosophical literature lacks a detailed, empirically informed theory of object files. In this paper, we articulate and defend the multiple-slots view, which specifies both the format and architecture of object files. We argue that object files represent in a non-iconic, propositional format that (...)
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  2.  18
    Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in experiments involving masked priming. Do unconscious perceptual states provide justification as well? The answer depends on one’s theory of justification. While most varieties of externalism seem compatible with unconscious perceptual justification, several theories have recently afforded to consciousness a special role in perceptual justification. We argue that (...)
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  3.  51
    Against Dispositionalism: Belief in Cognitive Science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.
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  4.  87
    Iconicity and the Format of Perception.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):255-263.
    According to one important proposal, the difference between perception and cognition consists in the representational formats used in the two systems (Carey, 2009; Burge, 2010; Block, 2014). In particular, it is claimed that perceptual representations are iconic, or image-like, while cognitive representations are discursive, or language-like. Taking object perception as a test case, this paper argues on empirical grounds that it requires discursive label-like representations. These representations segment the perceptual field, continuously pick out objects despite changes in their features, and (...)
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  5.  83
    Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Dual-Component Theory.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):550-575.
    According to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full-blown propositional beliefs. This classical dual-component theory of experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases of known illusions, wherein subjects have beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual-component theories reject the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual (...)
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  6.  27
    Inferential Transitions.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    This paper provides a naturalistic account of inference. We posit that the core of inference is constituted by bare inferential transitions, transitions between discursive mental representations guided by rules built into the architecture of cognitive systems. In further developing the concept of BITs, we provide an account of what Boghossian [2014] calls ‘taking’—that is, the appreciation of the rule that guides an inferential transition. We argue that BITs are sufficient for implicit taking, and then, to analyse explicit taking, we posit (...)
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  7.  19
    Believing Our Eyes: The Role of False Belief in the Experience of Cinema BSA Prize Essay, 2014.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (3):269-283.
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  8.  35
    Was Reid a Direct Realist?Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):302 - 323.
    There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues ? colour perception and visible figure ? and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ?directness? as well as what Reid calls ?acquired perception?, which is ?mediate? in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct perception.
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  9.  42
    Believing Without Reason.Eric Mandelbaum & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2015 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:42-52.