This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: ‘epistemic’ virtues like open-mindedness; ‘motivational’ virtues like courage, and more robustly ‘moral’ virtues like justice. A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues.
This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: 'epistemic' virtues like open-mindedness; 'motivational' virtues like courage, and more robustly 'moral' virtues like justice. A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues.
In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is "epistemic" in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and "practical" in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of "inner epistemic virtue" to the "outer risks" implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.
In this paper I want to explore, and suggest a theoretical explanation of, an apparent asymmetry governing some of our most basic ethical judgments. I also want to use this asymmetry to probe into the relative plausibility of ‘moral character’ and ‘volition’ based accounts of moral responsibility. Briefly, my argument will be that, with suitable modifications, the latter type of account succeeds just where the former, the more Aristotelian approach, breaks down.Consider, first, a series of acts exemplifying the same vice.A (...) person, say, is repeatedly late or is consistently selfish. Now our tendency here, surely, would be to view such acts as increasingly blameworthy — increasingly worthy, one might say, of some form of punishment — as they are repeated. (shrink)
Is it possible to avoid “the agrarian myth” while recognizing the genuine value—which is not necessarily the economic or monetary value—of agrarian pursuits? My answer is that such a recognition of genuine agrarian values is possible, but only if we recapture a lost sense of the value of productive activities generally.An impediment to this recognition, I maintain, is modern economics—both socialist and free market; one important means to it, the natural law philosophy of the eighteenth century French Physiocrats.
My account begins with Strawson’s celebrated “Freedom and Resentment” lecture. Here by making the “reactive emotions” partly constitutive of holding someone responsible, Strawson offered a deep analysis of what was wrong with the forward-looking, behavior-affecting view of responsibility often espoused by determinists, while apparently avoiding the metaphysical baggage carried by libertarianism. Yet, for all the promise of such a view, there remained the question of what a carefully worked-out, Strawsonian conception of responsibility would actually look like. In this study I (...) examine the thoughtful version of such a theory R. Jay Wallace offers in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. (shrink)
Karl Jaspers celebrates the “Axial Age” as marking a fundamental advance in humanity’s self-understanding, but rejects Christianity as “fettering” this new enlightenment to a notion of Jesus as the sole incarnation of the divine. Here I try to show that, relative to Jaspers’ own account of Existenz and especially of existential “foundering,” Jesus becomes distinctive in a way that Socrates, Buddha, and Confucius are not (even on Jaspers’ own accounts of these four “paradigmatic individuals”). I go on to show how, (...) on Karl Rahner’s inclusivist account of theincarnation, Jaspers’ objections to Christianity mostly dissolve. Finally, I suggest the need to recognize two Axial Age traditions: one rejecting sacrificial forms in favor of ethical prescriptions, the other finding new ethical meaning in these older forms. (shrink)
William James indicated a “middle path” according to which religious experience yields something like knowledge for the mystic, but not a kind that others, who do not share his experience, are compelled to accept. Such a middle way is initially appealing, but how is it to be developed? Here I suggest three leading ideas—the epistemic analogue of “agent-relative permissions,” the complementary relationship between the Jamesian virtues of bold exploration and sober caution, and the kind of special access the lover may (...) claim with respect to knowledge of his beloved—with an eye to such development. Each is found helpful, but in ascending order of importance. (shrink)
William James indicated a “middle path” according to which religious experience yields something like knowledge for the mystic, but not a kind that others, who do not share his experience, are compelled to accept. Such a middle way is initially appealing, but how is it to be developed? Here I suggest three leading ideas—the epistemic analogue of “agent-relative permissions,” the complementary relationship between the Jamesian virtues of bold exploration and sober caution, and the kind of special access the lover may (...) claim with respect to knowledge of his beloved—with an eye to such development. Each is found helpful, but in ascending order of importance. (shrink)
My account begins with Strawson’s celebrated “Freedom and Resentment” lecture. Here by making the “reactive emotions” partly constitutive of holding someone responsible, Strawson offered a deep analysis of what was wrong with the forward-looking, behavior-affecting view of responsibility often espoused by determinists, while apparently avoiding the metaphysical baggage carried by libertarianism. Yet, for all the promise of such a view, there remained the question of what a carefully worked-out, Strawsonian conception of responsibility would actually look like. In this study I (...) examine the thoughtful version of such a theory R. Jay Wallace offers in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. (shrink)
My account begins with Strawson’s celebrated “Freedom and Resentment” lecture. Here by making the “reactive emotions” partly constitutive of holding someone responsible, Strawson offered a deep analysis of what was wrong with the forward-looking, behavior-affecting view of responsibility often espoused by determinists, while apparently avoiding the metaphysical baggage carried by libertarianism. Yet, for all the promise of such a view, there remained the question of what a carefully worked-out, Strawsonian conception of responsibility would actually look like. In this study I (...) examine the thoughtful version of such a theory R. Jay Wallace offers in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. (shrink)
