15 found
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James A. Ryan [16]James Andrew Ryan [1]
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James Ryan
University of Miami (PhD)
  1.  31
    Moral Relativism and the Argument From Disagreement.James A. Ryan - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):377-386.
  2. Moral Relativism and the Argument From Disagreement.James A. Ryan - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (3):377–386.
  3. Leibniz' Binary System and Shao Yong's "Yijing".James A. Ryan - 1996 - Philosophy East and West 46 (1):59-90.
    The Yijing/Binary System Episode involved Leibniz' discovery of a de facto representation of the binary number system in the sixty-four-hexagram Fu Xi "Yijing." Scholars have left the match unexplained, since they have found no evidence of a forgotten binary number system in ancient China. The interesting similarities and differences are discussed between the thought of Leibniz and that of Shao Yong, both of whom, it is argued, understood and recognized the importance of the double geometric progression in the diagram.
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  4.  73
    Moral Philosophy and Moral Psychology in Mencius.James A. Ryan - 1998 - Asian Philosophy 8 (1):47 – 64.
    This paper defends both an interpretation of Mencius' moral theory and that theory itself against alternative interpretive defences. I argue that the 'virtue ethics' reading of Mencius wrongly sees him as denying the distinction between moral philosophy and moral psychology. Virtue ethics is flawed, because it makes such a denial. But Mencius' moral theory, in spite of Mencius' obvious interest in moral psychology, does not have that flaw. However, I argue that Mencius is no rationalist. Instead, I show that he (...)
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  5.  47
    The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (1):79-88.
    I show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification. Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism.
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  6.  92
    Conservatism and Coherentism in Aristotle, Confucius, and Mencius.James A. Ryan - 2001 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28 (3):275–284.
  7.  65
    Coherentist Naturalism in Ethics.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:471-487.
    After briefly arguing that neither (Kantian or utilitarian) rule-based ethics nor virtue ethics offers promise as a moral theory, I state that argument by analogy (i.e., deliberation within coherence constraints) is a satisfactory form of moral deliberation. I show that what is right must be whatever corresponds to the largest and most coherent set of a society’s moral values. Since we would not know how to interpret the claim that what is right might be repugnant to all our shared moral (...)
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  8.  69
    Taking the ‘Error’ Out of Ruse‘s Error Theory.James A. Ryan - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):385-397.
    Michael Ruses Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral (...)
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  9.  38
    A Defence of Mencius' Ethical Naturalism.James A. Ryan - 1997 - Asian Philosophy 7 (1):23 – 36.
    I argue that Mencius puts forth a defensible form of ethical naturalism, according to which moral properties, moral motivation, and moral deliberation can be accounted for within the parameters of a naturalistic worldview. On this position, moral properties are the subjectively real properties which acts have in virtue of their corresponding to our most coherent set of shared desires. I give a naturalistic definition of 'right' which, I argue, is implicit in Mencius' philosophy. I address the objection that some of (...)
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  10.  6
    On Living High and Letting Die.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):103-109.
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  11.  32
    Letters to the Editor.Bernard Freyberg, Dan Werner, James A. Ryan, Steven Yates & Robert L. Perea - 2001 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (5):143 - 147.
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  12.  36
    The Compatibilist Philosophy of Freedom of Shao Yong.James A. Ryan - 1993 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 20 (3):279-291.
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  13.  37
    A Defense of the Coherence Theory of Truth.James A. Ryan - 1998 - Philosophia 26 (3-4):89-101.
    I argue that coherentists can admit that there are facts about what systems of beliefs communities accept, without being committed to the claim that these facts are the truth conditions of sentences about what communities accept. (edited).
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  14.  5
    Coherentist Naturalism in Ethics.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:471-487.
    After briefly arguing that neither rule-based ethics nor virtue ethics offers promise as a moral theory, I state that argument by analogy is a satisfactory form of moral deliberation. I show that what is right must be whatever corresponds to the largest and most coherent set of a society’s moral values. Since we would not know how to interpret the claim that what is right might be repugnant to all our shared moral values, I argue that a definitional naturalist position (...)
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  15.  22
    On Living High and Letting Die.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (1):103–109.