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James B. Freeman [58]James Beaumont Freeman [1]
  1.  89
    Dialectics and the macrostructure of arguments: a theory of argument structure.James B. Freeman - 1991 - Berlin ; New York: Foris Publications.
    Chapter The Need for a Theory of Argument Structure. THE STANDARD APPROACH The approach to argument diagramming which we call standard was originated, ...
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  2.  23
    Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem.James B. Freeman - 2005 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    When, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Can the criterion be theoretically or philosophically justified? This is the first book to provide a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability and it answers the questions above from an epistemological approach that the author calls common sense foundationalism. It will be eagerly sought out not just by specialists in informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation theory but also by a (...)
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  3.  53
    Argument structure: representation and theory.James B. Freeman - 2011 - New York: Springer.
    An approach to argument macrostructure -- The dialectical nature of argument -- Toulmin's problematic notion of warrant -- The linked-convergent distinction, a first approximation -- Argument structure and disciplinary perspective : the linked-convergent versus multiple-co-ordinatively compound distinctions -- The linked-convergent distinction, refining the criterion -- Argument structure and enthymemes -- From analysis to evaluation.
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  4.  25
    Systematizing Toulmin’s Warrants: An Epistemic Approach.James B. Freeman - 2005 - Argumentation 19 (3):331-346.
    Relevance of premises to conclusion can be explicated through Toulmin’s notion of warrant, understood as an inference rule, albeit not necessarily formal. A normative notion of relevance requires the warrant to be reliable. To determine reliability, we propose a fourfold classification of warrants into a priori, empirical, institutional, and evaluative, with further subdivisions possible. This classification has its ancestry in classical rhetoric and recent epistemology. Distinctive to each type of warrant is the mode by which such connections are intuitively discovered (...)
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  5.  40
    Relevance, warrants, backing, inductive support.James B. Freeman - 1992 - Argumentation 6 (2):219-275.
    We perceive relevance by virtue of inference habits, which may be expressed as Pierce's leading principles or as Toulmin's warrants. Hence relevance in a descriptive sense is a ternary relation between two statements and a set of inference rules. For a normative sense, the warrants must be properly backed. Different types of warrant to empirical generalizations, we introduce L.J. Cohen's notion of inductive support. A to empirical generalizations, we introduce L.J. Cohen's notion of inductive support. A generalization H is supported (...)
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  6.  64
    An analysis of the subjunctive conditional.Charles B. Daniels & James B. Freeman - 1980 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):639-655.
  7.  76
    Govier’s Distinguishing A Priori from Inductive Arguments by Analogy: Implications for a General Theory of Ground Adequacy.James B. Freeman - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (2):175-194.
    In a priori analogies, the analogue is constructed in imagination, sharing certain properties with the primary subject. The analogue has some further property clearly consequent on those shared properties. Ceteris paribus the primary subject has that property also. The warrant involves non-empirical, e.g., moral intuition but is also defeasible. The argument is thus neither deductive nor inductive, but an additional type. In an inductive analogy, the analogues back the warrant from below. Distinguishing these two types of arguments by analogy gives (...)
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  8.  40
    What types of arguments are there?James B. Freeman - unknown
    Our typology is based on two ground adequacy factors, one logical and one epistemic. Logically, the step from premises to conclusion may be conclusive or only ceteris paribus. Epistemically, warrants may be backed a priori or a posteriori. Hence there are four types of arguments: conclusive a priori, defeasible a priori, defeasible a posteriori, and prima facie conclusive a posteriori. We shall give an example of each and compare our scheme with other typologies.
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  9.  51
    Argument Structure and Disciplinary Perspective.James B. Freeman - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (4):397-423.
    Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. The pragma-dialectical tradition distinguishes multiple from co-ordinatively compound argumentation. Although these two distinctions may appear to coincide, constituting only a terminological difference, we argue that they are distinct, indeed expressing different disciplinary perspectives on argumentation. From a logical point of view, where the primary evaluative issue concerns sufficient strength of support, the unit of analysis is the individual argument, the particular premises put forward to support a given conclusion. (...)
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  10.  47
    Logical Form, Probability Interpretations, and the Inductive/Deductive Distinction.James B. Freeman - 1983 - Informal Logic 5 (2).
    Logical Form, Probability Interpretations, and the Inductive/Deductive Distinction.
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  11.  46
    What Types of Statements are There?James B. Freeman - 2000 - Argumentation 14 (2):135-157.
    Building on the work of Sproule, Fahnestock and Secor, and Kruger, we present a specific typology of statements. In particular, we distinguish broadly logically determinate statements, descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations. We generate this typology through a series of dichotomous divisions of statements. We divide statements first into the broadly logically determinate versus contingent, the contingent into the evaluational versus natural, and the natural into the extensional versus intensional. We show that the rationales for these distinctions are well motivated and philosophically (...)
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  12.  37
    Dialectical situations and argument analysis.James B. Freeman - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (2).
    Dialectical Situations and Argument Analysis.
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  13.  64
    Argument Strength, the Toulmin Model, and Ampliative Probability.James B. Freeman - 2006 - Informal Logic 26 (1):25-40.
    We argue that Cohen’s concept of inductive or ampliative probability facilitates proper explication of sufficient strength for non-demonstrative arguments conforming to the Toulmin model. The data and claims of such arguments are singular statements. We may epistemically classify the warrants of such arguments as empirical (either physical or personal), institutional, or evaluative. Backing evidence and rebutting considerations vary with the epistemic type of warrant, but in each case the notion of ampliative probability for arguments with warrants of that type can (...)
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  14.  81
    The Place of Informal Logic in Philosophy.James B. Freeman - 2000 - Informal Logic 20 (2).
    We argue that informal logic is epistemological. Two central questions concern premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Both may be explicated in tenns of justification, a central epistemological concept. That some premises are basic parallels a foundationalist account of basic beliefs and epistemic support. Some epistemological accounts of these concepts may advance the analysis of premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Infonnallogic has implications for other aspects of philosophy. If causal interpretations are acceptable premises and thus justified, does the world have a (...)
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  15.  19
    Walton`s Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation.James B. Freeman - 1996 - Informal Logic 18 (2).
  16.  34
    Classical second-order intensional logic with maximal propositions.Charles B. Daniels & James B. Freeman - 1977 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):1 - 31.
    By the standards presented in the Introduction, CMFC2 is deficient on at least one ontological ground: ‘∀’ is a syncategorematic expression and so CMFC2 is not an ideal language. To some there may be an additional difficulty: any two wffs provably equivalent in the classical sense are provably identical. We hope in sequel to present systems free of these difficulties, free either of one or the other, or perhaps both.This work was done with the aid of Canada Council Grant S74-0551-S1.
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  17.  35
    Compactness for RQ.James B. Freeman - 1975 - Studia Logica 34 (3):269 - 274.
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  18.  36
    Fairness and the value of disjunctive actions.James B. Freeman - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (2):105 - 111.
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  19.  20
    The truth about truth as a condition of premise adequacy.James B. Freeman - unknown
    Is truth a condition of premise adequacy? We may distinguish objective and subjective argument correctness. Objective correctness means true premises rendering the conclusion true or probable. Subjective correctness means acceptable pr emises rendering the conclusion acceptable. Acceptability depends on evidence available and so is internalist. Objective and subjective correctness of the premises is ordinarily distinct. For connection adequacy, objective rightness and subjective righ tness coincide. We recognize entailment or rendering probably a priori. Logic is thus internalist. Logic needs an internalist (...)
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  20.  14
    What Types of Statements are There? A Philosophical Look at Stasis Theory.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  21.  32
    Epistemic justification and premise acceptability.James B. Freeman - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (1):59-68.
    In this paper, we want to explore the connection between premises' being acceptable and their being in some sense justified. The equivalence of premise acceptability and justification seems intuitively correct. But to argue for such a connection, we need to analyze the concepts of acceptability and justification. Such an analysis also seems necessary if this equivalence is to advance our understanding of premise acceptability. Following L. J. Cohen, we may say S believes that p when S is disposed to feel (...)
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  22.  15
    The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption.James B. Freeman - 2023 - Argumentation 37 (2):217-231.
    One takes one’s word that p when a source vouches for p and one accepts the word of that source. If the source is reliable in this case, p is acceptable. The reliability of the source is a measure of its plausibility. If a source has the relevant competence, credibility, authority, that word is acceptable. Likewise, the word may be acceptable if accompanied by a cogent argument, but presumption may be misplaced. One may recognize a presumption for a statement when (...)
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  23.  13
    Two Notions of Truth.Charles B. Daniels & James B. Freeman - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):333-345.
  24.  50
    Arguments about arguments.James B. Freeman - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (4):525-540.
    We survey the contents of Finocchiaro's papers collected in Arguments about Arguments , pointing out, where appropriate, their expected interest for readers of Philosophy of the Social Sciences. The papers include essays about argument theory and reasoning, the nature of fallacies and fallaciousness, critiques of noteworthy contributions to argumentation theory, and historical essays on scientific thinking. Key Words: arguments • dialectic • dialectical approach • empirical logic • evaluation • fallacies • informal logic • interpretation • reasoning.
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  25. A caution on propositional identity.James B. Freeman - 1977 - Analysis 37 (4):149.
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  26.  83
    A Caution on Propositional Identity.James B. Freeman - 1977 - Analysis 37 (4):149 - 151.
  27.  8
    Aristotelian Intellectual Intuition, Basic Beliefs and Naturalistic Epistemology.James B. Freeman - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 45:88-93.
    I first argue that Aristotelian intellectual intuition generates basic beliefs which are not inferred — inductively or deductively — from other beliefs. Both involve synthetic intuitive insight. Epagoge grasps a connection and nous sees its general applicability. I next argue that such beliefs are properly basic by adapting an argument made by Hilary Kornblith. According to Kornblith, the world is objectively divided into natural kinds. We humans perceive the world divided into natural kinds. There is empirical evidence suggesting that we (...)
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  28.  20
    Aristotelian Logic.James B. Freeman - 1994 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1):130-131.
  29.  19
    Algebraic Semantics for Modal Predicate Logic.James B. Freeman - 1976 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 22 (1):523-552.
  30.  38
    Algebraic Semantics for Modal Predicate Logic.James B. Freeman - 1976 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 22 (1):523-552.
  31.  50
    A second-order relevance logic with modality.James B. Freeman & Charles B. Daniels - 1979 - Studia Logica 38 (2):113 - 135.
    In this paper a system, RPF, of second-order relevance logic with S5 necessity is presented which contains a defined, notion of identity for propositions. A complete semantics is provided. It is shown that RPF allows for more than one necessary proposition. RPF contains primitive syntactic counterparts of the following semantic notions: (1) the reflexive, symmetrical, transitive binary alternativeness relation for S5 necessity, (2) the ternary Routley-Meyer alternativeness relation for implication, and (3) the Routley-Meyer notion of a prime intensional theory, as (...)
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  32.  17
    Can Interpretations Ever Be Acceptable Basic Premises?James B. Freeman - unknown
  33.  19
    Commentary on Blair.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  34.  12
    Commentary on Goddu.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  35.  13
    Commentary on Kauffeld.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  36.  19
    Commentary on Los.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  37.  25
    Commentary on: Scott Aikin and John Casey's "Don't feed the trolls: Straw men and iron men".James B. Freeman - unknown
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  38.  24
    Errors of Reasoning, Naturalizing the Logic of Inference.James B. Freeman - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (3):395-426.
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  39.  35
    Govier's The Philosophy of Argument.James B. Freeman - 2002 - Informal Logic 22 (1).
  40.  18
    Higher Level Moral Principles in Argumentation.James B. Freeman - unknown
    Suppose two persons disagree over whether an act is right, justifying their judgments by appealing to divergent higher-level moral principles. These principles function as backing and rebuttals in their argumentation. To justify these principles, we may argue either that they would be accepted in some ideal model or that they are in reflective equilibrium with our considered moral judgments. Disagreement over the model indicates difference in philosophical anthropology but does not preclude resolution through argument.
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  41.  59
    Maximal propositions and the coherence theory of truth.James B. Freeman & Charles B. Daniels - 1978 - Dialogue 17 (1):56-71.
    In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintains that “The world is all that is the case.” Some philosophers have seen an advantage in introducing into a formal language either a constant which will represent the world, or an operator, e.g., ‘Max’, such that indicates that p gives a complete description of the actual world, of the world at some instant of time, or of a possible world. Such propositions are called world propositions, possible world propositions, or maximal propositions. For us, a maximal (...)
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  42.  12
    19. Premiss Acceptability and Truth.James B. Freeman - 2005 - In Kent A. Peacock & Andrew D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of reason: essays in honour of John Woods. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. pp. 348-363.
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  43.  66
    Premise Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification.James B. Freeman - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (2).
    Acceptability is a thoroughly normative epistemic notion. If a statement is acceptable, i.e. it is proper to take it as a premise, then one is justified in accepting it. We also hold that a statement is acceptable just in case there is a presumption of warrant in its favor. We thus see acceptability connected to epistemic normativity on the one hand and to warrant on the other. But there is a distinct tension in this dual connection. The dominant tradition in (...)
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  44.  13
    Progress Without Regress on the Dialectical Tier.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  45.  16
    Resolving Moral Dissensus: Possibilities for Argumentation.James B. Freeman - unknown
    Moral dissensus may arise first because persons may disagree over the warrants licensing inferring an evaluative conclusion from premises asserting that properties alleged evaluatively relevant hold. This results in seeing different properties as evaluatively relevant. Secondly, such properties will frequently not be descriptive but interpretive, asserting some nomic connection. Persons may disagree over what evaluatively relevant properties hold in a given case. We explore the possibilities for argumentation to resolve these two types of disagreement.
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  46.  17
    Reply to commentary on "The Method of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, and Bias".James B. Freeman - unknown
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  47.  20
    Reply to my Commentator - Freeman.James B. Freeman - unknown
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  48.  49
    The Human Image System and Thinking Critically in the Strong Sense.James B. Freeman - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (1).
    The Human Image System and Thinking Critically in the Strong Sense.
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  49.  20
    The Logical Dimension of Argumentation and Its Semantic Appraisal in Bermejo-Luque’s Giving Reasons.James B. Freeman - 2011 - Theoria 26 (3):289-299.
    We critically examine Bermejo-Luque’s account of the logical dimension of argumentation and its logical or semantic evaluation. Our considerations concern her views on inference claims, validity, logical normativity, warrants, necessity, warrants and the justification of inferences, ontological versus epistemic modal qualifiers, ontological versus epistemic probability, and ontological versus conditional probability.
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  50.  55
    van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger`s Handbook of Argumentation Theory: A Critical Survey of Classical Backgrounds and Modern Studies.James B. Freeman - 1987 - Informal Logic 9 (1).
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