A fierce debate about civic education in American public schools has erupted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many liberals and conservatives, though they disagree strongly about which civic virtues to teach, share the assumption that such education is an appropriate responsibility for public schools. They are wrong. Civic education aimed at civic virtue is at best ineffective; worse, it is often subversive of the moral purpose of schooling. Moreover, the attempt to impose these partisan conceptions (...) of civic virtue on America's students violates the civic trust that underpins vibrant public schools. (shrink)

For a long time, it seemed that Aristotelians and Kantians had little to say to each other. When Kant the moralist was known in the English-speaking world primarily from his Groundwork and his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant's conceptual vocabulary of “duty,” “law,” “maxim,” and “morality” appeared quite foreign to Aristotle's “virtue,” “end,” “good,” and “character.” Yet ever since philosopher Mary Gregor's Laws of Freedom, published in 1963, made Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals central to the interpretation of his ethical (...) thought, it has become clear that such “Aristotelian” terms as virtue, end, good, happiness, and character are also central to Kant. Aristotelians and Kantians now see that they have plenty to say to each other, and they have gone from being adversaries to sharing a sometimes unprincipled urge to merge central aspects of Aristotle's and Kant's ethical thought. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJohn Tomasi argues that a theory of justice should include economic liberty since it provides people with a way of living self-authored lives. However, as Aristotelians have pointed out, even seemingly neutral theories of justice rely on non-neutral conceptions of the good. In Tomasi's case, the ideal of self-authorship assumes that it is good to exert economic agency and in so doing, exercise one's economic liberty. Thus, Tomasi equates self-authorship with participation in market activities, tacitly universalizing what is, in fact, (...) a narrow and objectionable conception of the good. (shrink)

Despite their obvious importance to social and political life, custom and customary law have largely escaped philosophical scrutiny. There are important recent philosophical analyses of convention, but none of custom. And customary law has been recently neglected by the dominant legal positivism. One reason for the neglect of custom is the familiar dichotomy between nature and convention. Social practices are said to be either by nature, and therefore assumed to be unalterable, or they are said to be by convention, and (...) therefore assumed to be created at will. But customs arise neither simply from nature nor from deliberate stipulation, so they are excluded by the familiar opposition of nature and convention. Custom is a notoriously vague concept: custom seems both to be natural and conventional. I attempt to show how custom bridges human nature and social norms. I argue that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: habit and convention. Custom is a habitual convention and a conventional habit. I discuss habit and convention in relation to contemporary psychology and analytic philosophy. Habit roots custom in the physiology of human nature while convention links custom to social norms. Aristotle pioneered this approach to custom by using two words to describe what we call custom: ethos and nomos. Ethos focuses our attention on the habitual dimension of custom while nomos focuses our attention on the conventional dimension of custom. I argue that the function of law is to remedy the deficiencies of custom: law is custom’s instrument for shaping its own evolution. (shrink)

NO THREE CONCEPTS ARE MORE CENTRAL to legal theory than nature, custom, and stipulation; thus the familiar expressions "natural law," "customary law," and stipulated or "positive law." The problem is that conflicting claims are made for natural law, customary law, and positive law. I will argue that to make sense of these conflicting claims we must first make a distinction between law as a species of social order and jurisprudence as the explanation of law. For example, the debate between the (...) advocates of legal positivism and the advocates of natural law reflects a confusion between law and jurisprudence: law as social order is essentially stipulated, but the jurisprudential explanation of law requires the three categories of nature, custom, and stipulation. Thus legal positivists rightly insist that all law is stipulated, but advocates of natural law rightly insist that the explanation of law requires the use of a notion of nature. Conversely, the legal positivists wrongly insist that jurisprudence must be restricted to the consideration of stipulated "norms" or "rules," and the natural law theorists wrongly insist that "nature" can stipulate a code of law. Finally, the historical school's emphasis on "customary law" reflects the same confusion between law and jurisprudence: there is no such thing as "customary law," but custom is an essential category of jurisprudence. Only by clarifying the distinction between law and jurisprudence can we begin to reconcile these three schools of legal theory. (shrink)

In this book, the author defends the substantial unity of a human person whose life endures through time. Because a human being is an irreducible whole (including biological, psychological, and narrative powers), our lives can have personal coherence over time. The whole temporal expanse of a life is prior to any of its stages, just as a whole human person is prior to any of her organs or powers. We can tell stories about our past, present, and future only because (...) we possess a certain kind of complex unity at any one time. What we are as human beings makes it possible for us to lead the life of a human person. (shrink)

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States and, to some extent, to its (...) own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law. (shrink)

Social psychologists have performed many well-known experiments demonstrating that experimental subjects will perform in ways that are normatively inconsistent even across very similar situations. Situationist social psychologists and philosophers have often interpreted these findings to imply that most people lack general moral dispositions. These situationists have argued that our moral dispositions are at best narrowly local traits; they often describe our moral characters as fragmented. In this paper, I offer an alternative hypothesis for the same experimental results. I argue that (...) these normative inconsistencies in behavior might well be produced by habit interference: experimental subjects err by over-generalizing dispositions formed in prior situations. I ground this alternative hypothesis in the long tradition of transfer of learning studies, which demonstrated that cognitive inconsistency was often the result of habit interference and, hence, overly generalized dispositions. I shall thus explore the analogy between moral and cognitive inconsistency to show why social psychology might well benefit from adopting the experimental design of the classic transfer of learning studies. (shrink)

Pope Benedict XVI’s 2009 Encyclical-Letter “ Caritas in Veritate ,” (CV) breaks some new ground in the tradition of Catholic social teaching. I argue that explicitly this document makes a call for a new theory of economic exchange. Whereas, the traditional scholastic theory of the “just price” was focused on “the principle of the equivalence in value of exchanged goods” (CV 35), a new theory of exchange must focus instead on “a metaphysical understanding of the relations between persons” (CV 53). (...) True, Thomas Aquinas pioneered this new approach to the morality of exchange when he argued that the Golden Rule must take precedence over the logic of the just price: the relation between persons must trump the relation between the goods exchanged. Caritas in Veritate argues further for a new theory of exchange that combines elements of mutual gain with elements of gift-giving. Here again we see a revision of traditional scholastic theory in which every transaction was defined exclusively either as a unilateral gift (subject to norms of distributive justice and charity) or as a bilateral exchange (subject to norms of commutative justice). Benedict, by contrast, calls for a vision of economic life in which gift-giving and exchange are mixed, so that bargains are “redolent with the spirit of gift” (CV 37) in a new “economy of gratuitousness” (CV 38). I propose to outline a new theory of exchange in which the elements of mutual gain and gift-giving are combined. To do so, I shall have to revise the traditional scholastic analysis of the just price, which was focused on the equality of the goods exchanged and instead focus on the moral equality of the parties to an exchange. (shrink)

John Deely's new introduction to semiotics deserves the attention of philosophers because of his ambitious attempt to ground semiotics in a general philosophical framework rather than in linguistics or literary theory. By uniting the signs of brute animal communication, the signs of language, and the perceptual signs of cognition within a single framework of the logic of relations, Deely has rightly grounded semiotics in logic and epistemology rather than in the theory of language. Language is but one sign system, and (...) must not be regarded as the paradigm for semiotics; yet this fallacy of pars pro toto is all but universal, not only in the sémiologie of French structuralism, but also in recent Anglo-American analytic philosophy, as evident in D. S. Clarke's Principles of Semiotic. Deely's semiotic maxim, by contrast, is suitably general: "There is nothing in thought or in sensation which is not first possessed in a sign". According to Deely, semiotics brings all of cognition and communication, from the simplest organisms to human beings, into a single point of view. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the tension between truth telling and the demands of civic life, with an emphasis on the tension between serving one's country and reporting the truth as completely and independently as possible. We argue that the principle of truth telling in journalism takes priority over the promotion of civic values, including a narrow patriotism. Even in times of war, responsible journalism must not allow a narrow patriotism to undermine its commitment to truth telling. Journalists best fulfill (...) their civic role by adopting the perspective of a democratic patriotism. We conclude that if news organizations accept the primacy of truth telling and democratic patriotism, they should not embed reporters with military units, or if they do, they have an ethical obligation to implement special editorial precautions. (shrink)

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro discover a curious gulf between the prestige of rational choice approaches and the dearth of solid empirical findings. But we can understand neither the prestige of rational choice theory nor its pathologies unless we see it as a variant of the equilibrium analysis found in physics, economics, and biology. Only such a global perspective on rational choice theory will reveal its core assumptions and the likely shape of its future in political science. In this light, (...) the growing dominance of rational choice theory in political science is all but inevitable and its pathologies are all but inescapable. (shrink)