In the UK, over 70% of AIDS, including new cases, is located in a few Districts in central London where the distribution of previously occurring and new cases is essentially confined to the original risk groups of homosexual/bisexual men, drug addicts of both sexes, and some of their sexual partners and consorts. But control policy is still based on the assumption that HIV has already spread from persons in these risk groups into the general population, and that it will spread (...) hereafter at an increased rate because of heterosexual transmission to cause a widespread epidemic of AIDS.The basis and implications of this policy were investigated in the South East region adjacent to London, Analysis of demographic and epidemiological data shows that, with one exception, there is very little extension of AIDS from affected Districts in London to the surrounding region or even to the suburban fringe. Where AIDS is prevalent, as in this exception, the distribution follows the same, original pattern which relates essentially to risks arising from life-styles. There is no significant association between the prevalence or spread of AIDS and conventional markers of deprivation, economic and social disadvantage.Allocations of personnel, services and expenditure, assessed from returns required under the AIDS Control Act of 1987 and official registration data, continue to follow the original policy assumptions. They are therefore unrelated to the numbers of existing and new cases, disproportionate and unrealistic. Claims that this widespread excess of effort is justified by the fact that AIDS has not spread to the general population are falsified by the continuation of cases almost exclusively in risk groups. There is nothing in the data required under the Act or in registrations in this main locus of AIDS in the UK to suggest any change in this or to justify continuation of current expenditure and redundant activities.There is no evidence in these data that ethnic variations in the resident populations of Districts are associated with variations in the prevalence of AIDS. However, the larger figures available in some of the national data do indicate a disproportionate increase in some minority ethnic groups. Further detail about risks factors in these groups are required and, meanwhile, effort and expenditure should be re-orientated toward treatment, contact tracing and other public health measures for more effective containment of the continuing spread of AIDS in all the high risk groups. (shrink)
Esta investigación intenta identificar al "muftí de Orán," bosquejando su vida y carrera a través de un análisis de los datos disponibles en las fuentes oorteafricanaa. Quisiera plantear que, ya en las fuentes biográficas del siglo XVI, se bao coofundido las biografias de dos emditoa, la del muftí, Abti l-'Abbáa Alimad b. Ahí (~um'a (m. 917/1511), y la de su hijo, Abti 'Abd Alláb Mul~ammad ~aqrtin (m. 929/1523-24). Mi investigación propone resolver esta confusión. Originario de Orán, Al~mad estudió en Tremecéo (...) y acabó por establecerse en Fez, donde cooaiguió un puesto como profesor de ley islámica. Ea probable que haya emitido su famoaafarwó de 910/1504 a los moriscos desde allá, como uno de los juristas prominentes de la ciudad, con la intención de oponerse a la opinión de su contemporáneo AlJmad b. YalJyá alWaniariai (m. 914/1508). (shrink)
Goodman’s book is neither a survey, nor a comprehensive history of American philosophy before pragmatism emerged in the late nineteenth century in the works of Charles S. Peirce and William James, nor does it explore undiscovered depths of American thought possibly overlooked or lost to time. Rather, Goodman’s treatment of five men—-Jonathan Edwards, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau—attempts to follow James’s understanding of what philosophies are and to “convey each writer’s feel for (...) the ‘whole push’ of things”. In that regard, Goodman succeeds and gives the reader a sense of each man’s motivations. Each is given his own chapter, including an interlude and an... (shrink)
This book attempts to portray a unity in the work of William James that the author believes is achieved by James’ constant concern with man. Dooley begins with an analysis of James’ early psychological works emphasizing the key notion of an efficacious consciousness that selects according to its needs and purposes. The author begins to paint an "interactionist" view of man, although at this point in James’ career it is admittedly only a "passing thought." A similar (...) vein is struck in James’ moral and religious works where they describe the experience of free choice as a feeling of effort, a passional nature which can decide what we shall believe in certain cases, and a conversion which is explained by certain controlling interests of consciousness. But these early intimations do not yet point to any experience of a self as the source of these activities. (shrink)
This work is at once sympathetic and critical, as well as a very clear and perceptive treatment of some of the major theories of four pragmatists. The author holds pragmatism to be a significant contribution to modern thought in that it is a serious attempt to rethink philosophical problems in the light of new scientific developments, and is comprehensive in dealing with both old and contemporary problems. The separate treatments of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey contain a biographical comment, (...) explanations of their philosophical positions, and separate sections of critical remarks. Peirce is the most extensively treated of the four. This section includes discussions of Peirce’s cosmological views, criticisms of Cartesianism, his views on inquiry, clarification of ideas, and the nature of thought. While in many ways sympathetic with Peirce’s thought, in particular his view that beliefs are in fundamental ways tied to action and expectation, Scheffler questions in the light of scientific practice, for example, whether doubt must as Peirce says, be real and unfeigned. Moreover he is critical of Peirce’s suggestion that science is a good method of fixing or stabilizing belief, and holds as insufficient his explanation of regularity on the basis of pure spontaneity alone. (shrink)
This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)
Disagreeing with many students of American philosophy who have interpreted Chauncey Wright as foreshadowing basic elements in the pragmatisms of Peirce, James and Dewey, Madden contends that the characteristic elements of Wright's thought are neither peculiar to pragmatism nor anticipations of its basic tenets. After an introductory biography of Wright's short, often lonely, tragic life, Madden presents a penetrating analysis of Wright's more important essays dealing with many currently debated problems in the philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophy of (...) science and cosmology, epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. The case for Wright's "philosophical independence" seems to be based on Madden's neglect of important nuances within pragmatism itself.--B. G. R. (shrink)
A series of lectures, directed to philosophical laymen, tracing the effects of secular philosophy on religious doctrines. Relevant reflections by Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, James and Santayana are briefly and sensitively discussed.--J. A. B.
In this volume the author discusses the major trends in the philosophy of religion from Kant to the beginning of the twentieth century. The work is divided into three parts dealing respectively with the methods of study of the religious phenomenon, the nature of religion, and the approach to religion from experience and the principle of immanence. In Part I the theological method, based on revelation and authority, is first discussed; and then the rationalistic method emphasizing the approach to religion (...) from natural reason and having its chief exponents in Kant, Fries, Hegel, Feuerbach and Schleiermacher. Both methods are called aprioristic in contrast with the empirical method adopted by philologists, anthropologists, sociologists and, more recently, by psychologists such as Ribot, Delacroix, Starbuck and William James. Important as it is, the empirical method cannot attain to the essence of religion, which is the chief objective of Lamanna's study. Hence a distinction must be made between science of religion characteristic of the empirical method and philosophy of religion to which the author directs his attention in the second part of his work. Taking as starting point the threefold aspect of psychic life in its dynamic activity, Lamanna groups the various trends in the study of the essence of religion under the following headings: 1) religion as a product of the cognitive function, where both the idealistic doctrines of Hegel, Caird, Vacherot and Spir and the naturalistic doctrines of Gratry, Max Müller, Wundt, and Spencer are analyzed; 2) religion as a product of practical function, where the idealistic theories of Kant, Ritschl, Herrmann, and others are contrasted with the positivistic views of Comte, Durkheim and Nietzsche; 3) religion as a product of the contemplative function, where again idealistic trends as represented by Fries and Schleiermacher are opposed to the naturalistic trends of Schopenhauer, Hartmann and Guyau. The last part of the work is devoted to the study of those theories of religion which stress the approach to God through the inner activity of the self. This may take the form of immediate experience of the divine in the consciousness of the moral ideal ; experience and affirmation of the Absolute immanent in action ; experience and affirmation of the Absolute in the intuition of becoming ; and finally, experience of the divine in the unconscious. In summarizing the results of his inquiry, the author points out the need for an Absolute Reality as the objective goal toward which the inner tendencies of the life of the spirit are directed and as the actualization of the supreme ideals of truth, goodness and beauty. Lamanna's work is a very thorough and extremely informative study that has few equals in the field of philosophy of religion.--B. M. B. (shrink)
Marsh borrows Richard McKeon's methodological notion of the "problematic" approach to intellectual history. Concentrating on their dialectical character, English criticism from 1650-1800 is explored in the writings of the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Mark Akenside, David Hartley, and James Harris.—D. J. B.
We argue that confusability between items should be distinguished from generalization between items. Shepard's data concern confusability, but the theories proposed by Shepard and by Tenenbaum & Griffiths concern generalization, indicating a gap between theory and data. We consider the empirical and theoretical work involved in bridging this gap. [Shepard; Tenenbaum & Griffiths].
This new edition of William James’s 1909 classic, A Pluralistic Universe reproduces the original text, only modernizing the spelling. The books has been annotated throughout to clarify James’s points of reference and discussion. There is a new, fuller index, a brief chronology of James’s life, and a new bibliography—chiefly based on James’s own references. The editor, H.G. Callaway, has included a new Introduction which elucidates the legacy of Jamesian pluralism to survey some related questions of contemporary (...) American society. -/- A Pluralistic Universe was the last major book James published during his life time. It is a substantial philosophical work, devoted to a thorough-going criticism of Hegelian monism and Absolutism—and the exploration of philosophical and social-theological alternatives. Our world of some one hundred years on is much the better for James’s contributions; and understanding James’s pluralism deeply contributes even now to America’s self-understanding. At present, we are more certain that American is, and is best, a pluralistic society, than we are of what particular forms our pluralism should take. Keeping an eye out for social interpretations of Jamesian pluralism, this new philosophical reading casts light on our twenty-first century alternatives by reference to prior American experience and developments. -/- . (shrink)
William James had the courage to experience the collision of European and American ways of thinking head on, and to emerge from it with a new philosophy - one displaying a remarkable vitality for dealing with the transformative issues at the core of the human condition. This easy to read introduction to his life and work explains why James' work is overwhelmingly valuable to us today in getting to grips with the spiritual dimension of human experience.
Summary Although Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo's An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie has long served as an invaluable resource for those interested in Beattie's life and thought, there has been little scholarship on the genesis of Forbes's book. This article considers the role played by Dugald Stewart?as well as that of his friend, Archibald Alison?in the making of Forbes's Life of Beattie. It also examines the reasons for Forbes's decision not to print (...) class='Hi'>Stewart's letter in its entirety in the Life of Beattie and explores the letter's significance for understanding Stewart's philosophical development. (shrink)
I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s (...) picture of science, a picture that figured prominently in the general education natural science courses that Conant taught at Harvard. On the other hand, I show that Kuhn’s Structure contains important contributions that do not figure in Conant’s picture of science. I argue that the following three themes in Structure do not originate with Conant: (1) the concept of “normal science”; (2) “the problem of scientific revolutions,” that is, the apparent threat posed by radical changes of theory in science; and (3) Kuhn’s emphasis on the social dimensions of science, specifically the social structure of research communities. (shrink)
James B. Ashbrook's "new natural theology in an empirical mode" pursued an integrated understanding of the spiritual, psychological, and neurological dimensions of spiritual life. Knowledge of neuroscience and personality theory was central to his quest, and his understandings were necessarily revised and amplified as scientific findings emerged. As a result, Ashbrook's legacy may serve as a case example of how to do religion-and-science in a milieu of scientific change. The constant in the quest was Ashbrook's core belief in the (...) basic holism of brain, mind, personality, the nature of reality, and the underlying reality of God. (shrink)
This paper examines James Conant’s pragmatic theory of science – a theory that has been neglected by most commentators on the history of 20th-century philosophy of science – and it argues that this theory occupied an important place in Conant’s strategic thinking about the Cold War. Conant drew upon his wartime science policy work, the history of science, and Quine’s epistemological holism to argue that there is no strict distinction between science and technology, that there is no such thing (...) as “the scientific method,” and that theories are better interpreted as policies rather than creeds. An important consequence that he drew from these arguments is that science is both a thoroughly value-laden, and an intrinsically social, enterprise. These results led him to develop novel proposals for reorganizing scientific and technological research – proposals that he believed could help to win the Cold War. Interestingly, the Cold War had a different impact upon Conant’s thinking than it did upon many other theorists of science in postwar America. Instead of leading him to “the icy slopes of logic,” it led him to develop a socially- and politically-engaged theory that was explicitly in the service of the American Cold War effort. (shrink)
Summary When Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo was preparing his An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie (1806) for the press, he asked his friend Dugald Stewart to contribute a summary and assessment of the argument of Beattie's most famous philosophical work, the Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770). After some delay, in late 1805 or early 1806 Stewart sent to Forbes a lengthy letter in which he criticised Beattie's appeal to (...) the principles of common sense and contrasted Beattie's writings with those of Stewart's mentor, Thomas Reid. In the end, Forbes published only brief excerpts from Stewart's letter in the Life of Beattie. This article publishes for the first time a complete transcription of the extant manuscript of Stewart's letter to Forbes, which is on deposit in the Fettercairn Papers in the National Library of Scotland. (shrink)