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James Henry Collin [10]James Collin [3]James H. Collin [1]
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James Collin
University of Glasgow
  1. Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.
    Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think that this (...)
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  2.  92
    A sensitive virtue epistemology.Anthony Bolos & James Henry Collin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1321-1335.
    We offer an alternative to two influential accounts of virtue epistemology: Robust Virtue Epistemology and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. We argue that while traditional RVE does offer an explanation of the distinctive value of knowledge, it is unable to effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck; and while ALVE does effectively deal with cases of epistemic luck, it lacks RVE’s resources to account for the distinctive value of knowledge. The account we provide, however, is both robustly virtue-theoretic and anti-luck, having the (...)
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  3.  81
    Semantic inferentialism as (a Form of) active externalism.Adam Carter, James H. Collin & Orestis Palermos - unknown
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers :7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With (...)
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  4. Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.James Collin - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):846-856.
    Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism makes the case that the conjunction of evolutionary theory and naturalism cannot be rationally believed, as, if both evolutionary theory and naturalism were true, it would be highly unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable. I present Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and survey a theory of meaning espoused by Robert Brandom, known as semantic inferentialism. I argue that if one accepts semantic inferentialism, as it is developed by Brandom, then Plantinga's motivation for the (...)
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  5. Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism.J. Adam Carter, James Henry Collin & S. Orestis Palermos - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference (...)
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  6.  16
    Sensitivity Theorists Aren’t Unhinged.James Henry Collin & Anthony Bolos - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):535-544.
    Despite its intrinsic plausibility, the sensitivity principle has remained deeply unpopular on the grounds that it violates an even more plausible closure principle. Here we show that sensitivity does not, in general, violate closure. Sensitivity only violates closure when combined with further auxiliary premises—regarding which of an agent’s commitments constitute that agent’s beliefs—which are optional for the sensitivity theorist.
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  7.  41
    Reverse Ontological Argument.James Henry Collin - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):410-416.
    Modal ontological arguments argue from the possible existence of a perfect being to the actual (necessary) existence of a perfect being. But modal ontological arguments have a problem of symmetry; they can be run in both directions. Reverse ontological arguments argue from the possible nonexistence of a perfect being to the actual (necessary) nonexistence of a perfect being. Some familiar points about the necessary a posteriori, however, show that the symmetry can be broken in favour of the ontological argument.
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    Sensitivity Theorists Aren’t Unhinged.Anthony Bolos & James Henry Collin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):535-544.
    Despite its intrinsic plausibility, the sensitivity principle has remained deeply unpopular on the grounds that it violates an even more plausible closure principle. Here we show that sensitivity does not, in general, violate closure. Sensitivity only violates closure when combined with further auxiliary premises—regarding which of an agent’s commitments constitute that agent’s beliefs—which are optional for the sensitivity theorist.
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  9.  29
    Soul‐making, theosis, and evolutionary history: An irenaean approach.James Henry Collin - 2019 - Zygon 54 (2):523-541.
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  10. Do Logic and Religion Mix?James Collin - 2017 - In Duncan Pritchard & Mark Harris (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. London, UK:
    Logic is the study of the validity of arguments, which is to say the study of when a conclusion follows or does not follow from a set of premises. Logic is an ancient discipline pioneered by Aristotle and developed by some of the greatest thinkers in the Middle Ages. However, in the nineteenth century logic underwent a remarkable transformation into a precise branch of mathematics that changed the nature of logic, and the study of religion, forever. Both religious adherents and (...)
     
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  11.  6
    Mathematical Nominalism.James Henry Collin - 2022 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mathematical Nominalism Mathematical nominalism can be described as the view that mathematical entities—entities such as numbers, sets, functions, and groups—do not exist. However, stating the view requires some care. Though the opposing view (that mathematical objects do exist) may seem like a somewhat exotic metaphysical claim, it is usually motivated by the thought that mathematical … Continue reading Mathematical Nominalism →.
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  12. Theodicy and the problem of evil.James Henry Collin - 2022 - In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Philosophy and Religion. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  13.  25
    Nominalist’s Credo.James Henry Collin - unknown
    Introduction: I lay out the broad contours of my thesis: a defence of mathematical nominalism, and nominalism more generally. I discuss the possibility of metaphysics, and the relationship of nominalism to naturalism and pragmatism. Chapter 2: I delineate an account of abstractness. I then provide counter-arguments to claims that mathematical objects make a di erence to the concrete world, and claim that mathematical objects are abstract in the sense delineated. Chapter 3: I argue that the epistemological problem with abstract objects (...)
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  14. Of Marriage and Mathematics: Inferentialism and Social Ontology.James Henry Collin - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    The semantic inferentialist account of the social institution of semantic meaning can be naturally extended to account for social ontology. I argue here that semantic inferentialism provides a framework within which mathematical ontology can be understood as social ontology, and mathematical facts as socially instituted facts. I argue further that the semantic inferentialist framework provides resources to underpin at least some aspects of the objectivity of mathematics, even when the truth of mathematical claims is understood as socially instituted.
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