A Husserl-based social ethics is within the noetic-noematic field as disclosed through various reductions. The focus is how at the passive and active levels a bsic sense of will is in play as well as the "telos" of subjectivity in terms of both a "godly" intersubjective ideal "we". This is inseparable form the disclosure of the full sense of person through an "absolute ought" and the "truth of will" wherein the common world and common goods are tied to an ideal (...) community as a person of a higher order. (shrink)
Book 1 focused on transcendental-phenomenological ontology and distinguished the non-sortal from the propertied personal sense of ourselves. I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic. Book 2 addresses the other richer sense of ourself when we respond to "Who are you?" where the answer might be in terms of an anguished question of identity or the ethical what sort of person am I? It might also be the normative (...) question of whom one ought to be. (shrink)
The editors, Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, of Husserl's Aufsdtze und Vortri~ge (1922-1937) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989) have given us a fascinating present with quite a few surprises. I would like to take this occasion to thank them publicly for their able and selfless labors. Here we have Husserl attempting to address himself to a large philosophically untrained audience for funds of which he had dire need: he had two children getting married and the real value of his inflated German (...) annual income was worth $160.00. But, as he told a friend, what he was doing was as genuine philosophical work as what he would do for his Jahrbuch ffir Philosophie und phginomenologische Forschung. In many ways it is regrettable the work did not come to full fruition for the publication in the Jahrbuch because then the tensions and ambiguities we find here would have been perhaps less severe. (shrink)
Nam-In Lee’s impressive study of “instinct” in Husserl1 gives a new sense to Husserl’s self-description of his work as a preoccupation with beginnings (see p. x) because it seeks not only to integrate the theme of instinct systematically into Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology but to demonstrate that it has a fundamental position. I believe the author has successfully demonstrated his contention that other students of Husserl who have treated the theme of instinct as a marginal consideration failed to see that Husserl’s (...) genetic phenomenology requires the theory of instinct as its fundamental ingredient (Urstück, 10). The theme of instinct therefore informs the sense of Husserl’s later understanding of transcendental subjectivity and monadology. The book is so packed with discussions that the inevitable omissions of a review run the risk of distorting the merits of the work. (shrink)
Steinbock, Anthony J. Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience . Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10743-009-9056-8 Authors James G. Hart, Indiana University Department of Religious Studies Sycamore Hall 230 Bloomington IN 47405-7005 USA Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848 Journal Volume Volume 25 Journal Issue Volume 25, Number 2.
Reflection is the basic attitude of transcendental phenomenology. However, as we shall see in this essay, prereflective experiencing may make a unique claim for philosophical foundations - albeit a claim which can only occur when mediated by reflection.
This anthology applies phenomenological concepts and methods to issues of philosophical theology and philosophical theology and philosophy: the being and nature of God, and the divine modes of relatedness to nature, to society, and to the self. Essays in Phenomenological Theology contains previously unpublished papers by Iso Kern, J. N. Findlay, Charles Courtney, Thomas Prufer, Robert Williams, James Hart, Steven Laycock, and James Buchanan. It is the first volume to assemble an entire spectrum of phenomenological-theological ideas, including those of neo-Platonic (...) meditation, phenomenological neo-Thomism, Hegelian phenomenological dialectics, Husserlian transcendental reflection, and post-modern deconstructive iconoclasm. The book will be useful to philosophers and theologians seeking an enriched understanding of the rapidly-burgeoning discipline of phenomenological theology, and promises unexpected insights even to seasoned phenomenologists seeking to expand their horizons. (shrink)
This book is a rounded well-informed study of violence, especially from a hermeneutical and social-studies perspective. It is relevant to peace studies. It raises key issues about the phenomenology of the person, of violence, of the foundations of ethics. Although it tends to skirt normative phenomenological, eidetic as well as moral issues they are always insistently on the edge of the rich discussions philosophical-hermeneutical issues and contemporary writings on these matters.
The dialogue between Blondel and Husserl carried on by Maréchal and Duméry and other thinkers has been silent for almost fifty years. Yet Husserl's Nachlass provides reasons for deepening the dialogue, especially in the area of the basic Blondelian themes: the willing-will and the teleological and religious nature of consciousness. Nevertheless there are intriguing differences in their respective philosophical theologies.
The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more (...) precise Husserl's ethical position. (shrink)
Although the connections of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology, what she called, “realontology,” to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology were constant concerns that usually remained in the background of her work, on occasion they became foreground. Similarly the problems surrounding the individuation of the person and spirit were persistent but rather marginal in her writings. In this paper I want first to review some of the issues as they are connected to ontological and transcendental phenomenology. Then I want to relate them to the (...) cosmological and theological issues that were no less important for Conrad-Martius. (shrink)
Both the sociological as well as biblical-theological concepts of secularism may make use of the phenomenological discussions of implicit horizonal knowledge as informing explicit forms of knowing. If secularism may mean the erosion of faith by way of appropriation of fundamental beliefs about oneself or the world, the deep secularism may mean an appropriation of beliefs which make faith itself appear reprehensible. But perhaps the deepest form of secularism is the existence of scientific, reductionist naturalism; this may take the forms (...) eliminativism or of identity theory. This ‘secularism’ is such that it makes knowing itself impossible. Its basic move is to reduce the transcendental conditions of the manifestation, description, or display of the world to physical causes. Its most startling thesis is that first-person experience itself is an illusion and this illusion is the source of the major lies and beliefs that are most harmful for the culture, e.g. religious faith and belief in immortality. Unfortunately for deep secularism, as scientistic reductionistic materialist naturalism, it self-destructs. (shrink)