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James Levine [30]James P. Levine [1]James A. Levine [1]
  1. Logic and Truth in Frege.Thomas Ricketts & James Levine - 1996 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (1):121 - 175.
  2.  26
    Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory. [REVIEW]James Levine - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):138-141.
    In his 1903 Principles of Mathematics, Russell holds that “it is a characteristic of the terms of a proposition”—that is, its “logical subjects”—“that any one of them may be replaced by any other entity without our ceasing to have a proposition”. Hence, in PoM, Russell holds that from the proposition ‘Socrates is human’, we can obtain the propositions ‘Humanity is human’ and ‘The class of humans is human’, replacing Socrates by the property of humanity and the class of humans, respectively. (...)
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  3. Analysis and Decomposition in Frege and Russell.James Levine - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):195-216.
    Michael Dummett has long argued that Frege is committed to recognizing a distinction between two sorts of analysis of propositional contents: 'analysis', which reveals the entities that one must grasp in order to apprehend a given propositional content; and 'decomposition', which is used in recognizing the validity of certain inferences. Whereas any propositional content admits of a unique ultimate 'analysis' into simple constituents, it also admits of distinct 'decompositions', no one of which is ultimately privileged over the others. I argue (...)
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  4. On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense.James Levine - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.
    In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...)
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  5. Analysis and Abstraction Principles in Russell and Frege.James Levine - 2007 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn. Routledge. pp. 51-74.
  6. Acquaintance, Denoting Concepts, and Sense.James Levine - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):415-445.
    In a recent article, Michael Kremer revisits Russell's "Gray's Elegy" argument—the argument in "On Denoting" in which Russell rejects "the whole distinction of meaning and denotation". Kremer argues that the Gray's Elegy argument is directed not at Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung but rather at Russell's own theory of "denoting concepts" in his earlier Principles of Mathematics. Furthermore, and more originally, Kremer argues that Russell's views of acquaintance play a central role in the argument. For Kremer, it is because (...)
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  7.  3
    The Place of Vagueness in Russell’s Philosophical Development.James Levine - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. Springer Verlag.
    I distinguish three periods in Russell’s philosophical development: the Moorean period, following his break with Idealism around 1899 through his attending the Paris conference in August 1900 at which he saw Peano; the period following the Paris conference through his prison stay in 1918; and his post-prison period, in which he becomes concerned with the nature of language as such. I argue that while the topic of vagueness becomes an explicit theme in his post-1918 writings, his view that ordinary language (...)
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  8.  35
    Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory.James Levine - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):138-141.
    In his 1903 Principles of Mathematics, Russell holds that “it is a characteristic of the terms of a proposition”—that is, its “logical subjects”—“that any one of them may be replaced by any other entity without our ceasing to have a proposition”. Hence, in PoM, Russell holds that from the proposition ‘Socrates is human’, we can obtain the propositions ‘Humanity is human’ and ‘The class of humans is human’, replacing Socrates by the property of humanity and the class of humans, respectively. (...)
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  9.  11
    Acquaintance, Denoting Concepts, and Sense.James Levine - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):415-445.
    In a recent article, Michael Kremer revisits Russell's "Gray's Elegy" argument—the argument in "On Denoting" in which Russell rejects "the whole distinction of meaning and denotation". Kremer argues that the Gray's Elegy argument is directed not at Frege's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung but rather at Russell's own theory of "denoting concepts" in his earlier Principles of Mathematics. Furthermore, and more originally, Kremer argues that Russell's views of acquaintance play a central role in the argument. For Kremer, it is because (...)
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  10.  47
    Analysis, Abstraction Principles, and Slingshot Arguments.James Levine - 2006 - Ratio 19 (1):43–63.
  11. The What and the That: Theories of Singular Thought in Bradley, Russell, and the Early Wittgenstein.James Levine - 1998 - In Guy Stock (ed.), Appearance Versus Reality: New Essays on Bradley's Metaphysics. Clarendon Press.
     
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  12.  34
    On Russell's Vulnerability to Russell's Paradox.James Levine - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (4):207-231.
    Influenced by G. E. Moore, Russell broke with Idealism towards the end of 1898; but in later years he characterized his meeting Peano in August 1900 as ?the most important event? in ?the most important year in my intellectual life?. While Russell discovered his paradox during his post-Peano period, the question arises whether he was already committed, during his pre-Peano Moorean period, to assumptions from which his paradox may be derived. Peter Hylton has argued that the pre-Peano Russell was thus (...)
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  13. From Absolute Idealism to The Principles of Mathematics.James Levine - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (1):87-127.
    In this review article of Volumes 2 and 3 of _The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, I distinguish and attempt to clarify three periods of Russell's early philosophical development: R 'subscript 1', his Hegelian period of 1894-1898; R 'subscript 2', his Moore-influenced period from the end of 1898 to his meeting Peano in August 1900; and R 'subscript 3', the period after he met Peano through the completion of _The Principles of Mathematics. I argue that the position Russell defends in (...)
     
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  14.  24
    Review of Stewart Candlish, The Russell/Bradley Dispute and its Significance for Twentieth-Century Philosophy[REVIEW]James Levine - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).
  15.  15
    From Moore to Peano to Watson.James Levine - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4:200.
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  16.  3
    Walking Time Is Associated With Hippocampal Volume in Overweight and Obese Office Workers.Frida Bergman, Tove Matsson-Frost, Lars Jonasson, Elin Chorell, Ann Sörlin, Patrik Wennberg, Fredrik Öhberg, Mats Ryberg, James A. Levine, Tommy Olsson & Carl-Johan Boraxbekk - 2020 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.
  17.  19
    Review Essay / Jury Wisdom.James P. Levine - 1997 - Criminal Justice Ethics 16 (1):49-56.
    Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice: Jurors? Notions of the Law Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, 390pp.
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  18.  8
    Ananlysis, Mathematics, and Logic in Russell's Early Philosophy [Review of Jolen Galaugher, Russell's Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897-1905]. [REVIEW]James Levine - 2016 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 36 (2).
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  19. Berkeley's Master Argument and Prior's Analysis.James Levine - 2013 - In Peter Sullivan Michael Potter (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus. History and Interpretation. Oxford University Press. pp. 170.
     
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  20.  23
    Critical Notices.James Levine, Eddie Hyland & John Baker - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (1):111 – 133.
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  21. J. Alberto Coffa, "The Semantic Tradition From Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station".James Levine - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:111.
  22. John Skorupski, "English-Language Philosophy, 1750-1945". [REVIEW]James Levine - 1995 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):209.
     
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  23. Logic and Truth in Frege.James Levine - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 70:121-175.
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  24. Logical Form, General Sentences, and Russell's Path to "On Denoting"'.James Levine - 2001 - In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 74--115.
     
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  25.  55
    Prior, Berkeley, and the Barcan Formula.James Levine - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3551-3565.
    This paper presents structural similarities and historical connections between Prior’s rejection of the Barcan formula and his critique of Berkeley’s master argument for idealism in his 1955 paper “Berkeley in Logical Form”. Making use of Mackie’s paper “Self-Refutation—A Formal Analysis”, it concludes with some suggestions concerning what is at stake in the debate between Prior and Berkeley and in structurally similar debates such as whether to accept the Barcan formula.
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  26.  31
    Putnam, Davidson and the Seventeenth‐Century Picture of Mind and World.James Levine - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):193 – 230.
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  27.  37
    Russell, Particularized Relations and Bradley's Dilemma.James Levine - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (2):231-261.
    In writings prior to the publication of The Principles of Mathematics (PoM), Russell denies that relations “in the abstract” ever relate and holds instead that only particularized relations, or relational tropes, do so; however, in PoM section 55, he argues against his former view and adopts the view that relations “in the abstract” are capable of a “twofold use” – either as “relations in themselves” or as “actually relating”. I argue that while Russell rightly came to recognize that rejecting his (...)
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  28.  40
    The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation. [REVIEW]James Levine - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):145-147.
    As Gideon Makin introduces his book, it may seem that his concerns are primarily historical and negative—namely, to show that when properly understood, Russell’s “On Denoting” and Frege’s “On Sense and Reference” make little, if any, contact with issues in contemporary philosophy of language. First, he claims that these papers are not typically understood in the context of the philosophical development of their authors. Russell’s central argument in “On Denoting”—the so-called “Gray’s Elegy argument”—is directed against the theory of denoting concepts (...)
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  29.  33
    The Mathematical Roots Of Russell’s Naturalism And Behaviorism.James Levine - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4.
    Recently, there has been a growing awareness that Russell’s post–1918 writings call into question the sort of picture that Rorty presents of the relation of Russell’s philosophy to the views of subsequent figures such as the later Wittgenstein, Quine, and Sellars. As I will argue in this paper, those writings show that by the early 1920’s Russell himself was advocating views—including an anti-foundationalist naturalized epistemology, and a behaviorist–inspired account of what is involved in understanding language—that are more typically associated with (...)
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  30.  11
    The Mathematical Roots Of Russell’s Naturalism And Behaviorism.James Levine - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4.
    Until relatively recently, the main focus of interest in Russell’s philosophy, has been, I think it is fair to say, on his views from his 1905 paper “On Denoting” through his 1918 lectures ”The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”. Such a focus does not involve distinguishing Russell’s early Moore–influenced post–Idealist position from the views he accepted in the wake of the 1900 Paris Congress or considering the interplay between these two aspects of Russell’s development in his 1903 book, The Principles of (...)
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  31. Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" and Logical Empiricism: A Comparison of Semantically and Epistemologically Generated Philosophies.James Levine - 1991 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the relationship between two traditions within analytic philosophy: the epistemologically-centered philosophy exemplified by C. I. Lewis and other logical empiricists; and the semantically-generated philosophy which derives from certain views of Frege and Russell and which is exemplified in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Logical empiricists generate their views by pursuing concerns with justification and evidence; the early Wittgenstein generates his views by pursuing concerns with the nature of language. I argue, however, that although they develop (...)
     
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