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Profile: James Morauta (University College, Oxford)
  1. Three Separation Theses.James Morauta - 2004 - Law and Philosophy 23 (2):111-135.
    Legal positivism's ``separation thesis'' is usually taken in one of two ways: as an analytic claim about the nature of law – roughly, as some version of the Social Thesis; or as a substantive claim about the moral value of law – roughly, as some version of the Value Thesis. In this paper I argue that we should recognize a third kind of positivist separation thesis, one which complements, but is distinct from, positivism's analytic and moral claims. The Neutrality Thesis (...)
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  2. In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
    A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that (...)
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    Andrei Marmor/the Rule of Law and its Limits 1–43 Joachim Hruschka/the Permissive Law of Practical Reason in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals 45–72. [REVIEW]James Morauta - 2004 - Law and Philosophy 23:639-640.
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  4. In Defence of State‐Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
    A state‐based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state‐based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state‐based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state‐based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that (...)
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