14 found
See also
James Griesemer
University of California, Davis
  1.  59
    Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference. [REVIEW]James R. Griesemer & H. Bradley Shaffer - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):725-729.
  2.  93
    Laboratory models, causal explanation and group selection.James R. Griesemer & Michael J. Wade - 1988 - Biology and Philosophy 3 (1):67-96.
    We develop an account of laboratory models, which have been central to the group selection controversy. We compare arguments for group selection in nature with Darwin's arguments for natural selection to argue that laboratory models provide important grounds for causal claims about selection. Biologists get information about causes and cause-effect relationships in the laboratory because of the special role their own causal agency plays there. They can also get information about patterns of effects and antecedent conditions in nature. But to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  3. The informational Gene and the substantial body: On the Generalization of evolutionary theory by abstraction.James R. Griesemer - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):59-116.
  4. Modeling in the museum: On the role of Remnant models in the work of Joseph Grinnell. [REVIEW]James R. Griesemer - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (1):3-36.
    Accounts of the relation between theories and models in biology concentrate on mathematical models. In this paper I consider the dual role of models as representations of natural systems and as a material basis for theorizing. In order to explicate the dual role, I develop the concept of a remnant model, a material entity made from parts of the natural system(s) under study. I present a case study of an important but neglected naturalist, Joseph Grinnell, to illustrate the extent to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  5.  49
    Material Models in Biology.James R. Griesemer - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:79 - 93.
    Propositions alone are not constitutive of science. But is the "non-propositional" side of science theoretically superfluous: must philosophy of science consider it in order to adequately account for science? I explore the boundary between the propositional and non-propositional sides of biological theory, drawing on three cases: Grinnell's remnant models of faunas, Wright's path analysis, and Weismannism's role in the generalization of evolutionary theory. I propose a picture of material model-building in biology in which manipulated systems of material objects function as (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  6.  71
    Must scientific diagrams be eliminable? The case of path analysis.James R. Griesemer - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (2):155-180.
    Scientists use a variety of modes of representation in their work, but philosophers have studied mainly sentences expressing propositions. I ask whether diagrams are mere conveniences in expressing propositions or whether they are a distinct, ineliminable mode of representation in scientific texts. The case of path analysis, a statistical method for quantitatively assessing the relative degree of causal determination of variation as expressed in a causal path diagram, is discussed. Path analysis presents a worst case for arguments against eliminability since (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  7.  60
    Populational heritability: Extending punnett square concepts to evolution at the metapopulation level. [REVIEW]James R. Griesemer & Michael J. Wade - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):1-17.
    In a previous study, using experimental metapopulations of the flour beetle, Tribolium castaneum, we investigated phase III of Wright's shifting balance process (Wade and Griesemer 1998). We experimentally modeled migration of varying amounts from demes of high mean fitness into demes of lower mean fitness (as in Wright's characterization of phase III) as well as the reciprocal (the opposite of phase III). We estimated the meta-populational heritability for this level of selection by regression of offspring deme means on the weighted (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  8.  27
    Collaboration in the museum of vertebrate zoology.James R. Griesemer & Elihu M. Gerson - 1993 - Journal of the History of Biology 26 (2):185-203.
  9.  35
    Materials for the study of evolutionary transition.James R. Griesemer - 1999 - Biology and Philosophy 14 (1):127-142.
  10.  34
    Of mice and men and low unit cost.James R. Griesemer & Elihu M. Gerson - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (2):363-372.
  11.  29
    Genes, memes and demes.James R. Griesemer - 1988 - Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):179-184.
  12.  24
    Science and Sentiment: Grinnell’s Fact-Based Philosophy of Biodiversity Conservation.Ayelet Shavit & James R. Griesemer - 2018 - Journal of the History of Biology 51 (2):283-318.
    At the beginning of the twentieth century, the biologist Joseph Grinnell made a distinction between science and sentiment for producing fact-based generalizations on how to conserve biodiversity. We are inspired by Grinnellian science, which successfully produced a century-long impact on studying and conserving biodiversity that runs orthogonal to some familiar philosophical distinctions such as fact versus value, emotion versus reason and basic versus applied science. According to Grinnell, unlike sentiment-based generalizations, a fact-based generalization traces its diverse commitments and thus becomes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
  13.  44
    Bill Wimsatt on Multiple Ways of Getting at the Complexity of Nature.William Bechtel, Werner Callebaut, James R. Griesemer & Jeffrey C. Schank - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (2):213-219.
  14.  23
    Causal Explanation in Laboratory Ecology: The Case of Competitive Indeterminacy.James R. Griesemer - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:337 - 344.
    This paper characterizes the role of the experimenter in causal explanations of laboratory phenomena. Causal explanation rests on appeals to the experimenter's efficacy as a causal agent. I contrast "demographic" and "genetic" explanations of stochastic outcomes in a set of competition experiments in ecology. The demographic view ascribes causes to the experimenter's agency in setting up the experiment and to events within the experimental set-up. The genetic view ascribes causes to an unrecognized effect of the experimenter's sampling process prior to (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation