_The Art of Theater_ argues for the recognition of theatrical performance as an art form independent of dramatic writing. Identifies the elements that make a performance a work of art Looks at the competing views of the text-performance relationships An important and original contribution to the aesthetics and philosophy of theater.

A survey of and a comparison of the relative strengths of two favored views of what theatrical performers do: pretend or engage in a variety of self-display. The behavioral version of the pretense theory is shown to be relatively weak as an instrument for understanding the variety of performance styles available in world theater. Whether pretense works as a theory of the mental capacities that underly theatrical performance is a separate question.

Hamilton explains why "drama" is a category of literature rather than of theater, even though it is appropriate to describe many theatrical performances as "dramatic." Consideration of the possibilities of theatrical performance are especially important to this category of literature, but need not be (and often are not) decisive in constraining interpretations of dramatic works.

An investigation of Handke's play by means of an analysis of the elements of the Tractatus, known to have influenced Handke at the time he wrote Kaspar. This approach yields a much more plausible account of Handke's representation of his central character's alienation than are available from now-standard semiotic and post-structuralist analyses.

Hamilton argues that narratives engage our imaginations not so much by having us pretend the events they depict are true or present as by having us engage in a kind of anticipation of events to come. The idea is that the grasp of a narratively structured presentation is explained in very much the same way any sequence of events, considered as a sequence, is grasped.

Hamilton shows how awareness of the uses of space -- in particular uses of space in which to stage an event of any kind -- enable spectators to pick out characters, props, and the like across performances within production runs, across production runs, and even across productions employing different scripts. The key ideas of object identification are taken both from the philosophical and the empirical literature and are treated as epistemic ideas rather than metaphysical conceptions.

Hamilton argues that there is a level of understanding of theatrical performances, and narrative performances in particular (called "plays"), that does not require grasp of the large-scale aesthetic features that usually inform the structure of what is presented. This "basic understanding" is required for any spectator to go on to have a deeper understanding and, so, grounds any spectator's understanding of the larger-scale features of a performance.

Gregory Currie offers a statement of an interesting problem about tragedy: ‘(1) We want the fiction be such that something, E, occurs in it; [yet] (2) we react in ways which make it tempting to say we want E not to occur.’ He argues for one way to make (2) more precise with regard to what it is we are tempted to say. I argue he should not so readily have accepted (1). More significantly, however, I argue both that Currie (...) is right to hold we need an account of what the tragic response is before we can determine precisely what Hume’s puzzle really is and that any account of the desires involved in the experience of tragedy must hinge on when, in the course of a performance of a tragedy, we are considering a spectator’s responses. (shrink)

Describes the life and influence of B. Brecht. Offers useful explanations of several key concepts Brecht employed, and revised over his career, including: gestus, Verfremdung, and Verfremdungseffekt.

In this article I propose a way of thinking about aesthetic and artistic verdicts that would keep them distinct from one another. The former are reflections of the kinds of things we prefer and take pleasure in; the latter are reflections of other judgments we make about the kinds of achievements that are made in works of art. In part to support this view of verdicts, I also propose a way of keeping distinct the description, the interpretation, and the evaluation (...) of works of art. The thesis I propose—the achievement model—is not original with me. What is original, perhaps, is that it is posed as an alternative to two other views of artistic evaluation, namely the appeal to “ideal critics” and the appeal to one way of understanding our preferences with regard to works of art. I do not attempt to show that each of these alternatives meets with insuperable problems; but I do indicate what I take to be the substantive content of those problems. In the end, in order to flesh out the thesis I propose, I borrow some material from the literature on human well-being concerning how we determine what an achievement is. (shrink)