John Dewey is considered not only as one of the founders of pragmatism, but also as an educational classic whose approaches to education and learning still exercise great influence on current discourses and practices internationally. In this book, we first provide an introduction to Dewey's educational theories that is founded on a broad and comprehensive reading of his philosophy as a whole. We discuss Dewey's path-breaking contributions by focusing on three important paradigm shifts - namely, the cultural, constructive and communicative (...) turns in 20th century educational thinking. Secondly, we seek to recontexualize Dewey for a new generation who has come of age in a very different world than that in which Dewey lived and wrote. We provide examples of such recontextualization by connecting his philosophy with six recent and influential discourses (Bauman, Foucault, Bourdieu, Derrida, Levinas, Rorty). These serve as models for other recontexualizations that readers might wish to carry out for themselves. (shrink)
Science educators and those who investigate science learning have tended, for good reason, to focus their attention on students' conceptual development, Such a focus is, however, too narrow to provide full and proper understanding of the complexities of original science learning. Recently developmental cognitive psychologists have called on the work of postpositivistic philosophers of science, especially Thomas Kuhn, to bolster their research into conceptual development in science acquisition. What these psychologists have not recognized is that Kuhn's position is actually a (...) derivative of Wittgenstein's methodological nominalism, a viewpoint far more favorable to behaviorism than cognitive psychology. After drawing out some of the consequences of this fact for the developmental cognitive psychologist program for studying science learning, we suggest our own radical alternative. Drawing on Floden, Buchmann and Schwille's idea of “Breaking with Everyday Experience” we propose an alternative notion of original science learning in terms of Alfred Schutz's modification of Williams James' many worlds thesis. The many worlds thesis will allow us to better understand students' difficulty in learning idealized worlds such as science, worlds that represent a discontinuous break with ordinary everyday practical experience. (shrink)
This essay is concerned with the processes of idealization as described by Husserl in his last work, "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology". Central as the processes of idealization are to Husserl's reflections on the origin of natural scientific knowledge and his attempt to reground that knowledge in the "forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science," they have not always been well understood. One reason for this is the lack of concrete historical examples. The main purpose of this paper is (...) to correct this deficit. The paper is comprised of four sections. The first distinguishes two separate processes of idealization, one ascending from the life-world and the other descending and applying to it. The interaction of the two is then considered. The second section takes up Husserl's own discussion of Galileo's employment of idealization in his original mathematization of nature. The third section examines Galileo's analysis of freefall as a historical example of the processes of idealization. Here it is seen that the evidence clearly justifies Husserl's claims regarding the role of idealization in the origins of modern natural science. The conclusion employs the insights gained in the previous sections to exhibit the importance of understanding the processes of idealization as propaedeutic to the appreciation of the role and importance of the phenomenological methods of epoché and reduction to restoring lost layers of meaning by nullifying the idealizations which cover the life world. (shrink)
happens, how it happens, and why it happens. Our assumption ought to be that this is as true in education as it is in atomic physics. But this leaves many other questions to answer. The crucial ones: What kind of science is proper or appropriate to education? How does it differ from physics? What is wrong with the prevai1~ ing, virtually unopposed research tradition in education? What could or should be done to replace it with a more adequate tradi tion? (...) What concepts are necessary to describe and explain what we find there? It is in this realm that we find ourselves. Where to start? One place - our place, needless to say - is with one limited but central concept in education, teaching. A long philosophical tradition concerned with the nature of teaching goes back to Plato, divulging most recent ly in the work of such philosophers as B. O. Smith, Scheffler, Hirst, Komisar, Green, McClellan, Soltis, Kerr, Fenstermacher, et al. An empirical tradition runs parallelto the philosophers -it has its most notable modern proponents in Gage, the Soars, Berliner, Rosen shine, but its roots can be traced to the Sophists. These two tradi tions have been at loggerheads over the centuries. (shrink)
Three experts collaborate in this passionate and rewarding dialogue on the legacy of the great American philosopher and educator John Dewey (1859 1952). Focused on growth and the creation of value within the context of real life, Dewey s pragmatic philosophy shares much with humanistic Buddhism. These similarities, which arise throughout the book, add richness to a dialogue already overflowing with faith in our capacity to find common ground and expand human well being in our rapidly globalizing world. For Dewey, (...) individual and social potential alike are unlimited. Readers will come away ready to embrace rather than fear the increasing complexity of our world.". (shrink)
By critically reviewing the event of Dewey’s visit to China through historical, philosophical and comparative perspectives, this book finds new value to revive the dialogue between Dewey and Eastern philosophies as a way to respond to contemporary educational challenges.
Recently, feminists like Jane Roland-Martin, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, and others have advocated a conversational metaphor for thinking and rationality, and our image of the rational person. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl refers to thinking as a “constant interconnecting of representations of experiences and an extension of how we hear ourselves and others. There are numerous disadvantages to thinking about thinking as a conversation.We think there are difficulties in accepting the current formulation of the conversational metaphor without question. First, there is danger that we will (...) lose important dialectical connections like that between the self and society. Second, the conversational metaphor alone cannot fully express the way conversations are constructed. We will want to take up the notion of narrative as a metaphor for thinking advocated by Susan Bordo, Alasdair MacIntyre, Jerome Bruner, and others, including Mary Belenky and her colleagues.Eventually, we want to champion narrative and the dramatic narrative of culture as a metaphor for thinking that involves such expressions as sights, insights, silences, as well as sounds, moments of mood and poetic moments. The dramatic narrative provides the structural possibilities needed to criticize certain kinds of conversations, in order to talk about the relations of public and private, self and society and most importantly, about the drama of our lives within and without.The dramatic narrative for thinking helps dispel the dangerous dualisms of mind and body that not even conversation or narration alone can banish, and allows us to frame questions about education that do not require us to separate mind from body. The dramatic narrative metaphor for thinking lets us show who we are, act out what we think, and reconstruct rationality to reflect what many women, and some men, do. (shrink)