SummaryThe Gainj of highland Papua New Guinea do not use contraception but have a total fertility rate of only 4·3 live births per woman, one of the lowest ever recorded in a natural fertility setting. From an analysis of cross-sectional demographic and endocrinological data, the causes of low reproductive output have been identified in women of this population as: late menarche and marriage, a long interval between marriage and first birth, a high probability of widowhood at later reproductive ages, low (...) effective fecundability and prolonged lactational amenorrhoea. These are combined with near-universal marriage, a low prevalence of primary sterility and a pattern of onset of secondary sterility similar to that found in other populations. Of all the factors limiting fertility, by far the most important are those involved in birth spacing, especially lactational amenorrhoea. (shrink)

SummaryThe effects of infant suckling patterns on the post-partum resumption of ovulation and on birth-spacing are investigated among the Gainj of highland New Guinea. Based on hormonal evidence, the median duration of lactational anovulation is 20·4 months, accounting for about 75% of the median interval between live birth and next successful conception. Throughout lactation, suckling episodes are short and frequent, the interval changing slowly over time, from 24 minutes in newborns to 80 minutes in 3-year olds. Maternal serum prolactin concentrations (...) decline in parallel with the changes in suckling patterns, approaching the level observed in non-nursing women by about 24 months post-partum. A path analysis indicates that the interval between suckling episodes is the principal determinant of maternal prolactin concentration, with time since parturition affecting prolactin secretion only in so far as it affects suckling frequency. The extremely prolonged contraceptive effect of breast-feeding in this population thus appears to be due to a slow decline in suckling frequency with time since parturition and absence of a decline over time in hypothalamic–pituitary responsiveness to the suckling stimulus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Contemplating the Beautiful: The Practical Importance of Theoretical Excellence in Aristotle’s EthicsJames L. Wood (bio)Aristotle, unlike plato, famously distinguishes φρόνησις from, practical from theoretical wisdom, in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. He distinguishes them on the basis of both their objects and their psychic spheres: is the excellence or virtue (ἀρετή) of the scientific faculty, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, “by which we contemplate [θεωρου̑μεν] the sort of beings whose principles (...) [ἀρχαί] do not admit of being otherwise,” while φρόνησις is an excellence of the calculative faculty, τὸ λογιστικόν, by which we contemplate “the sort of beings that admit of being otherwise” (VI.1, 1139a6–8).1 Φρόνησις is skilled and experienced deliberation about human action and emotion, and in particular about “the sort of things that relate to (πρός) living well in general” (VI.5,1140a28); so φρόνησις guides right action, and as it turns out, directly entails excellence of character, ἠθική ἀρετή (VI.13, 1145a1–2)., on the other hand, while necessary for complete happiness (VI.12, 1144a1–6), “contemplates none of the things that make a human being happy” (VI.12, 1143b19–20), because it contemplates not changeable human affairs, circumstances, and actions, but eternal and unchanging realities (VI.6–7; X.7–8; cf. On the Soul, III.9, 432b26–433a1). Θεωρία, contemplation itself, is defined with reference to in Book X, where contemplation is made the basis of the highest human happiness as the excellent activity of intellect (νου̑ς) by which “beautiful and divine” realities are apprehended (X.7, 1177a15–18 and following). In contrast, the excellence of practical activity (both φρόνησις and ἠθική ἀρετή) is explicitly distinguished from the excellent theoretical activity of νου̑ς in θεωρία and relegated to a merely “secondary” importance (X.8, 1178a9 and following).2 [End Page 391]We might well conclude from this account that theoretical activity has nothing to do with practical activity, even if each is independently necessary for complete human happiness, and even if, as Aristotle says, practical excellence is somehow necessary to prepare the way for theoretical excellence (cf. VI.13, 1145a6–11). I wish to counter this impression, however, by showing that there is a theoretical dimension to excellent practical activity.3 More precisely, I will argue that theoretical activity contributes to practical excellence by furnishing the principles (ἀρχαί) of practical reasoning to the calculative faculty and the motivating end (τέλος) of action to the irrational-appetitive (τὸ; ἄλογον) part of the soul. The intellectual faculty that performs this theoretical activity is νου̑ς; the principles that νου̑ς apprehends are the first premises of ethical and political deliberation; and the τέλος that νου̑ς holds up to the appetitive soul as an orienting and motivating object is το καλόν.4 What distinguishes this activity from the theoretical activity that furnishes the principles of scientific reasoning (ἐπιστήμη) for the sake of knowledge is both the kinds of objects studied and the purpose of the study. One typically studies mathematics or astronomy in order to gain knowledge, not to act virtuously; however, one can certainly study the principles of human nature for the sake of virtuous action (as well as knowledge), as Aristotle himself does in the Ethics and other treatises (cf. II.2, 1103b27–29).5 Moreover, the theoretical study of the most “beautiful and divine” realities, described in Book X of the Ethics and Book XII of the Metaphysics, raises the possibility of a direct contribution of θεωρία at the highest levels to πρα̑ξις through the mediating activity of νου̑ς in the contemplation of the highest beauty and divinity.In what follows I will develop and defend these points through a close examination of Aristotle’s discussion of these concepts. My argument has three main parts. The first examines the role of thought in excellent action, the second brings out [End Page 392] the significance of το καλόν as the universal object of practical excellence, and the third argues in three subsections for the contribution in different ways of theoretical to practical excellence.1. The Dependence of Desire on Thought in Excellent ActionAs is clear from his concluding remarks in Book VI, where he declares that the possession of φρόνησις entails the possession of all the virtues of character (VI.13, 1145a1–2), Aristotle holds that the ἀρεταί of practical thought and character, φρόνησις and ἠθική ἀρετή, are interdependent and mutually implicating in virtuous choice and action. Thought needs desire in order to be practically effective... (shrink)

This paper explores the place of evil in Plato’s thought through the lens of the Philebus. I show that the concept of evil in this dialogue is in broad agreement with the classic Christian position which accents metaphysically its privative and derivative character and morally its rebellious and self-oriented character. The entryway into the issue is 29d9–e1, where a “power of dissolution” is proposed in addition and opposition to the power of generation and mixture, and then quickly rejected. Such a (...) power would be both metaphysically and ethically subversive, or in short, evil. Plato appears to suppress the possibility of evil, but in fact, he relocates the power of dissolution within the unlimited genos in order to show its necessary subordination to and dependence on the limiting and causal principles within generated beings. Evil, on a metaphysical level, is subject to good. On an ethical level, however, the possibility of subversion remains and is exemplified in the dialogue in the radical hedonism of Philebus. After showing how hedonism manifests the power of dissolution in human life, I conclude by remarking the ultimate practical proof towards which this dialogue, and others, points in defense of its claims. (shrink)

This paper confronts Heidegger’s critique of Platonism and defends Plato as a productionist metaphysician. Heidegger misunderstands and abuses Platonic metaphysics. Rather than initiating the reification of being (Sein) in beings (das Seiende) and the subordination of nature to human control, as Heidegger accuses, Plato offers us a non-dogmatic metaphysics of human possibility oriented by and subordinated to being, conceived equally as the good and the beautiful. The relevant production constitutes the ethical counterpart of Platonic metaphysics: it is the responsible bringing (...) of ourselves to “presence” in accordance with the measures given in nature, a process that is erotic, progressive, and always on-the-way. (shrink)

This paper confronts Heidegger’s critique of Platonism and defends Plato as a productionist metaphysician. Heidegger misunderstands and abuses Platonic metaphysics. Rather than initiating the reification of being (Sein) in beings (das Seiende) and the subordination of nature to human control, as Heidegger accuses, Plato offers us a non-dogmatic metaphysics of human possibility oriented by and subordinated to being, conceived equally as the good and the beautiful. The relevant production constitutes the ethical counterpart of Platonic metaphysics: it is the responsible bringing (...) of ourselves to “presence” in accordance with the measures given in nature, a process that is erotic, progressive, and always on-the-way. (shrink)

In een vruchteloos debat van een filosoof en een bisschop komen vele vragen aan de orde, die de zoekende mens vanaf de oudheid hebben beziggehouden, waaronder het wezen God, de rechtvaardiging van het kwaad in de wereld en hoe dit te rijmen is met de goddelijke liefde.

This paper explores a possible Platonic grounding of human freedom in the Philebus. The Philebus presents a particularly intruiging account of the humangood and freedom alike in terms of the right relation of nous and pleasure. Through a close analysis of key passages in this dialogue I show how Plato conceives of freedom in terms of the intellect’s ordering and directing of desire and pleasure to genuinely fulfilling ends. The greatest fulfillment of desire comes together with the purest pleasure in (...) the highest actualization of reason in lifelong philosophic activity: the mixed life and good life for human beings. (shrink)

This paper explores a possible Platonic grounding of human freedom in the Philebus. The Philebus presents a particularly intruiging account of the humangood and freedom alike in terms of the right relation of nous and pleasure. Through a close analysis of key passages in this dialogue I show how Plato conceives of freedom in terms of the intellect’s ordering and directing of desire and pleasure to genuinely fulfilling ends. The greatest fulfillment of desire comes together with the purest pleasure in (...) the highest actualization of reason in lifelong philosophic activity: the mixed life and good life for human beings. (shrink)

En este texto, se explora la historia temprana del republicanismo en América Latina por el medio de los escritos de Francisco Bilbao, uno de los intelectuales radicales chilenos más importantes del siglo XIX. El pensamiento de Bilbao sobre la cuestión del cambio revolucionario fue fuertemente influenciado por su comprensión de la tradición revolucionaria republicana francesa. Examinamos las relaciones transatlánticas que dieron forma al pensamiento de Bilbao, el desarrollo del republicanismo chileno en las secuelas de la independencia política, y las Revoluciones (...) Francesas de 1789 y 1848. Sostenemos que la “regeneración” de la república chilena se convirtió en una especie de misión histórica para Bilbao y su generación de estudiantes universitarios y jóvenes profesionales. Para llevar a cabo esta misión histórica, ellos se hicieron intermediarios entre la vanguardia del pensamiento político en el mundo Atlántico y las realidades sociales obstinadas de un Chile postcolonial. Además, mostramos cómo el radicalismo de Bilbao inspiraba un contraataque feroz por las autoridades eclesiásticas conservadores, indicando cómo la Iglesia Católica respondería a los desafíos futuros * Traducido del inglés por: José A. Bravo de Rueda, Profesor de Español Facultad de Estudios Liberales, Universidad Agrícola y Técnica del Estado de Carolina del Norte, EEUU. El presente artículo es una traducción, con cambios menores en el texto, de James A. Wood, «The republic regenerated: French and Chilean revolutions in the imagination of Francisco Bilbao, 1842-1851». En Atlantic Studies Volume 3, Issue 1, April 2006. pp. 7-23. (shrink)

The _Philebus _is the only Platonic dialogue that takes as its central theme the fundamental Socratic question of the good, understood as that which makes for the best or happiest life. This predominantly ethical theme not only involves an extended psychological and epistemological investigation of topics such as sensation, memory, desire, anticipation, the truth and falsity of pleasures, and types and gradations of knowledge, but also a methodological exposition of dialectic and a metaphysical schema, found nowhere else in the dialogues, (...) that is intended to illuminate the nature of mixture. In its interweaving of ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological topics, the _Philebus_ offers a unique opportunity to assess the relation of these topics in Plato’s mature thought and so to gain insight into his philosophical vision as a whole. An introduction that provides guidance in the reading of Platonic dialogues and of this dialogue in particular. Following the translation is an appendix of parallel passages from other Platonic dialogues as well as related material from Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus. (shrink)

This paper takes a nuanced stance against an intellectualist position that is strong in the literature on the Philebus by arguing that pleasure’s goodness is inherent but not independent. Pleasure is worth pursuing together with intellectual activity in the mixed life because pleasure is the sensual manifestation, direct or indirect, of growth in goodness. Pleasure as the expression of this growth is the sensual component of the mixture that Socrates in this dialogue defends as the good for human beings. But (...) if pleasure’s contribution to the overall goodness of a human life is not to be outweighed by some corresponding badness, it must reflect an accurate assessment of the goodness of our experiences and either proceed directly from the right kind of intellectual or psychic activity or else be subordinated to the rational ordering activity of intellect according to the standards of virtue, moderation, and health. (shrink)

This paper examines the errant cause in the Timaeus. After eliminating the material elements, matter, chōra, and irrational soul, I show that the source of cosmic disorder lies in the manifestation of difference in genesis. This disorder is a necessary feature of demiurgic formation, which requires generated beings to fall short of their paradigmatic forms and to encounter each other in destabilizing motions. Errancy is thus a threat to generated beings, but it also presents an opportunity and a task to (...) those beings capable of bringing sameness to difference in themselves in imitation of the demiurge and cosmic soul. (shrink)