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James Dreier
Brown University
  1.  99
    The Real and the Quasi-Real: Problems of Distinction.Jamie Dreier - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):532-547.
    This paper surveys some ways of distinguishing Quasi-Realism in metaethics from Non-naturalist Realism, including ‘Explanationist’ methods of distinguishing, which characterize the Real by its explanatory role, and Inferentialist methods. Rather than seeking the One True Distinction, the paper adopts an irenic and pragmatist perspective, allowing that different ways of drawing the line are best for different purposes.
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  2. Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence.Jamie Dreier - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):269-287.
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  3. Is There a Supervenience Problem for Robust Moral Realism?Jamie Dreier - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1391-1408.
    The paper describes the problem for robust moral realism of explaining the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, and examines five objections to the argument: The moral does not supervene on the descriptive, because we may owe different obligations to duplicates. If the supervenience thesis is repaired to block, it becomes trivial and easy to explain. Supervenience is a moral doctrine and should get an explanation from within normative ethics rather than metaethics. Supervenience is a conceptual truth and should (...)
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  4. Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism.Jamie Dreier - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
  5.  52
    Two Models of Agent-Centered Value.Jamie Dreier - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (3):345-362.
    The consequentializing project relies on agentcentered value, but many philosophers find the idea incomprehensible or incoherent. Discussions of agent-centered value often model it with a theory that assigns distinct better-than rankings of states of affairs to each agent, rather than assigning a single ranking common to all. A less popular kind of model uses a single ranking, but takes the value-bearing objects to be properties rather than states of affairs. There are rhetorical, presentational differences between these kinds of models, but (...)
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  6.  11
    Explaining the Quasi-Real.Jamie Dreier - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
    This chapter discusses whether Quasi-Realism gains any advantage over Robust Realism with respect to the problem of explaining supervenience. The chapter starts with a summary of what the supervenience problem is and recounts the history of expressivist thinking about supervenience: the supervenience problem was a challenge raised by expressivist Robust Realists, with the idea that expressivism had an excellent explanation of the phenomenon and realism had none. The chapter then contrasts Quasi-Realism and Robust Realism in order to bring the big (...)
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  7. Was Moore a Moorean?Jamie Dreier - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 191.
     
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  8. Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism.Jamie Dreier - 2007 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oup Usa.
     
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  9. Mackie's Realism.Jamie Dreier - 2010 - In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchen (eds.), A World Without Values. Springer.
    The chapter argues that we should draw the line between realist and antirealist metaethics according to whether a theory locates the explanation for the special, puzzling features of moral terms and concepts out in the world, with the content of moral thoughts, or inside the head. This taxonomy places Mackie's error theory in the realist category, contrary to the usual scheme. The paper suggests that in looking for the “queerness” of objective value in the metaphysics of moral properties, Mackie makes (...)
     
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  10.  25
    Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism.Jamie Dreier - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714-721.
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  11.  83
    Truth and Disagreement in Impassioned Belief.Jamie Dreier - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):450-459.
  12.  81
    Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism. [REVIEW]Jamie Dreier - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714 - 721.
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  13.  69
    Shallow, Deeper, Deep: A Few Thoughts on a Small Piece of Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong's Moral Skepticisms.Jamie Dreier - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (3):197-206.
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  14. When Do Goals Explain the Rules That Advance Them?Jamie Dreier - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5.
     
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  15.  60
    Comments: Gibbard and Moore.Jamie Dreier - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement):158-164.
  16.  52
    Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism.Jamie Dreier - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714-721.
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  17. Humean Doubts.Jamie Dreier - 2011 - In Xu Xiangdong (ed.), Practical Reason. Zhejiang University Press.
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