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Jamie Carlin Watson [13]Jamie Watson [3]
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  1.  61
    The Shoulders of Giants: A Case for Non-Veritism About Expert Authority.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2018 - Topoi 37 (1):39-53.
    Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop (...)
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  2.  1
    Ethics Expertise Demystified: Using the Brummett/Salter Taxonomy.Jamie Watson - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (11):80-82.
    Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 80-82.
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  3.  20
    The End of Eternity.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2017 - Sophia 56 (2):147-162.
    A popular critique of the kalām cosmological argument is that one argument for its second premise illicitly assumes a finite starting point for the series of past temporal events, thereby begging the question against opponents. Rejecting this assumption, opponents say, eliminates any objections to the possibility that the past is infinitely old and undermines the IFA’s ability to support premise 2. I contend that the plausibility of this objection depends on ambiguities in extant formulations of the IFA and that we (...)
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  4.  14
    Dilemma Arguments Against Naturalism.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):1-15.
    Albert Casullo (2000, 2003) and Shane Oakley (2011) argue that dilemma arguments against epistemic naturalism, such as those offered by Laurence BonJour (1998) and Harvey Siegel (1984), are such that, whatever strength they have against naturalism applies equally to moderate rationalist accounts of a priori justification. They conclude that dilemma arguments are, therefore, insufficient for establishing an advantage for moderate rationalism over naturalized epistemology. I argue that both Casullo's and Oakley's criticisms depend on an illicit assumption, namely, that dilemma arguments (...)
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  5.  27
    What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues by David Coady, 2011 Malden, MA, Wiley‐Blackwellx + 202 Pp, US $93.95 US $36.95. [REVIEW]Jamie Carlin Watson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (4):400-402.
  6. What's Good on Tv: Understanding Ethics Through Television.Jamie Carlin Watson & Robert Arp - 2011 - Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  7.  35
    What Experts Could Not Be.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (1):74-87.
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  8.  11
    Talking the Talk: Enhancing Clinical Ethics with Health Literacy Best Practices.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2019 - HEC Forum 31 (3):177-199.
    A significant proportion of the U.S. population exhibits low health literacy. Evidence suggests that low health literacy is correlated with higher medical costs and poorer health outcomes. Even more concerning, evidence suggests that low health literacy threatens patients’ and families’ autonomy and exacerbates injustices in patients who are already vulnerable to difficulties navigating the health care system. There is also, however, increasing evidence that health literacy interventions—including initiatives such as plain language practices and teach-back—improve comprehension and usefulness of health care (...)
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  9. Justification, Epistemic.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2016
    Epistemic Justification We often believe what we are told by our parents, friends, doctors, and news reporters. We often believe what we see, taste, and smell. We hold beliefs about the past, the present, and the future. Do we have a right to hold any of these beliefs? Are any supported by evidence? Should we … Continue reading Justification, Epistemic →.
     
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  10.  19
    Many Irrelevant Evils: A Response to the Bayesian Problem of Evil.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (4):365-378.
    Robert Bass argues that the evidential problem of evil can be strengthened by the application of a Bayesian conditionalization argument. I argue that, whatever the merits of Bayesian conditionalization arguments, they are unsuccessful in substantiating the evidential problem of evil because the problem of evil doesn’t meet the necessary conditions for applying the formula informatively. I offer two examples to show that a successful application of the Bayesian formula must pass two tests, the competency test and the connection test. I (...)
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  11.  11
    Picking Out the a Priori.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (4):413-432.
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  12. For l'Amour : Love and Friendship in The Office (US).Robert Arp & Jamie Watson - 2008 - In Jeremy Wisnewski (ed.), The Office and Philosophy: Scenes From the Unexamined Life. Blackwell.
     
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  13.  6
    Moral Expertise: New Essays From Theoretical and Clinical Bioethics.Jamie Carlin Watson & Laura K. Guidry-Grimes (eds.) - 2018 - Springer International Publishing.
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  14. A Priori Justification and Experience.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2009 - Dissertation, Florida State University
    This dissertation is about a priori justification and its relationship to experiential evidence. I begin with the assumption that a priori justification is justification that is independent of experience. It has been argued that putative examples of a priori justification are implausible because they are not, in any significant sense, independent of experience. My two central claims are that (a) a subject is plausibly justified a priori in believing a proposition only if the belief is not revisable on empirical grounds, (...)
     
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  15. Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Reasoning Well.Jamie Carlin Watson & Robert Arp - 2011 - Continuum.
    Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Reasoning Well provides a concise and accessible introduction to logic and critical reasoning. Topics include:* the structure, formation, analysis and recognition of arguments* deductive validity and soundness* inductive strength and cogency* inference to the best explanation* truth tables* tools for argument assessment* informal and formal fallacies* reasoning on graduate school entrance exams* real life examplesDesigned for classroom use, the book features a host of student-friendly exercises, examples, study questions, diagrams, and suggestions for further reading. Ideal (...)
     
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  16. Prolegomena to an Epistemic Case for Classical Liberalism.Jamie Watson - 2014 - Libertarian Papers 6.
    The strength of many arguments for Classical Liberalism is often challenged on the grounds that these arguments appeal to controversial metaphysical structures or moral principles. To avoid these challenges, I appeal to a set of epistemic considerations to show that, in order to structure a society that affords optimal opportunity for citizens to obtain their interests, we have a rational obligation to protect individuals’ freedom to pursue those interests. In this paper, I defend the second premise of a larger argument (...)
     
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