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Jane Friedman
New York University
  1. Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
    In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an (...)
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  2. Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
    Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should (...)
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  3. Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
    In this paper I argue that suspension of judgment is intimately tied to inquiry and in particular that one is suspending judgment about some question if and only if one is inquiring into that question.
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    The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
    Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry? While much of this thought seems right, this paper argues that the relationship between the epistemic and the zetetic is not as harmonious as one might have thought and liked. In particular, this paper argues that (...)
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  5. Question‐Directed Attitudes.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
    In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.
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  6. Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief, we can (...)
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  7. Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.
    In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.
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  8. Checking Again.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):84-96.
  9. Teleological Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):673-691.
    It is typically thought that some epistemic states are valuable—knowing, truly or accurately believing, understanding. These are states it’s thought good to be in and it’s also said that we aim or want to be in them. It is then sometimes claimed that these sorts of thoughts about epistemic goods or values ground or explain our epistemic norms. For instance, we think subjects should follow their evidence when they form their beliefs. But why should they? Why not believe against the (...)
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    Achievable Hierarchies in Voting Games.Jane Friedman, Lynn Mcgrath & Cameron Parker - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (4):305-318.
    Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313–325 ] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited ], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapley–Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure on a swap robust (...)
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  11.  45
    Simple Majority Achievable Hierarchies.Dwight Bean, Jane Friedman & Cameron Parker - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (4):285-302.
    We completely characterize the simple majority weighted voting game achievable hierarchies, and, in doing so, show that a problem about representative government, noted by J. Banzhaf [Rutgers Law Review 58, 317–343 (1965)] cannot be resolved using the simple majority quota. We also demonstrate that all hierarchies achievable by any quota can be achieved if the simple majority quota is simply incremented by one.
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    Correction to: Teleological epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):287-287.
    In Section 3 of the original version, the Weak Evidentialist Norm is given as follows: ‘For every S, p and t, S’s coming to know p at t is permissible’.
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    Correction to: Teleological epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):287-287.
    In Section 3 of the original version, the Weak Evidentialist Norm is given as follows: ‘For every S, p and t, S’s coming to know p at t is permissible’.
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  14. Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscript
    A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.
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  15. Zetetic Epistemology.Jane Friedman - forthcoming - In Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.
     
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