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Jane L. Mcintyre [17]Jane Lipsky Mcintyre [2]
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Jane L. McIntyre
Cleveland State University
  1.  82
    Personal Identity and the Passions.Jane L. McIntyre - 1989 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4):545-557.
  2.  51
    Character: A Humean Account.Jane L. McIntyre - 1990 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (2):193 - 206.
  3. Hume: Second Newton of the Moral Sciences.Jane L. McIntyre - 1994 - Hume Studies 20 (1):3-18.
  4.  65
    Hume' Passions: Direct and Indirect.Jane L. McIntyre - 2000 - Hume Studies 26 (1):77-86.
    Book II of the Treatise minutely anatomizes the passions Hume dubbed “indirect.” As the account of pride, humility, love, and hatred unfolds, principles are uncovered, causes are exhaustively examined, experiments carried out, difficulties presented and solved. The barrage of detailed description and theorizing threatens to overwhelm even the most devoted of readers. By contrast, Hume’s explicit treatment of the direct passions appears perfunctory. Indeed, Hume states: “None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention except hope and fear.” (...)
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  5.  21
    Hume's “New and Extraordinary” Account of the Passions.Jane L. McIntyre - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Blackwell. pp. 199--215.
  6.  99
    Strength of Mind: Prospects and Problems for a Humean Account.Jane L. Mcintyre - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):393-401.
    References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with a brief comparison (...)
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  7.  27
    Hume’ Passions: Direct and Indirect.Jane L. McIntyre - 2000 - Hume Studies 26 (1):77-86.
    Book II of the Treatise minutely anatomizes the passions Hume dubbed “indirect.” As the account of pride, humility, love, and hatred unfolds, principles are uncovered, causes are exhaustively examined, experiments carried out, difficulties presented and solved. The barrage of detailed description and theorizing threatens to overwhelm even the most devoted of readers. By contrast, Hume’s explicit treatment of the direct passions appears perfunctory. Indeed, Hume states: “None of the direct affections seem to merit our particular attention except hope and fear.” (...)
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  8. Norms for a Reflective Naturalist: A Review of Annette Baier's A Progress of Sentiments. [REVIEW]Jane L. McIntyre - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (2):317-323.
  9.  24
    Locke on Personal Identity.Jane Lipsky McIntyre - 1977 - Philosophy Research Archives 3:113-144.
    In this paper I offer an analysis, reconstruction and defense of Locke's account of personal identity. I begin with a detailed analysis of Locke's use of the term 'conscious' in its historical context. This term, which plays a central role in Locke's theory, had senses in the seventeenth century which it does not have today. In the light of this analysis, an interpretation of continuity of consciousness as the ancestral of memory is given. It is argued that this interpretation of (...)
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  10.  21
    Further Remarks on the Consistency of Hume's Account of the Self.Jane L. McIntyre - 1979 - Hume Studies 5 (1):55-61.
  11.  22
    Chisholm on Indirect Attribution.Jane L. McIntyre - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (3):409 - 414.
    In "the first person" chisholm argues that the primary form of belief is non-Propositional belief about oneself. Belief about others is essentially indirect, Mediated by the attribution of a property to oneself. In this paper I argue that chisholm's account cannot give a non-Circular explanation of various plausible examples of "de re" belief.
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  12.  23
    David Fate Norton, Ed., "The Cambridge Companion to Hume". [REVIEW]Jane L. McIntyre - 1995 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (2):346.
  13. Hume and the Problem of Personal Identity.Jane L. Mcintyre - 2009 - In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Anne Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.
  14. New Perspectives on Locke and Personal Identity.Jane Lipsky Mcintyre - 1973 - Dissertation, Stanford University
  15. Passion and Artifice in Hume's Account of Superstition'.Jane L. McIntyre - 1999 - In D. Z. Phillips & Timothy Tessin (eds.), Religion and Hume's Legacy. St. Martin's Press, Scholarly and Reference Division. pp. 171--84.
  16.  67
    “So Great a Question”: A Critical Study of Raymond Martin and John Barresi.Jane L. McIntyre - 2003 - Hume Studies 29 (2):363-373.
  17. The Connection Between Impressions and Ideas.Jane L. Mcintyre - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:9.
  18.  8
    The Connection Between Impressions and Ideas.Jane L. Mcintyre - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (sup1):9-19.
  19.  25
    The Role of Temporal Adverbs in Statements About Persons.Jane L. McIntyre - 1978 - Noûs 12 (4):443-461.
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