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Janet Levin [42]Janet M. Levin [1]
  1. Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
    Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments (...)
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  2.  32
    Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap.Janet Levin - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
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  3. What is a Phenomenal Concept?Janet Levin - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  4. Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?Janet Levin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
    In this paper I discuss the claim that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.
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  5. The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the (...)
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  6.  92
    Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only (...)
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  7. Could Love Be Like a Heatwave?Janet Levin - 1986 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  8. Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.
    Abstract: Type-B materialism is the thesis that though phenomenal states are necessarily identical with physical states, phenomenal concepts have no a priori connections to physical or functional concepts. Though type-B materialists have invoked this conceptual independence to counter a number of well-known arguments against physicalism (e.g. the conceivability of zombies, the ignorance of Mary, the existence of an 'explanatory gap'), anti-physicalists have raised objections to this strategy. My aim here is to defend type-B materialism against these objections, by arguing that (...)
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  9.  89
    Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense.Janet Levin - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (2):151-174.
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  10. Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience.Janet Levin - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (March):245-61.
  11. Molyneux's Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.
    Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of (...)
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  12.  42
    Nagel Vs. Nagel on the Nature of Phenomenal Concepts.Janet Levin - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):293–307.
  13. Experimental Philosophy.Janet Levin - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):761-769.
    Levin argues that the results of the most methodologically sound and philosophically relevant studies discussed in this volume [ Experimental Philosophy] could have been obtained from the armchair, and thus that experimental philosophy may not present a serious challenge to the traditional methods of analytic philosophy.
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  14. Must Reasons Be Rational?Janet Levin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):199-217.
    This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those (...)
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  15.  46
    Do Conceivability Arguments Against Physicalism Beg the Question?Janet Levin - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):71-89.
    Many well-known arguments against physicalism—e.g., Chalmers’s Zombie Argument and Kripke’s Modal Argument—contend that it is conceivable for there to be physical duplicates of ourselves that have no conscious experiences and also that what is conceivable is possible—and therefore, if phenomenal-physical identity statements are supposed to be necessary, then physicalism can’t be true. Physicalists typically respond to these arguments either by questioning whether such creatures can truly be conceived, or denying that the conceivability of such creatures provides good evidencefor their ‘metaphysical’ (...)
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  16.  96
    Analytic Functionalism and the Reduction of Phenomenal States.Janet Levin - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):211-38.
  17.  74
    Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Janet Levin - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):391-421.
    It is standard practice in philosophical inquiry to test a general thesis (of the form 'F iff G' or 'F only if G') by attempting to construct a counterexample to it. If we can imagine or conceive of1an F that isn't a G, then we have evidence that there could be an F that isn't a G — and thus evidence against the thesis in question; if not, then the thesis is (at least temporarily) secure. Or so it is standardly (...)
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  18. Skepticism, Objectivity, and the Invulnerability of Knowledge.Janet Levin - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):63-78.
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  19.  36
    Functionalism and the Argument From Conceivability.Janet Levin - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:85-104.
  20.  2
    Perception and Cognition.Janet Levin & John Heil - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):458.
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  21.  50
    The Myth of Jones and the Return of Subjectivity.Janet Levin - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (2):173-192.
  22.  21
    Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.Janet Levin & Norton Nelkin - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):644.
  23.  73
    Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism.Janet Levin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.
    In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then traditional (...)
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  24.  82
    Tye's Ptolemaic Revolution (Review of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts).Janet Levin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):98-117.
  25. Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?Janet Levin - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
    In this paper I discuss the claim that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.
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  26.  81
    Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities.Janet Levin - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):400-411.
    In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences cannot be reduced to physical or functional (...)
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  27.  77
    Reconstruing Modal Intuitions.Janet Levin - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):97-112.
    In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that clearly conceived (or imagined) scenarios that seem to be counterexamples to a posteriori identity theses can indeed count as evidence against them—but only if, after reflection on our understanding of their constituent terms and the relevant empirical facts, we find that they cannot be acceptably reconstrued as intuitions about something else. This makes trouble for phenomenalphysical identity statements such as ‘pain is C-fiber stimulation’, since most agree that such statements cannot be so reconstrued—and (...)
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  28. Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?Janet Levin - 2007 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):253 – 269.
    In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that intuitions about what is possible play a limited, but important, role in challenging philosophical theses, counting as evidence against them only if they cannot be reconstrued as intuitions about something else, compatible with the thesis in question. But he doesn't provide clear guidelines for determining when such intuitions have been successfully reconstrued, leading some to question their status as evidence for modal claims. In this paper I focus on some worries, articulated by Michael (...)
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  29.  31
    Intuition By Elijah Chudnoff. [REVIEW]Janet Levin - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):97-99.
  30.  4
    Molyneux’s Question and the Amodality of Spatial Experience.Janet Levin - 2018 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):590-610.
    A recent study published in Nature Neuroscience purports to have answered a question posed to Locke in 1688 by his friend William Molyneux, namely, whether ‘a man born blind and made to see’ would be able to identify, immediately and by vision alone, objects previously known only by touch. The answer, according to the researchers – and as predicted by Molyneux, as well as Locke, Berkeley, and others – is ‘likely negative. The newly sighted subjects did not exhibit an immediate (...)
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  31.  44
    Molyneux Meets Euthyphro.Janet Levin - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):289-297.
    Many contemporary philosophers contend that a positive answer to Molyneux’s Question -- the question of whether a “man born blind and made to see” would be able to identify spatial figures, without touching them, on first viewing -- requires that there be a *rational connection* between the representations of those figures afforded by vision and by touch. This paper explores the question of what this could mean if the representations are non-discursive, or “pure recognitional” concepts, and argues that the most (...)
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  32.  14
    Review: Consciousness Disputed. [REVIEW]Janet Levin - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91 - 107.
  33.  1
    Levy on Neuroscience, Psychology, and Moral Intuitions.Janet Levin - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2 (2):10-11.
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  34.  3
    Appearance and Reality: A Philosophical Investigation Into Perception and Perceptual Qualities.Janet Levin & P. M. S. Hacker - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):654.
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  35. Folk Psychology and the Simulationist Challenge.Janet Levin - 1995 - Acta Analytica 10 (14):77-100.
     
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  36.  10
    Consciousness, by Josh Weisberg.Janet M. Levin - 2015 - Teaching Philosophy 38 (3):362-366.
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  37.  18
    Locke.Janet Levin - 1985 - Teaching Philosophy 8 (3):240-242.
  38.  18
    Review of Karsten R. Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences[REVIEW]Janet Levin - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7).
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  39.  7
    Consciousness Disputed. [REVIEW]Janet Levin - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91-107.
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  40. Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Janet Levin - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):624-628.
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  41. Can Mental Images Provide Evidence for What is Possible?Janet Levin - 2006 - Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):108-119.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that sensory images – “mental pictures” or other sense-based images of various situations – provide the best evidence for what is possible. In this paper I identify the best argument for this conclusion, but contend that it shows that certain non-sensory representations provide good evidence for possibility as well. That is, though I endorse the claim that the sensory imagination can be a source of evidence for what is possible, I deny that it (...)
     
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  42. Functionalism and the Argument From Conceivability.Janet Levin - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 11:85.
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  43. The Mental as Physical.Janet Levin & Edgar Wilson - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (2):295.
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