Personal reports of receiving bad news provide data that describes patients’ comprehension, reflections, experienced emotions, and an interpretative commentary with the wisdom of hindsight. Analysis of autobiographical accounts of “hearing bad news” enables the identification of patterns of how patients found out diagnoses, buffering techniques used, and styles of receiving the news. I describe how patients grapple with the news, their somatic responses to hearing, and how they struggle and strive to accept what they are hearing. I discuss metaphors used (...) within the languages of hearing bad news. Finally, I discuss implications for a change of focus in the breaking bad news research agenda, that is, from the physician’s “performance” to a patient-focused agenda. (shrink)
In this article a case is made for the importance of a previously overlooked phenomenon, physical empathy orcompathy,defined as the physical manifestation of caregiver distress that occurs in the presence of a patient in physical pain or distress. According to the similarity of a caregiver's response to the original symptoms, there can be four types of compathetic response: identical, initiated, transferred, and converted. Controlling for the compathetic response may involve narrowing one's focus and/or changing caregiver attitudes. Finally, we argue that (...) while the compathetic response may be beneficial to the caregiving relationship, enabling the provision of appropriate and adequate humane treatment and care, the caregiver must at times shield against the compathetic response in order to provide care. (shrink)
Morse has produced a work that emphasizes the extreme significance and vital discipline of legal philosophy in representing the integration of legal principles and moral precepts. The Thinkers discusses, delineates, and analyzes the integral legal philosophies of Hobbes, Wilson, Aquinas, Augustine, Descartes, Hegel, Leibnitz, Kant, Carlyle,Thoreau, and Hohfeld.
This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organised around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor's culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the (...) face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor's desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions. (shrink)
This article considers whether psychopaths should be held criminally responsible. After describing the positive law of criminal responsibility in general and as it applies to psychopaths, it suggests that psychopaths lack moral rationality and that severe psychopaths should be excused from crimes that violate the moral rights of others. Alternative forms of social control for dangerous psychopaths, such as involuntary civil commitment, are considered, and the potential legal implications of future scientific understanding of psychopathy are addressed.
This article demonstrates that there is no free will problem in forensic psychiatry by showing that free will or its lack is not a criterion for any legal doctrine and it is not an underlying general foundation for legal responsibility doctrines and practices. There is a genuine metaphysical free will problem, but the article explains why it is not relevant to forensic practice. Forensic practitioners are urged to avoid all usage of free will in their forensic thinking and work product (...) because it is irrelevant and spawns confusion. (shrink)
Most theories of learning would predict a gradual acquisition and refinement of skills as learning progresses, and while some highlight exponential growth, this fails to explain why natural cognitive development typically progresses in stages. Models that do span multiple developmental stages typically have parameters to “switch” between stages. We argue that by taking an embodied view, the interaction between learning mechanisms, the resulting behavior of the agent, and the opportunities for learning that the environment provides can account for the stage-wise (...) development of cognitive abilities. We summarize work relevant to this hypothesis and suggest two simple mechanisms that account for some developmental transitions: neural readiness focuses on changes in the neural substrate resulting from ongoing learning, and perceptual readiness focuses on the perceptual requirements for learning new tasks. Previous work has demonstrated these mechanisms in replications of a wide variety of infant language experiments, spanning multiple developmental stages. Here we piece this work together as a single model of ongoing learning with no parameter changes at all. The model, an instance of the Epigenetic Robotics Architecture embodied on the iCub humanoid robot, exhibits ongoing multi-stage development while learning pre-linguistic and then basic language skills. (shrink)
In her recent article, “The One Necessary Condition for a Business Ethics Course: The Teacher Must be a Philosopher,” Ellen Klein argues that philosophers are best qualified to teach business ethics by virtue of their expertise in ethical theory. Klein likens her claim to that of Plato’s “philosopher-king,” who claimed that the philosopher is best suited to be “king,” because he possesses a theoretical understanding of justice. In response to Klein, I point to Aristotle’s objection to Plato, which shows that (...) theoretical knowledge of ethics is not sufficient for making a person ethical, because ethics requires both theoretical and practical knowledge. Ultimately, I argue that in order to have a successful business ethics class, one must address both the issues unique to ethical theory, and the particularstructures and contexts that are unique to making an ethical decision within the business environment. (shrink)
Understanding the relationship between concepts and experience seems necessary to specifying the content of experience, yet current theories of concepts do not seem up to the job. With Peter Gärdenfors's conceptual spaces theory as a foundation and with enactivist philosophy as inspiration, we present a proposed extension to conceptual spaces theory and use it to outline a model of the emergence of concepts and experience. We conclude that neither is ultimately primary but each gives rise to the other: i.e., that (...) they co-emerge. Such a model can then serve as the anchor to a theory of concepts more generally. Concepts are most naturally understood in symbolic and representational terms, while much of experience, in contrast, is non-symbolic and non-representational; yet the conflict between the two will, herein, be shown to be more apparent than real. The main contribution of this paper is to argue for, by means of this account of co-emergence, a continuum between "low-level" mental content that is more appropriately understood in highly context-sensitive and directly sensorimotor-based terms, and "high-level" mental content that is more appropriately understood in context-free and representational or symbolic terms. In doing so we conclude that the extreme positions of representationalism and anti-representationalism are fatally flawed. (shrink)
(2006). Leadership, cross‐cultural contact, socio‐economic status, and formal operational reasoning about moral dilemmas among Mexican non‐literate adults and high school students. Journal of Moral Education: Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 247-267.
The author reflects on the premature speculations of many commentators on robot caregivers. He argues on the commentator's ethical issues that it creates false beliefs in children, in which he says that the creation of false beliefs by their caretakers is part and parcel of childhood. He argues that societies are already delegated the childcare onto others such as school and since technology is often substituting for direct physical social contact, its time to embrace the robotic care.
This article presents results from a multidisciplinary research project on the integration and transfer of language knowledge into robots as an empirical paradigm for the study of language development in both humans and humanoid robots. Within the framework of human linguistic and cognitive development, we focus on how three central types of learning interact and co-develop: individual learning about one's own embodiment and the environment, social learning (learning from others), and learning of linguistic capability. Our primary concern is how these (...) capabilities can scaffold each other's development in a continuous feedback cycle as their interactions yield increasingly sophisticated competencies in the agent's capacity to interact with others and manipulate its world. Experimental results are summarized in relation to milestones in human linguistic and cognitive development and show that the mutual scaffolding of social learning, individual learning, and linguistic capabilities creates the context, conditions, and requisites for learning in each domain. Challenges and insights identified as a result of this research program are discussed with regard to possible and actual contributions to cognitive science and language ontogeny. In conclusion, directions for future work are suggested that continue to develop this approach toward an integrated framework for understanding these mutually scaffolding processes as a basis for language development in humans and robots. (shrink)
Although work on computational and robotic modelling of cognition is highly diverse, as an empirical method it can be roughly divided into at least two clearly different, though non-exclusive branches, motivated to evaluate the sufficiency or the necessity of theories when it comes to accounting for data and/or other observations. With the rising profile of theories of situated/embodied cognition, a third non-exclusive avenue for investigation has also gained in popularity, the investigation of agent-environment embedding or more generally, exploration. Still in (...) its infancy, and often confused with sufficiency testing, this relatively new kind of modelling, which is theory- rather than data-driven, investigates the role of the environment in shaping the ontogenetic and/or phylogenetic development of situated agency. Each of these three approaches presents many issues that modellers must be sensitive to, both in the design of experiments, and in the conclusions that can be drawn from them. This paper highlights some of these issues, provides examples, and addresses the contribution of computational/robotic modelling to cognitive science, as well as some of its limitations. (shrink)
This paper explores the historic philosophical contributions ofMill and Marx toward a comprehensive conception of intellectual freedomas a basic educational entitlement. In a perhaps surprising confluence,Marx's theory of a material base for freedom of thought is then extendedin a discussion of contemporary freedoms including, importantly,academic freedom and its implication for teaching, the profession andits training.
ABSTRACT The article begins by contrasting medical and moral views of addiction and how such views influence responsibility and policy analysis. It suggests that since addiction always involves action and action can always be morally evaluated, we must independently decide whether addicts do not meet responsibility criteria rather than begging the question and deciding by the label of ?disease? or ?moral weakness?. It then turns to the criteria for criminal responsibility and shows that the criteria for criminal responsibility, like the (...) criteria for addiction, are all folk psychological. Therefore, any scientific information about addiction must be ?translated? into the law's folk psychological criteria. Distractions about responsibility are then quickly canvassed. Then it addresses the direct relation between addiction and criminal responsibility. It argues that most addicts retain sufficient rational and control capacities at the relevant times to be held responsible, especially for crimes that are not part of the definition of addiction itself. It suggests that there is good reason to excuse or mitigate addicts for the crimes of purchase and possession for personal use. It concludes by briefly considering what contemporary science can contribute to our understanding of addiction and agency. (shrink)
Although most scholars have ignored it, William James’s critique of Hegel, as developed in his book A Pluralistic Universe, poses a significant challenge to Hegelian thought. While not every argument James levels against Hegel is valid, and some are bogus, at least two of his arguments are highly persuasive—the charge of “vicious intellectualism” and the charge of “false unity.” As a result of leveling these charges, James escapes Hegel’s logic and is able to establish pragmatism as an original position in (...) the history of ideas. He also offers an entirely new and serious critique that modern day defenders of Hegel must contend with—a critique that, unless it is addressed, makes pragmatism seem to be a more reasonable philosophy to adopt than Hegel’s. (shrink)