The first book of NE is organised on the model of investigating definitions described in the second Book of the Posterior Analytics, although, of course, with some adaptation due to the subject matter. It first establishes if the object exists and looks for the meaning of the terms used in common language to indicate it, next considers some necessary qualities of the object and then concludes with a definition of the object. We find there a dialectical syllogism of definition, and (...) not the procedure in three steps described in NE VII 1, sometimes called 'the method of ethics'. In fact, the method described in NE VII 1 does not apply to the first book of the NE. Its relevance for the NE has been somehow exaggerated. (shrink)

Il problema della rappresentazione, connaturato ad ogni mediazione linguistica del rapporto di mente e mondo, è nelle sue molteplici forme un tema antico della riflessione filosofica. La rappresentazione letteraria appartiene alla stessa categoria e pone problemi analoghi al pensiero. Che cosa significa rappresentare poeticamente? Il concetto di finzione letteraria può avere solo un senso peggiorativo o limitante nei confronti della comunicazione dell’universale, o ne può essere una modalità? Il tema del saggio è il rapporto tra realtà e finzione letteraria che (...) pare emergere da I falsari di André Gide. Seguendo le intuizioni e i suggerimenti dello scrittore, si proverà a tracciare le linee principali di un’interpretazione positiva della finzione letteraria, che ne riconosca la potenza espressiva senza soffocarne i caratteri distintivi. Non è detto, poi, che ciò che vale per la rappresentazione poetica non possa avere un senso anche sotto punti di vista più generali. (shrink)

The first book of NE is organised on the model of investigating definitions described in the second Book of the Posterior Analytics, although, of course, with some adaptation due to the subject matter. It first establishes if the object exists and looks for the meaning of the terms used in common language to indicate it, next considers some necessary qualities of the object and then concludes with a definition of the object. We find there a dialectical syllogism of definition, and (...) not the procedure in three steps described in NE VII 1, sometimes called 'the method of ethics'. In fact, the method described in NE VII 1 does not apply to the first book of the NE. Its relevance for the NE has been somehow exaggerated. (shrink)

I aim to show that, contrary to standard deflationary or eliminativist theories of the self, we can argue from the phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness for the thesis that subjects of experience are substances. The phenomenological datum of subjectivity points to a specific metaphysical structure of our experience, that is, towards the substance view rather than the bundle or the minimal self view. Drawing on modern philosophical accounts of pre-reflective self-awareness, mineness and (self-) acquaintance, I will argue that a subject is (...) aware of being the one individual who has many experiences and that it is revealed to the subject that it is the bearer of experiences and their unifier. The subject is present in pre-reflective awareness and known as the subject of experiences, and even this minimal self-awareness gives us reason to favour the substance view. Thus, one can demonstrate how the debates on the phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness and the metaphysics of selfhood intersect. (shrink)

“Diaspora uzman(lığ)ı”, sivil toplum örgütleri ve uluslararası kuruluşlar tarafından tıbbi, teknik ve yönetimsel bilimler gibi çeşitli alanlarda uzman ve bir diaspora grubuna ait kişileri tanımlamak için kullanılmaktadır. Fakat bu kavramının bir de uzmanlık alanını diaspora konusu üzerine kazanmış kişileri anlatması söz konusudur. Bu çalışmada ilk durumu anlatmak için “diaspora-içinden-uzmanlık”, ikinci durum içinse “diaspora-üzerine-uzmanlık” kullanılmıştır. Diaspora-üzerine uzmanlık; diasporaların anavatanla, misafir ülkeyle ve diğer ülkelerdeki diaspora gruplarıyla ilişkilerini kapsayan bir ağın yönetimine; bir tür dünya politikasına yönelik uzmanlık bilgisidir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, günümüzde (...) diaspora üzerine uzmanlıktan beklenen bilgi, deneyim ve yetenek birikiminin siyaset kavramını ve disiplinini nasıl dönüştürdüğünü anlamaktır. Bu doğrultuda öncelikle kavramların anlamlarına (diaspora ve uzmanlık) ve diaspora-içinden-uzmanlığa değinilmiş; sonrasında diaspora-üzerine-uzmanlığın izleri üniversitelerde kurulan program, enstitü, merkez vb. oluşumlar üzerinden akademi alanında ve “diaspora uzman(lığ)ı” başlıklı iş ilanları üzerinden piyasada/uygulamada aranmıştır. Sonuç bölümünde diaspora-üzerine-uzmanlık konusundaki gelişmelerin siyaset çalışmaları akademisyenleri ve mezunları için neleri ima ettiği tartışılmıştır. (shrink)

Političko je obrazovanje dio općeg obrazovanja; utoliko se doima smislenijim posvetiti se opsežnijem, kako bi se ono podrobnije moglo razvrstati na odgovarajući način. Stoga sljedeća promišljanja ne trebaju stajati direktno pod geslom »demokracija i obrazovanje«, već imaju za zadaću razjasniti pitanje »obrazovanja u uvjetima demokracije«. U tu će svrhu Bolonjski proces ponajprije biti prikazan kao izričaj dominantnog razumijevanja obrazovanja u Njemačkoj odnosno Europi. Nakon okretanja ka humboldtovskom pojmu obrazovanja kao izrazu ideala, nekoć karakterističnog za široka područja školskog i univerzitetskog obrazovanja (...) u Njemačkoj, daljnji povijesni korak unazad trebao bi dovesti do platonskog pojma obrazovanja – kao izraza onog humanizma koji je u 19. stoljeću Humboldt postavio kao mjerilo vlastite školske i univerzitetske reforme. Na kraju, u kratkom rezimeu, povijesni početak i povijesni kraj bivaju usporedno suprotstavljeni. (shrink)

Fenomenološka tradicija dugo je smatrala da prirodna percepcija nije ni konceptualno artikulirana niti upravljana determinističkim zakonima, već je radije organizirana prema praktično artikuliranoj strukturi tjelesnog bitka-u-svijetu. Ali to ostavlja problem objašnjavanja kako percepcija može omogućiti opravdavajuću podršku mišljenju. Odgovor fenomenologa jest taj da nam značenjska struktura prirodne percepcije omogućuje da mislimo o objektima motivirajući pojedinačne misli o objektima kakvima se oni predstavljaju u percepciji. Pokazujem kako takvo gledište omogućuje izlaz iz briga koje more suvremenu filozofiju uma.The phenomenological tradition has long (...) contended that natural perception is neither conceptually articulatednor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized according to the practically articulatedstructure of bodily being-in-the-world. But this leaves the problem of explaining how perceptioncan provide justificatory support to thought. The phenomenologists’ answer is to say thatthe meaningful structure of natural perception makes it possible for us tothink about objects by motivating particular thoughts about the objects as they present themselvesin perception. I show how this view provides a way out of worries that plague contemporary philosophyof mind. (shrink)

According to a widely held view of assertion and belief, they are each governed by a tacitly acknowledged epistemic norm, and the norm on assertion and norm on belief are so related that believing p is epistemically permissible only if asserting it is. I call it the Same Norm View. A very common type of utterance raises a puzzle for this view, viz. utterances in which we say ‘I believe p' to convey somehow guarded affirmation of the proposition that p. (...) For example, one might respond to a query for directions to the station by saying ‘I believe it is down the first street on your left.' Often, when we reply in this way, it would have been pragmatically preferable simply to assert that p, had we been epistemically warranted in doing so. One's guarded reply thus suggests one is not so warranted. Nevertheless, if one believes what one, at face value, says one believes, one believes p. Contrary to what might seem to be suggested by the Same Norm View, one does not seem to portray oneself as irrational or epistemically beyond the pale in replying in this way. The paper develops this puzzle in detail, and examines a variety of options for a resolving it consistently with the Same Norm view. The most promising of these options, I argue, is to see ‘I believe' guarded affirmations as a form merely approximately correct speech. They would, though, be a form of such speech that interestingly differs from paradigm cases of loose use or conventional hyperbole in that speakers would be comparatively unaware of engaging in approximation. I conclude ‘I believe’—guarded affirmations either show the Same Norm View to be false or must be recognised as such an interestingly distinctive form of merely approximately correct speech. (shrink)

Ovaj tekst ima za svoj cilj teoretski uvod u rad dvoje postmarksističkih teoretičara politike, Ernesta Laclaua i Chantal Mouffe. Fokus je na njihovu zajedničkom radu Hegemonija i socijalistička strategija, pomoću čije se teze o temeljnoj »nemogućnosti društva« stvaraju epistemološke mogućnosti za lakanovsko promišljanje pojmova ideologije, kao i samog pojma ‘Političkog’ ili pojma i definicije ‘Društva’. Autori pokušavaju kroz koncept hegemonije Antonia Gramscija definirati ključno polje za konstrukciju političke zajednice. Njihova se teorija tako stavlja u kontekst i psihoanalitičkog diskursa, no i (...) diskursa koji je u društvenim znanostima poznat pod nazivom »društveni konstruktivizam«.This paper has for it’s purpose theoretical introduction into the work of two postmarxist theoreticians of politics, Ernesto Lacalau and Chantal Mouffe. We will focus on their collaboratory work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, whose theses about the basic “impossibility of society” creates the foundations for the possibility of Lacanian theorizing of ideology, as well the notion of ‘Politics’, or the very notion of ‘Society’. Using Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, authors try to define the key field for the construction of political community. Their theory is contextualized as a psychoanalitical discourse, as well as discourse known in social sciences by the name of “social constructionism”. (shrink)

OnN the essentials of Mimamsa philosophy; includes Hindi commentary.

Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the (...) notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self. (shrink)