Agresja putinowskiej Rosji na Ukrainę postawiła wobec dramatycznego wyzwania nobliwą doktrynę non‑violence. Zgodnie ze sformułowanym w latach 80. XX wieku wywodem antysowieckiego dysydenta rosyjskiego Władimira Bukowskiego to nie wojna jest przeciwieństwem pokoju, lecz przemoc, a do jej powstrzymania niekiedy konieczny jest zbrojny opór, czyli prowadzenie wojny. Według Clausewitza do wywołania stanu wojny nie wystarczy militarna agresja, lecz konieczne jest przeciwstawienie się jej, czyli aktywna obrona ze strony napadniętego, chcąc zatem uniknąć wojny, nie należy stawiać oporu agresorowi. Agresja na Ukrainę złamała (...) dwie zasady prowadzenia wojen: ius ad bellum i ius in bello. Według typologii Michaela Walzera jest to zatem niesprawiedliwa wojna prowadzona niesprawiedliwymi metodami, więc przeciwstawianie się jej, także militarne, jest prowadzeniem wojny sprawiedliwej. Zgodnie z analizą Slavoja Žižka tworzy to klarowną z etycznego punktu widzenia sytuację, zło jest łatwo identyfikowalne, a przeciwstawienie się mu stanowi etyczny obowiązek. Według filozofa Étienne’a Balibara w tej sytuacji pacyfizm nie jest żadną opcją. Helplessness as Acquiescence to Evil The aggression of Putin’s Russia towards Ukraine has posed a dramatic challenge to the noble doctrine of non-violence. In line with an argument made in the 1980s by anti-Soviet Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, war is not the opposite of peace; instead, violence is. Armed resistance, or warfare, is sometimes necessary to stop violence. According to Clausewitz, military aggression is insufficient to evoke a state of war; in its place, it is necessary to oppose aggression, i.e., actively mount a defense by the attacked party, thereby avoiding war requires not resisting the aggressor. However, the aggression against Ukraine broke two tenets of warfare: ius ad bellum and ius in bello. According to Michael Walzer’s typology, it is an unjust war waged by unjust methods, so resisting it, including militarily, amounts to waging a just war. According to Slavoj Žižek’s analysis, this establishes an ethically clear situation: evil is easily identifiable, and opposing it is an ethical duty. According to the philosopher Étienne Balibar, pacifism is not an option in such a situation. (shrink)

Liberalism and political polarization: The customary classification of the ideological doctri‑ nes in democratic systems, which expanded along a left–right axis, is nowadays obsolescent and has been deconstructed. At the same time, the close and strong connection between de‑ mocracy and liberalism, on which the primary model of liberal democracy was established, has been broken in many places of the world. The emerging of illiberal democracies has made the liberal component the main criterion for the classification of contemporary political systems, (...) instead of dividing them into democratic and nondemocratic systems as before. Numerous ideological options could also be classified as being contrary to the liberal one. Liberalism has thus become important in the typologies and analyses of contemporary political systems and ideological options as the opposite to those systems on many new axes. (shrink)

The power of philosophy, philosophy of power: Selfless search for truth does not only make sense of philosophy and science, but also involves participating in a competition between rival theories and hypotheses. Truth is not an ultimate criterion in this process, especially after Michel Foucault revealed its inclinations towards violence. Questioning the position of truth opens the door to different criteria, among them — power. Using the argument of power in philosophical disputes and scientific controversies has a long tradition and (...) nowadays with the unprecedented development of technology it has been offered new tools. (shrink)