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  1. A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Leplin attempts to reinstate the common sense idea that theoretical knowledge is achievable, indeed that its achievement is part of the means to progress in empirical knowledge. He sketches the genesis of the skeptical position, then introduces his argument for Minimalist Scientific Realism -- the requirement that novel predicitons be explained, and the claim that only realism about scientific theories can explain the importance of novel prediction.
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  2.  11
    Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science.Jarrett Leplin - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):314-315.
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  3.  35
    Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination.Larry Laudan & Jarrett Leplin - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):449.
  4. Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination.Larry Laudan & Jarrett Leplin - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):449-472.
  5. Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research.Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra - 1986 - Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.
  6.  19
    Studies in Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin & Andre Kukla - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):109.
    Why be a scientific realist? The predominant motivation is explanationist: we need realism to understand the successfulness of science. Why be an antirealist? The predominant motivation is skeptical: theory systematically exceeds the reach of empirical warrant. Antirealists deny that explanatory power is evidential; realists deny that the reach of empirical warrant summarily terminates at the boundary of the observable. But these counterarguments are mere protection of philosophical stances to which the adversaries independently incline.
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  7.  90
    A Theory of Epistemic Justification.Jarrett Leplin - 2009 - Springer.
    This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief.
  8.  14
    Is Science Progressive?Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Noûs 22 (2):316-321.
  9. The Underdetermination of Total Theories.Jarrett Leplin - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (2):203-215.
    This paper criticizes the attempt to found the epistemological doctrine that all theories are evidentially underdetermined on the thesis that all theories have empirically equivalent rivals. The criticisms focus on the role of auxiliary hypotheses in prediction. It is argued, in particular, that if auxiliaries are underdetermined, then the thesis of empirical equivalence is undecidable. The inference from empirical equivalence to the underdetermination of total theories would seem to survive the criticisms, because total theories do not require auxiliaries to yield (...)
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  10.  82
    The Concept of an "Ad Hoc" Hypothesis.Jarrett Leplin - 1975 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 5 (4):309.
  11.  6
    Is Science Progressive?Jarrett Leplin - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (4):646-648.
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  12. Studies in Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):109-112.
    Why be a scientific realist? The predominant motivation is explanationist: we need realism to understand the successfulness of science. Why be an antirealist? The predominant motivation is skeptical: theory systematically exceeds the reach of empirical warrant. Antirealists deny that explanatory power is evidential; realists deny that the reach of empirical warrant summarily terminates at the boundary of the observable. But these counterarguments are mere protection of philosophical stances to which the adversaries independently incline.
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  13.  47
    Surrealism.Jarrett Leplin - 1987 - Mind 96 (384):519-524.
  14.  98
    In Defense of Reliabilism.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.
    Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions. The reliability property does not appear closed under truth-preserving inference, whereas closure principles have strong intuitive appeal. And epistemic paradoxes, like the preface and the lottery, seem unavoidable if knowledge or justification depends on the frequency with (...)
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  15. The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.Jarrett Leplin - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):235-249.
  16.  50
    Truth and Scientific Progress.Jarrett Leplin - 1981 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (4):269.
  17. Renormalizing Epistemology.Jarrett Leplin - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):20-33.
    The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted.
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  18.  56
    Determination Underdeterred: Reply to Kukla.Jarrett Leplin & Larry Laudan - 1993 - Analysis 53 (1):8 - 16.
  19.  80
    Reference and Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 1979 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (4):265.
  20. The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven.Jarrett Leplin - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):376-380.
    Pursuant to criticism, this paper revisits the relation between the theses of empirical equivalence and evidential underdetermination. I argue against some antirealist strategies for fixing the empirical commitments of underdetermined theories.
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  21.  25
    Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality.Jarrett Leplin - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):31-51.
    In response to recent recognition of the complexities of scientific change, discussion of the objectivity and the rationality of science has focused on criteria of theory choice. This paper addresses instead the rationality of scientific decisions at the level of ongoing research. It argues that whether or not a realist view of theories is compatible with the historical discontinuities of scientific change, certain realist assumptions are crucial to the rationality of research. The researcher must presume that questions about the existence (...)
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  22.  92
    Is Essentialism Unscientific?Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):493-510.
    This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is fixed. The resources of the Causal Theory of Reference and of the traditional cluster or (...)
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  23. Meaning Variance and the Comparability of Theories.Jarrett Leplin - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):69-75.
  24.  39
    The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusion. Philip Kitcher. [REVIEW]Jarrett Leplin - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):666-671.
  25.  38
    Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Ian Hacking.Jarrett Leplin - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):314-315.
  26.  51
    Explaining Science's Success: Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Works by John Wright.Jarrett Leplin - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):184-185.
  27.  17
    The Bearing of Discovery on Justification.Jarrett Leplin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):805 - 814.
    The point of the traditional distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification is to insist on the normative character of epistemology. The point is not to dismiss from epistemology merely the genesis of ideas; into the context of discovery go also descriptions of evaluative practices and decisions. However ideas are created, scrutinized, and judged, it is only the approbation to which they are entitled, accorded or not, that allegedly matters to epistemology. The criticism, familiar since N.R. Hanson's Patterns of (...)
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  28. The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):738 - 740.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 738-740, December 2011.
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  29.  32
    Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. Larry Laudan.Jarrett Leplin - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):713-714.
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  30.  26
    Book Review:Is Science Progressive? Ilkka Niiniluoto.Jarrett Leplin - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (4):646-648.
  31.  43
    Enlisting Popper in the Case for Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophia Scientiae 11 (1):71-97.
    Karl Popper was a scientific realist in spite of himself. In defiance of his own restrictions on acceptable forms of scientific reasoning and the reach of empirical evidence, he insisted on a strongly realist conception of the goals and achievements of science. In this article I mount a general defense of scientific realism, taking advantage, as I proceed, of those Popperian positions that advance the argument, and criticizing those that impede it. While the overall line of argumentation is my own, (...)
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  32.  15
    Realism and Methodological Change.Jarrett Leplin - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:435 - 445.
    Some recent theories in theoretical physics are not subject to epistemic evaluation by empiricist standards of evidential warrant. The advantage of these theories is not pragmatic but explanationist; they fail to yield testable consequences that distinguish them from earlier theories. But this is essentially a technological limitation, rather than a theoretical defect. There is an explanation, itself confirmed by empiricist standards, of the unconfirmability of these theories. This paper considers what epistemic stance is proper in this situation, and explores the (...)
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  33.  78
    Theoretical Identification and the Mind-Body Problem.Jarrett Leplin - 1979 - Philosophia 8 (4):673-88.
  34.  23
    Reply to Professor Cross.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):99-101.
  35.  4
    The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven.Jarrett Leplin - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):376-380.
  36.  29
    Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology.Jarrett Leplin - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (4):476-490.
    Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxiliary assumptions are necessary for the derivation of evidential propositions from hypotheses is examined. (...)
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  37.  15
    Synchronisation Rules and Transitivity.Jarrett Leplin - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):399-402.
  38.  19
    The Historical Objection to Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:88 - 97.
    A realist interpretation of successful science is defended against a historical induction to the ultimate failure of current science from the failure of theories which once excelled by current standards. The defense requires (1) restrictions on the forms of success which realism, by its own lights, must explain, (2) referential stability through theory changes where the rejected theory achieves such success, and (3) degrees of truth for scientific statements.
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  39.  35
    Reply to Christensen.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):51 - 52.
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  40.  9
    Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Reality by Ernan McMullin. [REVIEW]Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Isis 79:691-692.
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  41.  9
    With Commentary.Jarrett Leplin - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (2):169.
  42.  6
    Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific RealityErnan McMullin.Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Isis 79 (4):691-692.
  43.  7
    Testing Scientific Theories by John Earman. [REVIEW]Jarrett Leplin - 1984 - Isis 75:723-724.
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  44.  4
    Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences by Rom Harré. [REVIEW]Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Isis 79:309-310.
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  45.  7
    The Role of Experiment in Theory Construction.Jarrett Leplin - 1987 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2 (1):72 – 83.
  46.  3
    Enlisting Popper in the Case for Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophia Scientae 11:71-97.
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  47.  2
    Testing Scientific Theories. John Earman.Jarrett Leplin - 1984 - Isis 75 (4):723-724.
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  48.  2
    Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences. Rom Harré.Jarrett Leplin - 1988 - Isis 79 (2):309-310.
  49.  2
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Jarrett Leplin - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):575-577.
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  50. Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin (ed.) - 2021 - University of California Press.
    This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1984.
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