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Jason D. Runyan
Indiana Wesleyan University
  1.  93
    Agent-Causal Libertarianism, Statistical Neural Laws and Wild Coincidences.Jason D. Runyan - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4563-4580.
    Agent-causal libertarians maintain we are irreducible agents who, by acting, settle matters that aren’t already settled. This implies that the neural matters underlying the exercise of our agency don’t conform to deterministic laws, but it does not appear to exclude the possibility that they conform to statistical laws. However, Pereboom (Noûs 29:21–45, 1995; Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; in: Nadelhoffer (ed) The future of punishment, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013) has argued that, if these neural (...)
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  2.  33
    Using Experience Sampling to Examine Links Between Compassion, Eudaimonia, and Prosocial Behavior.Jason D. Runyan, Brian N. Fry, Timothy A. Steenbergh, Nathan L. Arbuckle, Kristen Dunbar & Erin E. Devers - forthcoming - Journal of Personality.
    Objective: Compassion has been associated with eudaimonia and prosocial behavior, and has been regarded as a virtue, both historically and cross-culturally. However, the psychological study of compassion has been limited to laboratory settings and/or standard survey assessments. Here, we use an experience sampling method (ESM) to compare naturalistic assessments of compassion with standard assessments, and to examine compassion, its variability, and associations with eudaimonia and prosocial behavior. -/- Methods: Participants took a survey which included standard assessments of compassion and eudaimonia. (...)
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  3. Events, Agents, and Settling Whether and How One Intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.
    Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent’s settling of whether certain states-of-affairs obtain on a particular occasion can be reduced to the causing of events by certain mental events or states, such as certain desires, beliefs and/or intentions. Agent-causal libertarians disagree. A common critique against event-causal libertarian accounts is that the agent’s role of settling matters is left unfilled and the agent “disappears” from such accounts—a problem known as the disappearing agent problem. Recently, Franklin has argued that an “enriched” event-causal account (...)
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  4. Virtues, Ecological Momentary Assessment/Intervention and Smartphone Technology.Jason D. Runyan & Ellen Steinke - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology:1-24.
    Virtues, broadly understood as stable and robust dispositions for certain responses across morally relevant situations, have been a growing topic of interest in psychology. A central topic of discussion has been whether studies showing that situations can strongly influence our responses provide evidence against the existence of virtues (as a kind of stable and robust disposition). In this review, we examine reasons for thinking that the prevailing methods for examining situational influences are limited in their ability to test dispositional stability (...)
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    Editorial: Inner Experiences: Theory, Measurement, Frequency, Content, and Functions.Alain Morin, Jason D. Runyan & Thomas M. Brinthaupt - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  6.  9
    Teaching Empathic Concern and Altruism in the Smartphone Age.Brian N. Fry & Jason D. Runyan - 2018 - Journal of Moral Education 47 (1):1-16.
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  7.  61
    Human Agency and Neural Causes.Jason D. Runyan - 2013 - Palgrave-Macmillan.