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Jason Konek
University of Bristol
  1.  63
    Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
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  2.  43
    Believing Probabilistic Contents: On the Expressive Power and Coherence of Sets of Sets of Probabilities.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Jason Konek - forthcoming - Analysis Reviews.
    Moss (2018) argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in various propositions but as having beliefs in probabilistic contents, or probabilistic beliefs. Probabilistic contents are sets of probability functions. Probabilistic belief states, in turn, are modeled by sets of probabilistic contents, or sets of sets of probability functions. We argue that this Mossean framework is of considerable interest quite independently of its role in Moss’ account of probabilistic knowledge or her semantics for epistemic (...)
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  3.  67
    The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.
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  4.  25
    IP Scoring Rules: Foundations and Applications.Jason Konek - 2019 - Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 103:256-264.
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  5. Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account of epistemic value to delineate a class of reasonable epistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure of epistemic value or utility, then a popular family of decision rules (...)
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  6.  76
    Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability.Jason Konek - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (4):509-587.
    Sarah Moss argues that degrees of belief, or credences, can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This essay explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constituting credences, or "probabilistic knowledge." Whatever else it takes for an agent's credences to amount to knowledge, their success, or accuracy, must be the product of _cognitive ability_ or _skill_. The brand of Bayesianism developed here helps ensure this ability condition is (...)
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  7. The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Ben Levinstein - manuscript
    According to accuracy-first epistemology, accuracy is the fundamental epistemic good. Epistemic norms — Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, etc. — have their binding force in virtue of helping to secure this good. To make this idea precise, accuracy-firsters invoke Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT) to determine which epistemic policies are the best means toward the end of accuracy. Hilary Greaves and others have recently challenged the tenability of this programme. Their arguments purport to show that EpDT encourages obviously epistemically irrational behavior. (...)
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  8. The Art of Learning.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7.
    Confirmational holism is at odds with Jeffrey conditioning --- the orthodox Bayesian policy for accommodating uncertain learning experiences. Two of the great insights of holist epistemology are that the effects of experience ought to be mediated by one's background beliefs, and the support provided by one's learning experience can and often is undercut by subsequent learning. Jeffrey conditioning fails to vindicate either of these insights. My aim is to describe and defend a new updating policy that does better. In addition (...)
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  9. Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability.Jason Konek - manuscript
    Moss (2013) argues that partial beliefs, or credences can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This paper explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such ‘probabilistic knowledge’. Whatever else it takes for an agent’s credences to amount to knowledge, their success, or accuracy must be the product of cognitive ability or skill. The brand of Bayesianism developed here helps ensure this ability condition is satisfied. Cognitive ability, in (...)
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  10.  94
    Review of Isaac Levi's "Pragmatism and Inquiry".Jason Konek - forthcoming - Mind.
    The twin pillars of Levi’s epistemology are his infallibilism and his corrigibilism. According to infallibilism, any agent is committed to being absolutely certain about anything she fully believes. From her own perspective, there is no serious possibility that any proposition she believes is false. She takes her own beliefs to be infallible, in this sense. But this need not make her dogmatic, on Levi’s view. According to his corrigibilism, an agent might come to have good reason to change her beliefs (...)
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